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PREFACE

The purpose of this book of readings is to serve as a major guide and resource
for all who study and implement moral education and values clarification. It is more
than a usual facts and principles text with the expression of a single author's beliefs
or point of view. It is a collection of opinions and theories that reflect various
trends of thought concerning moral education and values clarificatio.n.
The authors have
attempted to provide points of view.
The readers are free to judge and draw their own
conclusions on moral education utilizing the readings as a guide.
Many values clarification lessons are being published.
These may take the form
of strategy books to elaborate kits. As materials prolificate, more and more teachers
will gain access.
In one sense this overabundance of materials can serve a useful pur
pose. However, the editors are concerned that well-meaning teachers and administrators
may do as much harm as good unless there is first some degree of comprehension of an
approach to values analysis and moral education.
It is the writers' contentions that moral education and values clarification is
not just another bandwagon. As educators we have a responsibility to keep abreast of
current curriculum trends; today, we must know something about behavioral objectives,
gaming and simulation, interaction analysis, role playing, inquiry, concepts, generaliza
tions, and reflection. We should also know something of the theoretical constructs of
values clarification and moral education.
We would maintain that moral education and values clarification are going to be
come much more important in all areas of the curriculum. As such these concepts have
existed for several years. Perhaps John Dewey's writings in the 1890's did much to
awaken the present generation to the need. During the past several years such writers as
Hunt and Metcalf, Jewett, Simon, Kohlberg and Piaget, have contributed much to curriculum
development. It is our contention that moral education and values analysis ought to be
of central concern to the curriculum. Values education is the most important kind of
education.
Nationwide we are witness to a growing trend of training educators in the skills
of moral education. Many education method courses are beginning to deal with this com
plex issue. Many special workshops are being offered. Thus a need exists to provide a
background for this new curriculum area.
This book is one such attempt at filling this
vacuum.
Ronald G. Helms
Gerald Strong
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DO WE NEED M'.)RAL EDUCATION?
by
Ronald G. Helms

(Reprinted by permission from the Ohio Council for the Social Studies Review, Spring,
1974.)
Today we often hear that people are behaving as they do because of a breakdown
in moral values. Some people assume that a lack of religious upbringing is central to
the plight of our misguided society. Others reason that our value crisis stems from
future shock, erosion of family life, cosmopolitan effects of mass media, revolution in
science and technology, and the complexity of ecological problems.
While we are not certain about all the causes of increasing violence, drug use,
and sexual promiscuity in contemporary American society, we are advised by leaders in the
field of moral education that many people are beset with moral confusion. We are advised
that many people, young and old, are unaware of their moral responsibilities to them
selves and to other people.
But how did we reach this state of moral confusion? Let us review some histor
ical origins of traditional value systems and see how the systems have broken down.
Throughout most of history the direction of cultural development was often de
termined by military power, by a church-state authoritarianism, or by some other type of
entrenched body which defined institutions and interpreted the value system. The indi
vidualization, industrialization, and increasing population of the twentieth century have
tended to diversify culture as well as value systems.
In the past Americans were largely concerned with the inculcation of the puritan
ethic. In the past we accepted the dual tenets that "fear is the mother of morality" and
that "morali1:y is the rationalization of self-interest". In contrast, today we are at
tempting to e,liminate fear from the life of the child; today we often insist that moral
ity should not be limited to self-interest.
In a time in which morals were viewed as God-given, immutable, and absolute, the
morality of children and adults could be assumed to be synonymous. In the past we were
in relative agreement as to the content of these absolute morals, and the institutions
of home, church, and school were much in agreement in the task of transmitting the cul
ture values to the youth. Today we find that, although these institutions are still very
much concerned with teaching morality, the teachings have become more pluralistic. Each
institution inculcates in children values which may be widely divergent from the values
instilled by other institutions. This diversity in values training has resulted in a
peoples harried by confusion and anomie.
Thus, we have eliminated the absolute aspect of morality, the three institutions
are no longer in complete concurrence, and we have eliminated fear as the basis of mor
ality. Yet, our society need not remain in this state of uncertainty.
Although this moral dilemma readily evidences negative implications for society,
there exist positive implications as well. For example, people may be forced to reflect
upon moral issues and thus discover and admit limitations in their own moral reasoning.
After a number of peoples begin to realize that their framework of values is indeed un
steady, it is hoped that a portion of these will determine that the value system should
be bolstered.

Since we often look to youth for flexibility and to educators for guidance, per
haps a logical approach to a stable, rational system of morals is the development of moral
education within the existing school curriculum. Educators must face this situation and
accept their responsibility for providing a method of early moral development.
We should at the outset distinguish between moral education and moralistic edu
cation. M:>ralistic education refers to past and ongoing practices of instilling, incul
cating, and indoctrinating a common set of values within children. M:Jral education as
we will use the term refers to a process of state -to -stage development-a continual pro
cess which is learned rather than reached automatically. Moralistic education is based
upon absolute answers and thus may involve passive acceptance; whereas the process of
moral education can be stimulated and enriched by presenting children with moral dilem
mas. Theoretically, through the latter process, the child can be assisted toward more
mature moral reasoning and a better resolution of moral problems.
In times past the traditional school curriculum utilized fables and similar mor
alistic "lessons" to inculcate "right" conduct. The child was trained to recite righ
teous precepts in the belief that recitation would lead to practice.
The school, church,
and family utilized sermonizing as a method of instilling morality. Although this mor
alization did seem to work, we might ask, was the instilling practice itself moral?
l\bralization might seem to guarantee a standard of behavior, but is standardization moral?
As some people recognize that moralistic education may indeed have a constraining
effect upon the spirit of the individual, they propose that the school system abandon all
training dealing with morals.
J-k>wever, we must recognize that so long as educators main
tain that their role is one of guidance and leadership, valueless teaching will not be
possible and therefore a morality-free school cannot exist.
If we conclude that values will permeate the curriculum, then surely values edu
cation should be based upon the twin concepts of individual moral autonomy and justice.
The overriding goal of moral education is that each person will be able to inde
pendently define his own value structure. Moral educators would agree that this is the
most important function of the curriculum. The new morality would emphasize the estab
lishment of a system of justice which would promote the well-being of the person as an
individual.
This :;;tress on independence and autonomy should not be a focal point of confu
sion. We are not advocating the removal of fear in order to substitute the pleasure
principle. While we would not advance a codification of values, we would agree that a
new "planless code" or a libertine situation would not be any more beneficial.
It is not standardization which we seek, but justice. People must be able to,
in their own r rame of reference, differentiate between their values.
Teachers must be
prepared to recognize that children come to school with different focal points in regard
to moral development. And so, in twelve years of schooling even in a traditional cur
riculum they will not graduate at the same level. Of course, teachers will also be
at varying levels of moral development.
Justice, the second of our twin concepts in values education, has in the past
been derived from arbitrary authority.
Individuals have either been unwilling to define justice for themselves or else
they have not been equipped to do so. For definition we have in the past turned to au
thority, to models , to special revelation, to faith, or to parental dictate rather than
to rely upon our own moral reasoning. Teachers today must function to give students al
ternatives to the above ready references. Before educators can presume to institute a
curriculum centering upon the concept of justice, we must recognize that justice cannot
be taught in an unjust school. As educators we need to recognize the injustices of our
system. The school is most certainly a legal institution; however, a legal system is
not always a moral system. Our only claim to moral superiority is through our commit
ment to justice.
For the complicated task of assisting students in moral development, there must
be some framework of approach. A school cannot hope to teach about values or morals sim
ply by offering one elective in the senior year; the curriculum K-12 must reflect a com
mitment to moral development. Moral education must be integrated with reflection, in
quiry, and citizenship skills.
Teachers must develop additional cognitive skills. Ad
ministrators will need to value the systematic research efforts of scholars in the field.
Finally, schools as social institutions must serve as microcosmic models of a just so
ciety.
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THE AIMS OF IDRAL EDUCATION
by
Edward L. Ericson

(Reprinted by permission from The Humanist, November-December, 1972, pp. 6-7.)

Character development--to paraphrase George Bernard Shaw--is too precious to be
wasted on children. At least i t is arguable that while moral growth is vital to the
developing child, moral education must be viewed as a life-long engagement.
Far from minimizing the importance of childhood education, this perspective re
quires us to heed the lament of young people that we have robbed them of a future.
To
the extent that their complaint is justified, i t is so because we have sentimentalized
about childhood and youth without regard to the quality of the adult life which is its
culmination.
Until our culture can again provide a reasonable basis for a sense of expectancy
-for the fulfillment of long-term personal goals in a meaningful social process-those
entering adulthood will be trapped in a cul-de-sac that mocks the promise of youth. Thus
moral education has as its task the continuing self-realization of human beings from in
fancy to matu :ci ty.
The inability to instill such a morale for meaningful living is the
mark of a dehumanized social structure that dangerously ignores the requisites for its
own survival.
Tested against this requirement, contemporary society proves to be an astonish
ing contradiction.
The spirit of the age has released what is often called a revolution
of rising expectations. Progress and the pursuit of happiness are our daily watchwords.
Yet everywhere hope for the future is buried under a landslide of cynicism and despair,
with increasing numbers of people seeming to design their lives-if they bother to shape
them at all-on the assumption that lasting values are out of reach and the great common
purposes of community and culture must fail. A social attitude that creates such oppo
site response:; is necessarily at war with itself, and likewise, the average person who
assimilates this social contradiction is condemned to a continuing conflict within his
own soul.
Every culture or belief system must provide the moral resources men and women
need to face the manifold pressures and traumas that otherwise overwhelm and fragment
human life.
The clue to the nature of this inner fortification is contained in the word
"morale" itself-one of the "good" words of our language, suggesting confidence and sense
of direction. High morale turns danger into challenge, doubt into determination. We
often seem to regard good morale as a state of grace, a spontaneous "happening" received
from the gods , which we accept gladly without analyzing or understanding. But goodmorale
does not just happen.
It is spontaneous in the sense that its attainment is largely un
conscious, in that it cannot be forced or contrived, yet intelligent behavior can do much
to bring abou 1; the conditions for its attainment.
We should note that while the word "morale" is used approvingly, we respond in
quite the opposite manner to the implications of the concept when these are made explicit.
"M:>rale" is only a variant of "moral," but what different connotations the two words
have I Morali ·cy is commonly avoided as a distasteful subject-necessary, perhaps, but to
be mentioned ,,s little as possible.
In the current idiom, i t "turns people off." Moral
backlash, following centuries of puritanical repression and authoritarian religion
usually associated with sexual guilt-has produced a mood in which morality is scorned;
and faith of ,my kind, including faith in the meaning and value of life itself, is sus
pect.
Is it any wonder, therefore, that our culture is undergoing a crisis of confidence
and purpose that few escape? Our morale collapses because we do not know our aims.
The morale of a people or civilization is nothing other than the force and clarity
of their moral will. Why, then, have we allowed a gap to open between the high morale
that we require to survive and the moral awareness that necessarily provides its sub
stance? Why, if not because of the unfortunate identification of morality with repres
sion and irrational guilt-the severance of human passion from meaningful insights and
socially significant goals? A different ethic, a morale of human realization, is thus
blocked by a repressive moralism that millions still struggle to overcome. Even the ex
aggerated rebellion against moral standards that dominates the current scene is an ex
pression of puritanic obsessions. The turning point in our social development will come
w~en a significant number of people recognize that a humanistic society cannot represent
simply a negative escape from dishonored and discredited moralities. We require a new
ethic of personal and social transformation, a deliverance from 40 years of wanderings
3

in the desert of social amnesia.
It is a commonplace that of all the animal species only man is a problem to him
self. He is a problem because he must use his intelligence and sensitivity to choose
among the seemingly countless possibilities that are open to him. Even his choices are
not limited to a finite number of simple, clearly marked options, but are of a higher
and more difficult order.
On the one hand we seem to be free to choose from life as we wish, yet we dis
cover that every choice commits us to a social and historical judgment. We are free to
make choices, but bound by the consequences of our choices-and we are not free to ignore
the ways in which our choices bear upon the lives of others.
Thus, the very exercise of
freedom generates responsibility. Freedom and obligation are the yin and yang of our
existences, each leading to the other and finding completion in the other.
The moral life is therefore not a repression or denial of our freedom as human
beings; it is rather a confirmation, a validation, of a dimension that is distinctively,
invaluably human. It is an enabling trait that equips us to become human. The crisis of
morale will be within reach of solution only when an appreciable number of men and wanen
take primary responsibility for the sanity and direction of their lives in the midst of
the lives of others. For without the human context, the plan-the morale of the indivi
dual life-has no place to go, no significant aim to achieve; and the crystalized sense
of meaning is dissolved again into a murk of uselessness and drift.
This is the condi
tion of many people today, a mood so prevalent that it has become the defining charac
teristic of the times.
The moral decision is always the determination to be personally responsible, to
find self-realization in the creative act of moral engagement. But the fulfillment of
that decision obligates one to create community and trust, to weave into the meaning of
life the web of other lives and experiences.
Modern man, this solitary creature who is a problem to himself, lives under an
emotional and spiritual imperative which can be reduced to the obligation to become wise,
to grow through self-awareness and social intelligence to wisdom. Yet, despite all the
achievements and special skills of our technological age, we have probably neglectedmore
than most other ages the meaning and disciplines of wisdom.
Psychoanalysis and other
psychotherapies have dealt with the wisdom of life from their own particular concerns and
vantage points, too often ignoring the larger issues of a humanistic culture. But des
pite lip service to the humanities, very little exists in the way of a genuinely human
istic education. What is required is a new conception of moral preparation for life - a
"morale-making" mastery of living. This is wisdan and that is what a humanistic morality
must provide.

To the argument that wisdom and moral maturity cannot be taught, I would answer
that their development cannot be left to chance. No form of behavior can be taught until
there is readiness and responsiveness in the learner. In one sense, not even language
can be taught. Noam Chomsky and other linguists have recently demonstrated that there is
a universal logic imbedded in the human use of language - a logic that seems to be in
herent in the structure of human intelligence regardless of the particular language under
consideration. The young child does not simply imitate the speech he learns from adults.
All children everywhere impose their own logical forms in the process of mastering speech.
But the child who never hears speech will not develop a language by himself. He must be
saturated with speech before his inherent capacity for speech can be actualized.
And so it is with the process of moral development.
Research in this field, espe
cially the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, reveals a similar underlying logic, the same un
folding of a human potentiality, with constants and commonalities observable across cul
tural boundaries, thereby setting limits to that cultural relativism so grossly over
stated by an ,~arlier generation of sociologists and anthropologists.
In learning a language, or in acquiring the social intelligence and insight we
identify as moral, the initiative must be original; the "decision" must have its genesis
in the act of the first person singular. But in both achievements, speaking a tongue or
behaving humanely and wisely, the individual must be immersed in the preparatory influ
ences of human beings who know and share his awakening vision - whose insight springs
from a common passion, a common ambition for the happiness and security of our species on
this planet.
Contemporary education and the behavioral sciences provide no systematic practice
for the application of ethical knowledge to the design of personal lives, or to the de
sign of personal lives, or to the design of communities of people, as we shape our per
sonal or vocational goals.
4

In contrast, there are many forms of psychotherapy for the psychiatrically dis
turbed. What skilled counsel is there for the increasing millions whose problem is not
psychiatric, but rather a problem of finding meaning in an age that has made the loss of
purpose a veritable life-style? A theoretical ethics is not enough. Given our present
moral knowledge and human needs, a new discipline of Life Values Education, and partic
ularly of Life Values guidance and counseling, is both a possibility and a necessity.
It is this human and social need which I believe humanistic ethicists must be prepared to
serve. Life Values Education would enable people to examine more critically and expertly
the logic of their aimless or drifting lives. They would be enabled to see more clearly
what must be abandoned in their life plans, if they are to realize their deeper values
and more humanizing goals.
The same examination must extend to our social morality and to the questionable
assumptions upon which our industrial and commercial systems operate - assumptions that
have been newly exposed by the rebellion of youth and the necessity of living within the
limits of our human and natural environments.
We need, therefore, to develop a disciplined "value analysis" - or (to coin a
term using the Greek prefix for value) an "axio-analysis" - of the ways we live and the
values, including the low and false values which our existing social, psychological and
economic patterns tend to impose.
I do not believe, as many do, that our economic and
social systems are impervious to change. Certainly we have no right to abandon the task
of modifying the system to serve human need, when we have hardly begun to develop the
sciences that could apply that we have already learned about how human beings acquire
values and structure their personal and social goals. These are the practical arts that
can help the recovery of morale and social vision.
Certainly a meaningful life-style is not reached by immersing ourselves in drugs,
devoting our lives to the acquisition of more material wealth than we actually need, nur
sing the racia.l and ethnic prejudices that fragment human life, retreating behind locked
doors while our cities decay and our culture degenerates, or waiting for the bomb to fall
or revolutionaries to strike. These are the ways to ruin.
Even :Lf our civilization should escape destruction, millions of people, by sur
rendering themselves to moral drift and purposeless existences, would see their lives
withered and their hopes voided. None of this need be. Enough is known already about
the requirements for human strength and growth for us to construct an applied science of
Life Values Education and guidance. The present crisis in ecology, economy, race rela
tions, and national goals should teach us that the victories and accomplishments of the
next half-century must be radically different from the last; they must be accomplish
ments of the human spirit, fired by a passionate attachment to the future of our one
human race hei:e on earth.

IBEORIES OF J\ORALS

by
John Dewey
(Reprinted by permission from Democracy and Education, MacMillan and Company, New York,
New York, 1916, pp. 402-418.)

1.
The Inner and the Outer. - Since morality is concerned with conduct, any
dualisms which are set up between mind and activity must reflect themselves in the theory
of morals. Since the formulations of the separation in the philosophic theory of morals
are used to justify and idealize the practices employed in moral training, a brief criti
cal discussion is in place.
It is a commonplace of educational theory that the estab
:is~in~ of character is a comprehensive aim of school instruction and discipline. Hence
~tis important that we should be on our guard against a conception of the relations of
intelligence to character which hampers the realization of the aim, and on the look-out
for the conditions which have to be provided in order that the aim may be successfully
acted upon.

The first obstruction which meets us is the currency of moral ideas which split
th e course of activity into two opposed factors, often named respectively the inner and
outer, or the spiritual and the physical.
This division is a culmination of the dualism
of mind and the world, soul and body, end and means, which we have so frequently noted.
In morals it takes the form of a sharp demarcation of the motive of action from its con
sequences, and of character from conduct. Motive and character are regarded as something
5

purely "inner, 11 existing exclusively in consciousness, while consequences and conduct are
regarded as outside of mind, conduct having to do simply with the movements which carry
out motives; consequences with what happens as a result. Different schools identify mo
rality with either the inner state of mind or the outer act and results, each in separa
tion from the other.
Action with a purpose is deliberate; i t involves a consciously forseen end and a
mental weighing of considerations pro and con. It also involves a conscious state of
longing or desire for the end.
The deliberate choice of an aim and of a settled disposi
tion of desire takes time. During this time complete overt action is suspended. A per
son who does not have his mind made up, does not know what to do. Consequently he post
pones definite action so far as possible. His position may be compared to that of man
considering jumping across a ditch. If he were sure he could or could not make it, def
inite activity in some direction would occur. But if he considers, he is in doubt; he
hesitates. DJring the time in which a single overt line of action is in suspense, his
activities are confined to such redistributions of energy within the organism as will
prepare a determinate course of action. He measures the ditch with his eyes; he brings
himself taut to get a feel of the energy at his disposal; he looks about for other ways
across, he re.fleets upon the importance of getting across. All this means an accentua
tion of consciousness; it means a turning in upon the individual's own attitudes, power,
wishes, etc.
Obviously, however, this surging up of personal factors into conscious recogni
tion is a part of the whole activity in its temporal development.
There is not first a
purely psychical process, followed abruptly by a radically different physical one. There
is one continuous behavior, proceeding from a more uncertain, divided, hesitating state
to a more overt, determinate, or complete state. The activity at first consists mainly
of certain tensions and adjustments within the organism; as these are coordinated into
a unified attitude, the organism as a whole acts - some definite act is undertaken. We
may distinguish, of course, the more explicitly conscious phase of the continuous activ
ity as mental or psychical. But that only identifies the mental or psychical to mean the
indeterminate, formative state of an activity which in its fullness involves putting forth
of overt e~ergy to modify the environment.
our conscious thoughts, observations, wishes, aversions are important, because
they represen·t inchoate, nascent activities.
They fulfill their destiny in issuing,
later on, into specific and perceptible acts. And these incho ate , budding organic read
justments are important because they are our sole escape from the dominion of routine
habits and blind impulse. They are activities having a ~ meaning in process of devel
opment. Hence, normally, there is an accentuation of personal consciousness whenever
our instincts and ready formed habits find themselves blocked by novel conditions. Then
we are thrown back upon ourselves to reorganize our own attitude before proceeding to a
definite and i rretrievable course of action. Unless we try to drive our way through by
sheer brute force, we must modify our organic resources to adapt them to the specific
features of the situation in which we find ourselves.
The conscious deliberating and
desiring which precede overt action are, then, the methodic personal readjustment im
plied in activity in uncertain situations.
This role of mind in continuous activity is not always maintained, however.
Desires for something different, aversion to the given state of things caused by the
blocking of successful activity, stimulates the imagination. The picture of a different
state of thin9s does not always function to aid ingenious observation and recollection
to find a way out and on. Except where there is a disciplined disposition, the tendency
is for the iru,gination to run l oose.
Instead of its objects being checked up by condi
tions with reference to their practicability in execution, they are allowed to develop
because of the immediate emotional satisfaction which they yield. When we find the suc
cessful display of our energies checked by uncongenial surroundings, natural and social,
the easiest way out is to build castles in the air and let them be a substitute for an
actual achieVE?ment which involves the pains of thought. So in overt action we acquiesce,
and build up c,n imaginary world in mind. This break between thought and conduct is re
flected in those theories which make a sharp separation between mind as inner and con
duct and consE?quences as merely outer.
For the split may be more than an incident of a particular individual's experi
ence. The social situation may be such as to throw the class given to articulate reflec
tion back intc their own thoughts and desires without providing the means by which these
ideas and aspirations can be used to reorganize the environment . Under such conditions,
men take revenge, as it were, upon the alien and hostile environment by cultivating con
tempt for it, by giving it a bad name. They seek refuge and consolation within their
own states of mind, their own imaginings and wishes, which they compliment by calling
both more real and more ideal than the despised outer world. Such periods have recurred
6

in history. In the early centuries of the Christian era, the influential moral systems
of Stoicism, of monastic and popular Christianity and other religious movements of the
day, took shape under the influence of such conditions. The more action which might ex
press prevailing ideals was checked, the more the inner possession and cultivation of
ideals was regarded as self-sufficient - as the essence of morality.
The external world
in which activity belongs was thought of as morally indifferent. Everything lay in having
the right motive, even though that motive was not a moving force in the world. Much the
same sort of situation recurred in Germany in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries; it led to the Kantian insistence upon the good will as the sole moral good,
the will being regarded as something complete in itself, apart from action and from the
changes or consequences effected in the world.
Later i t led to any idealization of ex
isting institutions as themselves the embodiment of reason.
The purely internal morality of 'meaning well,' of having a good dispostion re
gardless of what comes of it, naturally led to a reaction. This is generally known as
either hedonism or utilitarianism. It was said in effect that the important thing morally
is not what a man is inside of his own consciousness, but what he does - the consequences
which issue, the changes he actually effects. Inner morality was attacked as sentimental,
arbitrary, dogmatic, subjective - as giving men leave to dignify and shield any dogma
congenial to their self-interest or any caprice occurring to imagination by calling it an
intuition or an ideal of conscience. Results, conduct, are what counts; they afford the
sole measure of morality.
Ordinary morality, and hence that of the schoolroom, is likely to be an incon
sistent compromise of both views. On one hand, certain states of feeling are made much
of; the individual must 'mean well,' and if his intentions are good, if he had the right
sort of emotional consciousness, he may be relieved of responsibility for full results in
conduct. But since, on the other hand, certain things have to be done to meet the con
venience and the requirements of others, and of social order in general, there is great
insistence upon the doing of certain things, irrespective of whether the individual has
any concern OT intelligence in their doing. He must toe the mark; he must have his nose
held to the grindstone; he must obey; he must form useful habits; he must learn self-con
trol, - all of these precepts being understood in a way which emphasizes simply the imme
diate thing tangibly done, irrespective of the spirit of thought and desire in which it
is done, and irrespective therefore of its effect upon other less obvious doings.
It is hoped that the prior discussion has sufficiently elaborated the method by
which both of these evils are avoided. One or both of these evils must result wherever
individuals, whether young or old, cannot engage in a progressively cumulative under
taking under conditions which engage their interest and require their reflection. For
only in such cases is it possible that the disposition of desire and thinking should be
an organic factor in overt and obvious conduct. Given a consecutive activity embodying
the student's own interest, where a definite result is to be obtained, and where neither
routine habit nor the following of dictated directions nor capricious improvising will
suffice, and chere the rise of conscious purpose, conscious desire, and deliberate re
flection are i nevitable. They are inevitable as the spirit and quality of an activity
having specific consequences, not as forming an isolated realm of inner consciousness.
2. The Opposition of Duty and Interest. - Probably there is no antithesis more
often set up in moral discussion than that between acting from II principle" and from "in
terest."
To act on principle is to act disinterestedly, according to a general law,
which is abov,? all personal considerations.
lb act according to interest is, so the alle
gation runs, to act selfishly, with one's own personal profit in view. It substitutes
the changing expediency of the moment for devotion to unswerving moral law.
The false
idea of intenist underlying this opposition has already been criticized (See Chapter X),
but some moral aspects of the question will now be considered.
A elev, to the matter may be found in the fact that the supporters of the "inter
est" side of the controversy habitually use the term 'self-interest.' Starting from the
premisses tha1: unless there is interest in an object or idea, there is no motive force,
they end with the conclusion that even when a person claims to be acting from principle
or from a sense of duty, he really acts as he does because there "is something in it" for
himself.
The premiss is sound; the conclusion false.
In reply the other school argues
that since mar, is capable of generous self-forgetting and even self-sacrificing action,
he is capable of acting without interest. Again the premiss is sound, and the conclusion
false•
The error on both sides lies in a false notion of the relation of interest and
the self.
Both ~.ides assume that the self is a fixed and hence isolated quantity. As a
consequence there is a rigid dilemma between acting for an interest of the self and
~ithout int;rest.
If the self is scmething fixed antecedent to action, then acting from
interest means trying to get more in the way of possessions for the self - whether in the
7

way of fame, approval of others, power over others, pecuniary profit, or pleasure. Then
the reaction from this view as cynical depreciation of human nature leads to the view
that men who act nobly act with no interest at all.
Yet to an unbiased judgment itwould
appear plain that a man must be interested in what he is doing or he would not do it. A
physician who continues to serve the sick in a plague at almost certain danger to his own
life must be interested in the efficient performance of his profession - more interested
in that than in the safety of his own bodily life. But it is distorting facts to say
that this interest is merely a mask for an interest in something else which he gets by
continuing his customary services - such as money or good repute or virtue; that it is
only a means to an ulterior selfish end.
The moment we recognize that the self is not
something readymade, but something in continuous formation through choice of action, the
whole situation clears up. A man's interest in keeping at his work in spite of danger to
life means that his self is found in that work; if he finally gave up, and preferred his
personal safety or comfort, it would mean that he preferred to be that kind of a self.
The mistake lies in making a separation between interest and self, and supposing that the
latter is the end to which interest in objects and acts and others is a mere means.
In
fact, self and interest are two names for the same fact; the kind and amount of interest
actively taken in a thing reveals and measures the quality of selfhood which exists.
Bear in mind that interest means the active or moving identity of the self with a certain
object, and the whole alleged dilennna falls to the ground.
Unselfishness, for example, signifies neither lack of interest in what is done
(that would mean only machine-like indifference) nor selflessness - which would mean ab
sence of virility and character. As employed everywhere outside of this particular the
oretical controversy, the term 'unselfishness' refers to the kind of aims and objects
which habitually interest a man. And if we make a mental survey of the kind of interests
which evoke the use of this epithet, we shall see that they have two intimately associat
ed features.
(i) The generous self consciously identifies itself with the full range of
relationships implied in its activity, instead of drawing a sharp line between itself and
considerations which are excluded as alien or indifferent; (ii) it readjusts and expands
its past ideas of itself to take in new consequences as they become perceptible. When
the physician began his career he may not have thought of a pestilence; he may not have
consciously identified himself with service under such conditions. But, if he has a nor
mally growing or active self, when he finds that his vocation involves such risks, he
willingly ado:; its them as integral portions of his activity. The wider or larger self
which means inclusion instead of denial of relationships is identical with a self which
enlarges in order to assume previously unforseen ties.
In such crises of readjustment - and the crisis may be slight as well as great there may be a transitional conflict of 'principle' with 'interest.'
It is the nature of
a habit to involve ease in the accustomed line of activity. It is the nature of a read
adjusting of habit to involve an effort which is disagreeable - something to which a man
has deliberately to hold himself.
In other words, there is a tendency to identify the
self - or take interest - in what one has got used to, and to turn away the mind with
adversion or irritation when an unexpected thing which involves an unpleasant modifica
tion of habit comes up. Since in the past one has done one's duty without having to face
such a disagreeable circumstance, why not go on as one has been? To yield to this temp
tation means to narrow and isolate the thought of the self - to treat is as complete.
Any habit, no matter how efficient in the past, which has become set, may at any time
bring this temptation with it.
To act from principle in such an emergency is not to act
on some abstract principle, or duty at large; it is to act upon the principle of a course
of action, instead of upon the circumstances which have attended it.
The principle of a
physician's conduct is its animating aim and spirit - the care for the diseased. The
principle is not what justifies an activity, for the principle is but another name for
the continuity of the activity. If the activity as manifested in its consequences is
undesirable, ·to act upon principle is to accentuate its evil. And a man who prides him
self upon act:Lng upon principle is likely to be a man who insists upon having his own way
without learning from experience what is the better way.
He fancies that some abstract
principle justifies his course of action without recognizing that his principle needs
justification.
Assum~ng, however, that school conditions are such as to provide desirable occu
pations, it is interest in the occupation as a whole - that is, in its continuous devel
opment - which keeps a pupil at his work in spite of temporary diversions and unpleasant
obstacles. Where there is no activity having a growing significance, appeal to principle
is either pun?ly verbal, or a form of obstinate pride or an appeal to extraneous consid
erations clothed with a dignified title. Undoubtedly there are junctures where momentary
interest ceases and attention flags, and where reenforcement
is needed.
But what carries
a person over these hard stretches is not loyalty to duty in the abstract, but interest
in his occupa -i;ion. Duties are "offices"- they are the specific acts needed for the ful
filling of a function - or, in homely language, doing one's job. And the man who is gen
uinely interei;ted in his job is the man who is able to stand temporary discouragement, to
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persist in the face of obstacles, to take the lean with the fat:
out of meeting and overcoming difficulties and distractions.

he makes an interest

3.
Intelligence and Character. - A noteworthy paradox often accompanies dis
cussions of morals. On . the one hand, there is an identification of the moral with the
rational.
Reason is set up as a faculty from which proceed ultimate moral intuitions,
and sometimes, as in the Kantian theory, it is said to supply the only proper moral mo
tive. On the other hand, the value of concrete, everyday intelligence is constantly
underestimated, and even deliberately depreciated. Morals is often thought to be an
affair with which ordinary knowledge has nothing to do.
M::>ral knowledge is thought to
be a thing apart, and conscience is thought of as something radically different from con
sciousness. This separation, if valid, is of especial significance for education. M::>r
al education in school is practically hopeless when we set up the development of charac
ter as a supreme end, and at the same time treat the acquiring of knowledge and the de
velopment of understanding, which of necessity occupy the chief part of school time, as
having nothing to do with character. On such a basis, moral education is inevitably re
duced to some kind of catechetical instruction, or lessons about morals. Lessons "about
morals" signify as matter of course lessons in what other people think about virtues and
duties. It amounts to something only in the degree in which pupils happen to be already
animated by a sympathetic and dignified regard for the sentiments of others. Without
such a regard, it has no more influence on character than information about the moun
tains of Asia; with a servile regard, it increases dependence upon others, and throws
upon those in authority the responsibility of conduct. As a matter of fact, direct in
struction in :morals has been effective only in social groups where it was a part of the
authoritative control of the many by the few. Not the teaching as such but the reen
forcement of it by the whole r~gime of which it was an incident made it effective.
To
attempt to get similar results from lessons about morals in a democratic society is to
rely upon sentimental magic.
At the other end of the scale stands the Socratic-Platonic teaching which iden
tifies knowledge and virtue - which holds that no man does evil knowingly but only be
cause of ignorance of the good.
This doctrine is canmonly attacked on the ground that
nothing is more common than for a man to know the good and yet do the bad: not knowl
edge, but habituation or practice, and motive are what is required. Aristotle, in fact,
at once attacked the Platonic teaching on the ground that moral virtue is like an art,
such as medicine; the experienced practitioner is better than a man who has theoretical
knowledge but no practical experience of disease and remedies. The issue turns, however,
upon what is meant by knowledge. Aristotle's objection ignored the gist of Plato's
teaching to the effect that man could not attain a theoretical insight into the good ex
cept as he had passed through years of practical habituation and strenous discipline.
Knowledge of the good was not a thing to be got either from books or from others, but
was achieved through a prolonged education.
It was the final and culminating grace of a
mature experience of life.
Irrespective of Plato's position, it is easy to perceive that
the term know.ledge is used to denote things as far apart as intimate and vital personal
realization, - a conviction gained and tested in experience, - and a second-handed,
largely symbolic, recognition that persons in general believe so and so - a devitalized
remote information. That the latter does not guarantee conduct, that it does not pro
foundly affect character, goes without saying . But if knowledge means some thing of the
same sort as our conviction gained by trying and testing that sugar is sweet and quinine
bitter, the case stands otherwise. Every time a man sits on a chair rather than on a
stove, carrie,; an umbrella when it rains, consul ts a doc tor when ill - or in short per
forms any of the thousand acts which make up his daily life, he proves that knowledge of
a certain kind finds direct issue in conduct. There is every reason to suppose that the
same sort of knowledge of good has a like expression; in fact "good II is an empty term un
less it inclucies the satisfactions experienced in such situations as those mentioned.
Knowledge that other persons are supposed to know something might lead one to act so as
to win the approbation others attach to certain actions, or at least so as to give others
the impression that one agrees with them; there is no reason why it should lead to per
sonal initiative and loyalty in behalf of the beliefs attributed to them.
It is not necessary, accordingly, to dispute about the proper meaning of the term
knowledge. le is enough for educational purposes to note the different qualities cover
~d by_ the one name, to realize that it is knowledge gained at first hand through the ex
ig~ncies of experience which affects conduct in significant ways. If a pupil learns
things from books simply in connection with school lessons and for the sake of reciting
what he has learned when called upon, then knowledge will have effect upon some conduct
-namely upon that of reproducing statements at the demand of others.
There is nothing
surprising that such 11 knowledge 11 should not have much influence in the life out of school.
But this is not a reason for making a divorce between knowledge and conduct, but for
ho~ding in low esteem this kind of knowledge.
The same thing may be said ot knowledge
which relates merely to an isolated and technical speciality; it modifies action but only
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in its own narrow line. In truth, the problem of moral education in the schools is one
with the problem of securing knowledge-the knowledge connected with the system of im
pulses and habits. For the use to which any known fact is put depends upon its connec
tions. The knowledge of dynamite of a safecracker may be identical in verbal form with
that of a chemist; in fact, it is different, for it is knit into connection with differ
ent aims and habits, and thus has a different import.
Our prior discussion of subject-matter as proceeding from direct activity having
an immediate aim, to the enlargement of meaning found in geography and history, and then
to scientifically organized knowledge, was based upon the idea of maintaining a vital
connection between knowledge and activity. What is learned and employed in an occupation
having an aim and involving cooperation with others is moral knowledge, whether con
sciously so regarded or not. For it builds up a social interest and confers the intelli
gence needed to make that interest effective in practice. Just because the studies of the
curriculum represent standard factors in social life, they are organs of initiation into
social values. As mere school studies, their acquisition has only a technical worth.
Acquired under conditions where their social significance is realized, they feed moral
interest and develop moral insight. Moreover, the qualities of mind discussed under the
topic of method of learning are all of them intrinsically moral qualities. Open-minded
ness, singlemindedness, sincerity, breadth of outlook, thoroughness, assumption of res
sponsibility for developing the consequences of ideas which are accepted, are moral
traits. The habit of identifying moral characteristics with external conformity to auth
oritative prescriptions may lead us to ignore the ethical value of these intellectual at
titudes, but the same habit tends to reduce morals to a dead and machine-like routine.
Consequently while such an attitude has moral results, the results are morally undesir
able-above all in a democratic society where so much depends upon personal disposition.
4.
Toe Social and the M:>ral.-All of the separations which we have been criti
cizing-and which the idea of education set forth in the previous chapters is designed to
avoid - spring from taking morals too narrowly, -giving them, on one side, a sentimental
goody-goody turn without reference to effective ability to do what is socially needed,
and, on the other side, overemphasizing convention and tradition so as to limit morals to
a list of definitely stated acts. As a matter of fact, morals are as broad as acts which
concern our relationships with others. And potentially this includes all our acts, even
though their social bearing may not be thought of at the time of performance. For every
act, by the p:rinciple of habit, modifies disposition-it sets up a certain kind of in
clination and desire. And it is impossible to tell when the habit thus strengthened may
h a ve a direct and perceptible influence on our associatio n with o thers. certain traits
of character have such an obvious conne ction with our soci a l relationships that we call
them "moral" in an emphatic sense - truthfulness, honesty, chastity, amiability, etc.
But this only means that they are, as compared with some other attitudes , central: -that
they carry other attitudes with them. They are moral in an emphatic sense not because
they are isolated and exclusive, but becau se they are so intimately connected with thou
sands of other attitudes which we do not explicitly recognize - which perhaps we have not
even names for.
TO call them virtues in their isolation is like taking the skeleton for
the living body. The bones are certainly important, but their importance lies in the
fact that they support other organs of the body in such a way as to make them capable of
integrated effective activity. And the same is true of the qualities of character which
we specifically designate virtues. M:>rals concern nothing less than the whole character,
and the whole character is identical with the man in all his concrete make-up and mani
festations.
To possess virtue does not signify to have cultivated a few nameable and
exclusive traits; it means t o be fully and adequately what one is capable of becoming
through association with others in all the offices of life.
The moral and the social quality of conduct are, in the last analysis, identical
with each other. It is then bu t to restate explicitly the import of our earlier chap
ters regarding the s o cial function of education to say that the measure of the worth of
the administration, curriculum, and methods of instruction of the schoo l is the extent to
which they are animated by a social spirit. And the great danger which threatens school
work is the absence of conditions which make possible a permeating social spirit; this is
the great enemy of effective moral training. For this spirit can be actively present
only when certain conditions are met.
(i) In the first place, the school must itself be a community life in all which
that implies. Social perceptions and interests can be developed only in a genuinely
social medium - one where there is give and take in the building up of a common experi
ence.
Informational statements about things can be acquired in relative isolation by
any one who previously has had enough intercourse with others to have learned language.
But realization of the meaning of the linguistic signs is quite another matter. That
involves a context of work and play in association with others. The plea which has been
made for education through continued constructive activities in this book rests upon the
fact they af f ord an opportunity for a social atmosphere. In place of a school set apart

from life as a place for learnin;i lessons, we have a miniature social group in which
study and growth are incidents of present shared experience. Playgrounds, shops, work
rooms, laboratories not only direct the natural active tendencies of youth, but they in
volve intercourse, communication, and cooperation, - all extending the perception of con
nections.
(ii) The learning in school should be continuous with that out of school. There
should be a free interplay between the two.
This is possible only when there are numer
ous points of contact between the social interests of the one and of the other. A school
is conceivable in which there should be a spirit of companionship and shared activity, but
where its social life would no more represent or typify that of the world beyond the
school walls than that of a monastery. Social concern and understanding would be devel
oped, but they would not be available outside; they would not carry over.
The proverbial
separation of town and gown, the cultivation of academic seclusion, operate in this direc
tion.
So does such adherence to the culture of the past as generates a reminiscent social
spirit, for this makes and individual feel more at home in the life of other days than in
his own. A professedly cultural education is peculiarly exposed to this danger. An ide
alized past becomes the refuge and solace of the spirit; present-day concerns are found
sordid, and unworthy of attention.
But as a rule, the absence of a social environment in
connection with which learning is a need and a reward is the chief reason for the isola
tion of the school; and this isolation renders school knowledge inapplicable to life and
so infertile in character.
A narrow and moralistic view of morals is responsible for the failure to recog
nize that all the aims and values which are desirable in education are themselves moral.
Discipline, natural development, culture, social efficiency, are moral traits - marks of
a person who is a worthy member of that society which it is the business of education to
further.
There is an old saying to the effect that it is not enough for a man to be good;
he must be good for something. The something for which a man must be good is capacity to
live as a social member so that what he gets from living with others balances with what
he contributes. What he gets and gives as a human being, a being with desires, emotions,
and ideas, is not external possessions, but a widening and deepening of conscious life a more intense, disciplined, and expanding realization of meanings. What he materially
receives and gives is at most opportunities and means for the evolution of conscious life.
Otherwise, it is neither giving nor taking, but a shifting about of the position of things
in space, like the stirring of water and sand with a stick. Discipline, culture, social
efficiency , personal refinement, improvement of character are but phases of the growthof
capacity nobly to share in such a balanced experience. And education is not a mere means
t o such a life. Education is such a life. To maintain capacity for such education is
the essence of morals. For conscious life is a continual beginning afresh.
Summary. - The most important problem of !lDral education in the school concerns
the relationship of knowledge and conduct. For unless the learning which accrues in the
regular course of study affects character, it is futile to conceive the moral end as the
unifying and culminating end of education. When there is no intimate organic connection
between the methods and materials of knowledge and moral growth, particular lessons and
modes of discipline have to be resorted to: knowledge is not integrated into the usual
springs of action and the outlook on life, while morals become moralistic - a scheme of
separate virtues.
The two theories chiefly associated with the separation of learning from activ
ity , and hence from morals, are those which cut off inner disposition and motive - the
conscious personal factor - and deeds as purely physical and outer; and which set action
from interest in opposition to that from principle. Both of these separations are over
come in an educational scheme where learning is the accompaniment of continuous activi
ties or occupations which have a social aim and utilize the materials of typical social
situations. For under such conditions, the school becomes itself a form of social life,
~ miniature community and one in close interaction with other modes of associated exper
ience beyond school walls. All education which develops power to share effectively in
social life is moral. It forms a character which not only does the particular deed so
cially necessary but one which is interested in that continuous readjustment which is
essential to growth. Interest in learning from all the contacts of life is the essen
tial moral interest.
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TI-IE PROBLEMS APPROACH AND THE SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

by
Robert E. Jewett

(Reprinted by permission from Richard E. Gross and Raymond H. Muessig, eds., Problem
Centered Social Studies Instruction, National Council for the Social Studies, Washington,
D.C., pp. 58-59, 65-66.)

And this I believe:
that the free, exploring mind of the individual
human is the most valuable thing in the world. And this I would fight
for:
the freedom of the mind to take any direction it wishes, undirected.
And this I must fight against:
any idea, religion, or government which
limits or destroys the individual.
This is what I am and what I am about.
I can understand why a system built on a pattern must try to destroy the
free mind, for this is one thing which can by inspection destroy such a
system. Surely I can understand this and I hate i t and I will fight
against i t to preserve the one thing that separates us from the uncreative
beasts.
If the glory can be killed, we are lost.
-John Steinbeck

As I envision it, the primary goal of the senior high school should be to produce
the intellectually autonomous individual; the individual who can arrive at his own con
clusions based on the relevant facts.
To produce the autonomous individual -- the self
directing person--the school must help the student discover his identity; that is, help
him come to know who he is, what he values, and what he wants to achieve .
The social studies program within the senior high school can play a key role in
achieving this goal. The content of the social studies, if approached from a problem
solving orientation, is rich in opportunities to develop the skills and insights, and
values, required for a reflective resolution of problems.
For the student to gain a sense of identity he must come to understand the sa
lient features of his social environment; he must come to grips with the crucial issues
imbedded in his culture. Furthermore, as he makes sense out of his society, as he re
solves social issues reflectively, he must determine the significance of the meanings
thus acquired for his pattern of values. When doubt is resolved, when a social situation
which was confused has be=me clarified, then the meaning acquired needs to be related to
the value structure of the student.
Thus, the student gains insight into self through
the recognition of the significance of meanings derived in problem-solving for his con
cept of self.
The problems with which the student comes to grips within the social studies
classroom are social, the meanings which he derives from their solutions must become
personal if self-knowledge is to be attained. A student, for example, addressing him
self to the question, "How can Negroes acquire decent housing?", is involved in a social
problem and he is dealing with social studies content.
The student may conclude that
"open housing" is a necessary condition for a solution to the problem.
If so, he has
arrived at a solution to the problem. Assuming that the quality of the thinking that
took place in the process of problem-solving was of a high order, the meaning distilled
from the process is significant.
If problem-solving is to contribute to intellectual
autonomy in this instance, the student must ascertain his reactions to the principle of
"open housing." Thus, in engaging in the solution of social problems, the student gains
meaning which when referred to the self affords knowledge which results in clarification
of identity.
Assuming that we develop the intellectually autonomous student, will he face
frustration and become alienated from his society due to the complexity of modern life
and the centralization of decision making? Aware of social problems and skillful in ar
riving at a satisfactory logical solution, will he feel powerless to effect change, to
realize his solutions? This outcome seems unlikely, since the student will be aware of
the social forces and the organizational structures inherent in society.
He will be cog
nizant of the organized groups and the influential individuals that effect chane in so
ciety. Hence he will be able to effectively engage in "the passions and actions of his
time."
Will the student use his skills to gain selfish, anti-social ends?
There is no
certainty in this matter, since the very nature of autonomy precludes determination of
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the values sought by the student. However, by involving the student in the crucial prob
lems of society he is immersed in the human condition. He is sensitized to the trouble
and the tensions of his fellow men by the very focus of the social studies curriculum.
Furthermore, since an effective use of the problem solving approach required an intellec
tually permissive classroom atmosphere--an atmosphere in which the students contribution
is courteously and fairly · entertained--the student experiences sensitive inter-personal
relations and is expected to accord i t to his fellow classmates. Hence, living within a
socially sensitive classroom atmosphere, immersed in the problems of mankind, the likely
hood that the student will develop into a socially conscious individual is quite prob
able.
Next let us turn to an examination of the atmosphere which must exist if prob
lem-solving is to occur. If the student is to become engaged in problem-solving he must
be doubtful, uncertain or puzzled concerning something within his experience and have the
desire through inquiry to remove the doubt. As long as he is certain of the truth or
goodness of a particular idea or action; or as long as~ is unconcerned, indifferent
about the matter, he is not involved in problem-solving.
Hence, the initial task confronting the teacher is that of creating the state of
uncertainty or doubt in the mind of the student. Obviously, in instances where the stu
dent brings the doubt to the classroom this initial stage is eliminated. But for the
remainder of the students, and in most cases for reasons outlined below this will be a
majority of the class, the teacher must implant the element of doubt.
Let us now consider why students do not bring doubt to the classroom. Most
classrooms are places where doubt is not prized. Classroom activity consists largely of
producing right answers. Usually the atmosphere is one of certainty, not doubt .
The
classroom activities often consist of recitation in which the student is required to re
call specific facts in an atomistic context. Certainly doubt is not demanded.
The very
fact that formal educatio;-i must take place within the confines of a social organization
discourages an emphasis upon the nurturing of doubt and the fostering of inquiry, for
social organi::ations tend to be conservative.
Problem-Solving and Values
Much confusion, frustration, and indoctrination can be avoided in class discus
sions if the ceacher--and eventually the student--have a clear understanding of the rela
tionship which exists between the process of reflection and the realm of values.
The reflective problem-solving process operates both in dealing with problems of
fact and problems of value, but in different ways. The failure to recognize this dis
tinction is a basic cause of the ineffective use of the problem-solving process. When
the problem-solving process is used in a manner appropriate for dealing with a factual
problem in a c~ntext in which a value question is involved, the result is the breakdown
of the reflective process. Likewise, when the converse misapplication occurs, reflection
fails to perform its function.
For e}(:ample, in a senior high school class the following question arises, "Should
we declare war on Communist China?". In the course of the discussion the point is made
and conceded that this could bring Russia to the defense of China. With Russia 1 s capa
city for waging war, this could result in devastation to our country. At this point a
student asserts that he would rather be dead than Red. Another student counters with the
statement tha1 he would rather be Red than dead. The teacher then asks the class to de
termine reflectively which student is right.
In effect, one student has said that his ultimate value, in this situation, is to
stay alive even if this would mean living in a communistic system. The other student has
expressed as his ultimate value the desire to live regardless of the conditions of life.
Now in such a situation reflection can make clear what is at stake; it can clarify the
consequences flowing from p?rticul.ar choices and may uncover additional possible choices.
One or both of the students may discover that the value expressed is an instrumental ra
ther than an ultimate value. This latter possiblity will be discussed further, but let
me emphasize that the reflective process cannot decide matters of ultimate value. Both
st udents can agree that a declaration of war on Communist China would result in majordes
t:uction to the United states, arriving at that insight reflectively, yet they can con
tinue to disagree over the value to be sought and hence they will disagree on the course
of action to be adopted.
t·
When it becomes clear in a class discussion that what is involved is the selecion of ultimate (end} values, it becomes important at this point that the teacher use
r:f~e~tion to clarify the consequences of the possible choices (values) and to uncover
a ditional choices. When the teacher in dealing with a discussion involving end values
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treats the situation as if instrumental values or factual assertins were under consid
eration he creates a situation in which reflection is inoperative. For reflection can
not determine the right where right is an ultimate value.
If the teacher treats a problem involving ultimate values as if it were one in
which instrumental values were under consideration often indoctrination is the outcome-
indoctrination made more effective in that i t occurs under the guise of reflection.
Re
turning to the illustration, the teacher may conclude the discussion with the statement,
"Now that we have thoroughly examined the problem you can clearly see that to go to war
with Communist China would result in catastrophic destruction and we wouldn't want that.
Therefore, we see that we must avoid such a war." In this case the teacher assumes the
"correct" ultimate value and makes the leap from a reflective consideration of al terna
tives to sanctioning one of two ultimate values.
When values emerge in a problem-solving context, usually the value involved is an
instrumental one. When this is the case the situation can be handled in the same manner
as when strictly factual matters are at stake. The instrumental value either is or is not
a means to the end sought.
The determination of the question is open to reflective exam
ination.
If the student, for example, says that racially mixed marriages are wrong he
may, of course, be stating what for him is an ultimate value.
It is more likely that the
student has e~-pressed an instrumental value. In the course of the subsequent discussion
he may disclose that he opposes mixed marriages because the divorce rate is higher among
marriages in ·this category than among non-mixed marriages.
In this instance the stu
dent's ultimate value may be associated with the divorce question and his stand on mixed
marriages may be an instrumental value.
If this is the case, then the mixed marriage
statement can be dealt with on the basis of relevant fact.
The divorce rate in the two
categories can be checked.
It is true that most value statements encountered in problem-solving will either
initially or during the course of the discussion prove to be instrumental in nature. Yet
frequently the value involved is an ultimate value, and, in fact, all situations can be
pursued far enough to drive the discussion back to an ultimate value.
Therefore, while
much of the time classroom discussion will involve instrumental values which can be re
flectively tested, this should not obscure the fact that ultimate values will be encount
ered and that such values cannot be reflectively tested.
There is, of course, a third category of problems; namely, those problems which
do not directly involve values. Problems of this nature include such examples as the
following: De armament races lead to war? Under what conditions, if any, does a tax in
crease lead to deflation? Does an increase in the well-being of a suppressed class lead
to revolution? These are problems involving alleged relationships between concepts or
events. In problems of this type evidential relationships can be established. In other
words, such problems can be solved reflectively. Such problems, assume the data are
available, can be solved in a public manner. Such problems can be dealt with in a manner
which allows all persons, who are willing to examine the evidence and base their conclu
sions on the evidence, to arrive at the same conclusion.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MJRAL JUDGMENT
by
Clive Beck
(Reprinted by permission from James A. Phillips, Jr., ed., Developing Value constructs in
Schooling:
Inquiry into Process and Product, Ohio Association for Supervision and Curri
culum Development, 6300 N. High Street, Worthington, Ohio, 1972, pp. 41-50.)
J\t:>st educators at present seem to be concerned not so much with specific tech
niques of moral education, but rather with general problems about the teaching of ethics
and values, and even fundamental ethical questions: How do we arrive at our values?
What right hav ,? we to impose values on students? Or , if impose is too strong a word:
What right have we even to push them in a certain direction in the area of values?
It is fortunate that these are the concerns of educators, because it seems to me
that we are still at the stage where somewhat general discussion (an attempt to get our
bearings) is necessary.
I have been involved in some research into particular teaching
techniques in the Toronto area, but I am not going to report on them in any detail. For
one thing, it is difficult to draw conclusions from a few experiments; also, there are a
great many techniques that can be used and must be used in a balanced moral education pro
gram. However, I will discuss some aspects of the broad approach to moral education we
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have taken.
In what follows, I will be concentrating on the more cognitive aspects of moral
education. This is partly because of lack of space, but also partly because these are
the aspects upon which most of our efforts have been concentrated. Also, I must admit
to a certain prejudice in this direction.
It seems to me that in so-called character edu
cation programs in our schools there has often been a lack of discussion of ethical the
ory, a lack ol' a serious attempt to help students develop a value theory or set of value
ideas of their own. Although there has been a lot of talk in recent times about sensi
tivity training, role playing activities, sociodrama and psychodrama, and while all of
these are excellent and important for broad moral development, I feel there has not been
enough emphasis upon development of students in moral judgment . Accordingly, I plan to
concentrate here on the development of moral judgment as distinct from moral emotions or
moral actions.
First , however, I wish to state briefly what I consider to be the relationship
between development of moral judgment and development in moral emotions and dispositions.
some people assume that if they help students develop in their moral emotions and dispo
sitions, then development of their ITDral judgment will follow naturally. Other people
believe that if they help students develop in their thinking about moral matters, then
their moral emotions and dispositions will develop naturally.
It seems to me both of
these approaches are mistaken; what is needed is an interactive approach. Often we try
to help a child understand a particular aspect of ethical theory; for example, we try to
help him understand the need for reciprocal relationships (as in promise-keeping and for
mation of contracts); and we find that we fail, because there is a lack of sensitivity, a
lack of concern, a lack of emotional development- a lack of non-cognitive development
which prevent!; him from having this cognitive insight. On the other hand, there are cases
where we try to help a person become more sensitive to other people and their needs and
more disposed to help them, and the "log-jam" (to use a good Canadian expression) is his
lack of understanding of the place of concern for others in a person's life.
SO it works both ways: we have to move on both these fronts, helping students in
their cognitive and their emotional/dispositional development at the same time. However,
f o r the reasons I have given, in our work we have tended to concentrate upon their cog
nitive moral development. And, in doing this, we have drawn rather heavily on the work
o f Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard, who also has emphasized cognitive development.
Excerpt
e d below are 1:he stages of moral development he has identified:
Ko hlberg' s Definition of Moral Stages
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I .

Preconven1:ional Level
At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and
bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the
hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of
the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided in
t o the fo llowing two stages:
Stage 1:
The punishment and obedience orientation.
The physical consequences of
a ction determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these
consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in
their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by pun
ishment and aLthority (the latter being stage 4).
Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation.
Right action consists of that
Which instrume,ntally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others.
Human relatioLs are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness,
of reciprocity and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physi
cal pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I' 11 scratch
yours," not 01· loyalty, gratitude or justice.
II.

Conventicnal Level
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or
nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious con
sequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social
0rder, but of loyalty to it , of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order
a nd of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the
followin g two stages:
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy- nice girl" orientation.
Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is
~uc~ coi:if ormity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Bet -:i-vior is frequently judged by intention- "he means well" becomes important for the first
ime · One earns approval by being "nice. 11
Stage 4:

The "law and order" orientation.
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There is orientation toward authority,

fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order.
Right behavior consists of doing
one's duty, showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its
own sake.
III.

Post-Conventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles
which have validity and application apart from the individual's own identification with
these groups. This level again has two stages:
stage 5:
The social-contract legalistic orientation generally with utilitarian
overtones.
Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and
in terms of standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole
society.
There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions
and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching concensus. Aside from
what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of person
al "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but
with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations
of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside
the legal realm, free agreement, and contract is the binding element of obligation. This
is the "official" morality of the American government and Constitution.
Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the
decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency.
These principles are abstract and ethi
cal (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative):
they are not concrete moral rules like
the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reci
procity and eguality of the human rights and of respect for the dignity of human beings as
individual persons.
It is important not to misunderstand Kohlberg's position.
In some of his writings,
he seems to give the impression that if we look after cognitive development, then every
thing else will look after itself; or even that all there is to moral development is de
velopment of moral judgment. However, this is a false impression. It is due partly to
the fact that he is concerned to emphasize something he thinks has not been emphasized
sufficiently and partly to the fact that he has not always been very adept at conveying
his theories to the general public.
Our research, which has been going on for two and one-half years, has consisted
very largely in carrying on classroom discussions of values, most of which we have led
ourselves. We have completed one full cycle of research at the Grade 11 and 12 level, and
the results are quite interesting. We pretested two Grade 11 classes on the Kohlberg
questionnaire, discussed values with the experimental class for five months, two periods
a week, posttested both groups immediately afterwards, and then gave tham a follow-up
posttest fifteen months later. We found no change on the Kohlberg scale in either group
immediately after the series of discussions, but the experimental group showed quite a
significant shift into post-conventional morality fifteen months later compared with the
control group, thus displaying a "sleeper" effect.
The control group throughout this
twenty-month period did not change significantly.
This is just one piece of research: since it has yet to be corroborated by others,
we should not place too much emphasis on it. But it suggests to us that as we discuss
with students and try to help them see the purposes of morality, purposes which lie be
yond morality, try to help them to take a more questioning approach to moral conventions,
they initially tend to become "churned up." They enjoy the discussions very much, but if
we hit them with a questionnaire immediately afterwards ("What do you think about this,
and why?" or "What should so and so have done in such and such a situation?"), they re
vert to their more conventional responses:
they are still in that unsettled state gen
erated by the discussions.
This requires a comment on our approach to discussion. We try to let students
express whatev,~r views they want to express at a given time, even if this means they come
out with something which might seem quite abhorrent from a moral point of view. Of course ,
if a student says something which to us seems quite extreme (e.g. "I think I would like
to murder my g:!"andmother," or "Hitler was right killing six million Jews"), then we do not
let it pass without comment. However, our approach is not to throw up our hands and all
but send the student out of the classroom for ever having had such a thought (as has often
been the appro«ch in character education in the past): rather, we try to find out what
he is getting at. What is the point? Perhaps the conclusion he has come up with is mis
taken, but there is probably something really serious he is trying to get at.
We encourage students to consider a range of alternative approaches to different
moral dilemmas and moral decisions - which means that after the teaching period they have
not got a set of pat answers to moral dilemmas.
Rather, they have a range of approaches
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which they can then think about in making decisions in everyday life. We have extended
their imagination, so to speak: and I think there is a lot of truth in the notion that
people often do not develop morality because certain better alternatives have never oc
curred to them.
They go on reacting in the ronventional way simply for want of an al
ternative strategy. And so we try to suggest a more reflective, critical, independent,
autonomous kind of approach which they then work out in everyday living and which might
not become very apparent in their lives for a rouple of years.
But I have jumped the gun.
Let us begin at the other end of the K-13 spectrum.
In my booklet , M:>ral Education in the Schools, 2 there are some topics suggested for ages
s-9 with which we have not experimented yet.
Probably the discussion method cannot be
used in any systematic fashion below age 10. We have used it with 10-year-olds somewhat
successfully, but below that age I think one would definitely have to apply other teach
ing technique:;;, introducing children to vivid and concrete examples of certain kinds of
moral relationships.
I do not mean to discourage discussing values with youngP.r chil
dren; but it is even more obvious at this age level than at other levels that discussion
of values must be supplemented by other teaching techniques.
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The topics I have suggested for 5-9-year-olds include: Helping other people;
The self and others; The value of rules to ourselves and others; Exceptions to rules;
The need to look ahead; Parent-child relationships; Attitudes toward teachers; Other au
thorities in society; The need to learn; The need for advice; Making up one's mind; Val
uable goals in life; The legitimacy of happiness as a goal; The place of work; and so on,
taking topics from all the subsequent lists at appropriate times.
During this early age period, it is rather difficult to deal thoroughly with such
topics, but I think there are certain approaches to morality which one can help students
to develop; and later on in Chapter 1 of the booklet I mention some of them. Young chil
dren may learn that morality is meant to serve certain purposes, and is not just a set of
self-contained rules arbitrarily imposed by adults or the powers that be; they may learn
that being moral is not always unpleasant; they may learn that among the purposes moral
ity is meant to serve, their own well-being has an important place; they may learn that
other people have needs similar to their own; and they may gain some idea of the rom
plexity of value questions, and of the kind of situations in which exceptions must be
made to moral rules. There are many such hints about morality that one can communicate
at this earlier age level without exhaustive discussion.
Admittedly, research has shown that such ideas are rather difficult for younger
children to grasp. However, in my view, younger children can grasp them to a degree,
and this is v1?ry important. For example, a 6 year-old may learn that other people have
needs similar to his own.
This is difficult for him to understand in amy comprehensive
way, but he can begin to understand it.
Indeed, I think that from the earliest age chil
dren can acquire part of the raw material of a mature morality. Informally, I have no
ticed what I consider to be very significant differences between 2-year-olds in their
reactions to adults, other differences, which have a very strong change of showing up in
some form in t heir value structure when they are 16 or 17. However, it is impossible
with these younger children to have an intellectual discussion of all the aspects of
these topics, so one has to devise other methods of helping them gain these impressions,
or hints, of morality.
However, once we get to age 10 or 11, there are a great many topics that can be
discussed in quite a syste.ma tic fashion.
The broad approach to discussion I have used,
and would recommend for mid-elementary students and above, is perhaps best described as
the "theoretical discussion approach." This does not mean that one spends all the time
discussion abstract theories and principles; in fact, a great deal of time is devoted to
concrete cases. But I do not use the classical case-study method (.as it has bee;, devel
oped, for example, by the Ha rvard Public Issues people, and by the canadian Public Issues
Pr~ject in Toronto) in which a class discusses a particular case in great detail and then
t:ied to derive certain principles from it. What the class does is discuss ideas, prin
ciples, concepts, with constant reference to examples taken from their own lives, or from
othe: sources, so that in discuss ng a principle (e.g., that one often has to make ex
ceptions to rules) we might refer to twenty different examples. I have found this ap
proach very Scttisfactory. For one thing, it helps students to grasp the principle in a
rather thorough way. Also, it helps keep their interest; for, if we simply discuss a
case (it ~ght be a case of euthanasia, for example), there may be only a small group of
~tudents in the class who are interested in that case; whereas, if we discuss a general
idea or principle and review many relevant examples, then every student in the class can
~ome :1P with bis own examples and make a contribution to the discussion, at the same time
t~~rning more ~bout the principle.
(Of couise, the case study method can be adapted to
_is approach if plenty of analogous cases are considered fairly early in the discus
sion.)
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With respect to topics for ages 10 and 11, I have suggested the following, un
der the heading of Human Relations:
Rules people give up; The place of rules in society;
Exceptions to society's rules, the Individual's need for other people; Helping otherpeo
ple; The self andothers; The place of laws, judges, and police; The place of governments
and other authorities; Lawbreaking and the place of punishment; Different values am
rules in our society; Different values and rules around the world; Loyalty and patrio
tism; The place of the inner group of relatives and friends; Parent-child relationships;
Prejudice against races, social classes, and other groups; and Differences in taste in
our society and around the world.
The reason for discussion topics which have to do with the social aspects of
value at this particular age level is that most of the students fall roughly into what
Kohlberg calls the "Instrumental Relativist Orientation" (Stage 2) where they do not have
very much concern for other people, or for the rest of society. usually, we find that
children at this age level still have strong ties with their parents, but, as far as
their brothers and sisters and other children are concerned - as far as uncles, aunts,
and cousins and other adults are concerned - they are in a strongly independent phase.
So it is useful to have them begin thinking about the importance of other people, the
importance of getting along with other people, the importance of society, in an attempt
to move them into what Kohlberg would call the "umventional" stages, or what I have
called the"Conformity" stages, a necessary phase in their development.
But then, para
doxically, after we have helped them move in that direction (and we do not have to give
them much help because society in general is pushing them rather effectively), we have
to start to "deconventionalize" them, onsofar as this is appropriate. The topics on de
cision-making for ages 12 and 13, then, take up questions that have to do with the needs
of the individual and how these are met in social contexts. Among the topics are:
Worthwhile goals to pursue in life; The place of education in one's life; Work and lei
sure; The place of leisure, recreation, and exercise; Alcohol and drugs; Vocational de
cision-making; Personal moral virtues; and The need to look ahead.
Actua.Lly, in the Ontario situation, this fits in very appropriately since ages
12 and 13 (Grades 7 and 8) are the grades in which there is a heavier emphasis on the
guidance prog :ram, and so these kinds of topics tie in with the centrally prescribed
course of study.
For ages 14 and 15, I have suggested a number of topics which have to do with
social problems in the world today - issues such as War, Disarmament, Underdeveloped
Nations, Pollution, Population Control, Abortion, Euthanasia, Nationalism, Racism, and
Women's Liberation. Here there is a wealth of study material to use, some of which is
listed in the Bibliography given in M:>ral Education in the Schools. Various educational
series and a proliferation of semipopular literature in bookstores all provide resources
for these topics. When dealing with such topics, it is important to keep moving back to
the more general principles, ideas and concepts dealt with in the earlier discussions. I
would not recommend that a class become embroiled in extensive discussion of these con
crete issues without some prior consideration of general value theory. If they do en gage in such discussion prematurely and exclusively, without a background of this kind,
they tend to become frustrated and pessimistic, and may be forced into an extreme rela
tivism. Everyone seems to have a different point of view, and the students cannot see
how the differences can possibly be resolved. A mistake that is often made with the
case study method is th<!-t students become involved n9t only in .a particular problem area
(such as pollution), but in a particular case within that problem area, and they do not
have the necessary theoretical background to handle it.
In a case of pollution, one
student in the class knows that if there is a clampdown on po.llution in his town, his
father will be out of a job. So what sort of position is he going to take on the prob
lem of pollution? Another student's father is an academic, and his job would go on re
gardless of whether the mills stopped working, at least for five years or so, so he will
probably take a different approach. Again, constant reference to a general set of ideas
about values is necessary.
For ages 16-18 (Grades 11-12 in Ontario), I have suggested a list of topics on
value theory that includes the following:
The purpose of morality; Justifying moral
judgments; Th(! self and others; Favoring an inner group; Human moral psychology; Attain
ing moral maturity; Hedonistic and Utilitarian theories; and Principles of decision
making. For these topics I have developed a set of materials (which McGraw-Hill, Canada,
will publish 1:his summer) called An Introduction to Ethics. The chapters are divided
into discrete sections, with questions and projects attached to form a basis for discus
sion and further research. Here, again, we return to a more general consideration of the
nature of values, the criteria of good and bad, right and wrong, and one's general ap
proach to value questions. The list o f topics is like the one for 5-9 year-olds in many
respects, but of course they are dealt with at a much higher level of sophistication. so
we have a sort of spiral curriculum, in Bruner's terms; and hence, the fact that I am
advocating a linear approach to value discussions.
I think that one can keep revisiting
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topics constantly and develop one's own spiral curriculum. However, unless one does have
a list of toplcs, one tends, as a teacher, to keep harping on the same topic; and stu
dents also have a feeling of "not getting anywhere." I know this seems to be a case of
pandering to numan weakness, but I think i t is something we have to do. Because of the
manner in which subjects are normally studied in school, we must provide students with a
list of topics so they can have the feeling of having "done" this or that.
The topics proposed for K-13 are in many cases what might be called substantive
topics; and this illustrates one way in which we, in our work, depart rather fundamental
ly from the approach suggested in the book Values and Teaching, by Raths, Harmin and
simon3 and the approach put forward by Oliver and Shaver in Teaching Public Issues in
High Schools 4 and by Newmann and Oliver in Clarifying Public Controversy. 5 we feel that
discussion of the form or methodology of moral reasoning as distinct from the content
will not take one very far in dealing with values. Further, I suppose there is some dis
agreement here with the suggestions of Milton Rokeach in his presentation as I think he
also tended to advocate the values-clarification approach that reveals to students their
values and th,? values of other prople and then waits to "see what happens." What we have
done is take up substantive issues schh as those I have listed and actually try to re
solve them in the classroom.
Let us consider an example.
Obviously, nearly all of us favor a circle of relatives and friends over other
people. Someone may be dying of starvation in India, yet we buy our son a $2,000 car.
Is that morally wrong? M:Jst of us would say that provided we send a donation of $SO to
India, we can still go ahead and buy our son a $2,000 car. And so, the classical utili
tarian principle proves to be completely unworkable. The idea that you strive for the
greatest happiness of the greatest number is just not a practical moral principle. How
ever, there are some hard questions here that we have to examine. To what extent_ are we
morally entitled to favor our inner group? I think one has to confront this and try to
a:r .n.ve at som~, general conclusions about it. The difference between this and indoctri
nation is that the teacher does not impose the conclusions; he does not come with set
conclusions. He himself comes to the group with a somewhat open mind on the matter and
joins the group as it tries to arrive at solutions or the beginnings of solutions to this
problem.
This also differs from the traditional prescriptive type of moral education where
a teacher tells the students what is right. He would say that Joe Blow down the road
should not have bought his son a $2,000 car; he should have · bought him a $1,000 car and
shipped off $1,000 to India.
(This kind of concrete, very specific moralizing is inap
propriate.) Not that there are no answers to cpestions of this kind, but a teacher nor
mally does not know enough about the circumstances of Joe Blow to make such a specific
judgment. So, in a classroom discussion, we try to avoid making pronouncements, or en
couraging the class to make pronouncements, on these concrete, personal, and very spe
cific moral problems of individuals, with respect to which we do not have enough infor
mation. But, we do try to arrive at conclusions at a somewhat more general level.
Groups in the class may continue to disagree right to the end. But their respective po
sitions will all have increased in soundness as a result of the discussion, and the stu
dents should sense the progress that has been made and note how it has been made.
Other questions of content that we get into are these:
How much importance
should governments attach to treating people equally? How much control should a govern
ment exercise over the economy? Are politicians immoral people? Again, we must normally
stay clear of very specific judgments, but we can work out general principles which would
help one to judge in cases of this kind. Then there is the law. Which laws are immoral
and which are not? What principles can we arrive at that would help us to answer this
kind of question? Further, is it true that businessmen are immoral, as so many people
seem to belive? If not, what is the place of business and commerce in the life of a
morally mature person? Again, what about national, racial, and cultural distinctions:
How important are these? Are people who are racially, nationally and culturally biased
completely up the creek? Or is there something in inner-group loyalty and cohesiveness
th~t is important? The modern movement toward internationalism: Again, is this a good
thing? And so we try to resolve these kinds of substantive issues - with the teacher
always openly learning along with the students, so that we minimize the problem of in
doctrination.
I would like now to make a few observations concerning Kohlberg's theory of cog
nitive moral development, in the light of our own thinking and research.
To begin with,
we have again and again found evidence of the broad pattern of invariant progress through
the stages, and although not all reach the post-conventional stages (according to Kohl
berg, at least 80 per cent of Americans never proceed beyond Stage 4), yet insofar as
th ey develop morally, they go through the stages in the sequence indicated by Kohlberg.
There a.re, however, some qualifications of Kohlberg's account of the stages that
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I wish to suggest. I have informally noticed in Stage 4 students some awareness of more
obvious life goals- such as survival, security, health-which are served by morality and
seen as part of the basis of morality, Not it is important to realize this; otherwise,
one might easily classify a Stage 4 student as Stage 5; and this is in fact a standard
mistake that inexperienced people make when they are trying to assess students on this
kind of scale.
There is some inkling of more ultimate purposes that are served by mor
ality at Stage 4; although the main emphasis is certainly upon the maintenance of rules
and law and order.
Stage 6, as I see it, contains people who see the sole purpose of morality as
that of serving fundamental life goals such as f reedom, love, happiness, survival, self
respect; or, if you like the kinds of "terminal values" that Milton Rokeach has identi
fied although we can have discussions as to which values should be included in the list
and which excluded. But a Stage 6 person is a thorough-going utilitarian in some senses.
He says, "Well, morality must serve certain broad life goals for myself and for other
people.
If a particular implementation of a particular moral rule, principle or pro
cedure on a particular occasion does not serve these life goals, then we must set it
aside." And he has no qualms about that.
In a way, he accepts head-on the idea that the
ends justify the means. However, he recognizes that a log of people who have performed
highly immoral acts in the name of "the ends justifying the means," have, in fact, not
taken sufficient account of all the ends at stake in the situation. Sometimes when one
talks about what I have described as Stage 6 morality, people say, "But wouldn't this
justify Hitler's murdering six million Jews? I mean, after all, there was probably some
life goal he was pursuing." But think of all the life goals -even of the Nazis them
selves - that were frustrated by the measures he took. So, a lot of the obvious counter
examples of this kind of approach to morality can be met simply by pointing out that they
are not cases of the ends justifying the means; the means are not justifiable on any
ground. In fact, the ends do not justify the means if we take account of all the rele
vant ends which are affected by the particular course of action in question.
We could argue at great length about Stage 6. What I have suggested here is that
at Stage 6, a person takes account of all relevant considerations; and the reason why
this is an important qualification of Kolhberg's position is that at Stage 6, he sees
justice as the fundamental moral principle. Now in one sense of justice, he could be
saying simply what I am saying.
The word "justice" was used by the Greeks and has been
used by many people since to refer to doing what is right, all things considered; and if
this is what Kohlberg means by justice at Stage 6 there is no problem. A person takes
all relevant considerations into account; he is not hung up on rules {Stage 4); he is not
hung up on authority figures {Stage l); he is not hung up on institutions and processes
{Stage 5); he takes all these things into account but does.not take any one of them as
decisive.
However, there are some narrower definitions of justice. It is possible to
define justice in terms of simply equality - literally giving everyone the same amount of
everything - and it seems to me fairly obvious that this is inadequate as the ultimate
underpinning of a workable morality. Another definition of justice is giving everyone
what he deserves. Again, this is hardly appropriate as the ultimate underpinning of
morality - unless one defines what everyone deserves in a very broad way, so that it
comes down again to doing what is right, all things considered . The word "justice," then
is very ambiguous; and unless it is conceived and expressed in terms of taking all rele
vant considerations into account, it yields a rather narrow definition of moral maturity,
which we must avoid.
Conclusions
In Chc,pter 3 of Moral Education in the Schools, I summarize my approach to ethics
and some of its implications for schooling. This summary can here serve as an appropri
ate conclusion to my remarks.
1,
TI1ere is undoubtedly fairly wide diversity in moral codes in our society and
around the world, and hence a considerable amount of time in classes on values should be
spent in revie,wing these in order to build up understanding and, where appropriate, tol
erance of idfferent points of view.

2. Hcwever , the relativity of morals is limited, since certain basic and gener
ally accepted goals can be identified. Students should learn to identify these goals,
compare them in terms of ultimacy, and determine the emphasis to be given to each indif
ferent circumEtances. It should be pointed out that these goals normally cut across ideo
logical and religious differences.
3. ·Morality does have goals that lie beyond itself; and hence students should
normally be encouraged to abandon the conformity orientation, which simply accepts spe
cific moral values and rules as they are handed down, and le rn to identify the reasons
that lie behind morality. One must be careful, here, however, as some students may live
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in circumstances such that they cannot handle a post-conformity orientation,
4. Much of traditional morality - temperance, patience, courage, unselfishness,
humility, honesty, promise-keeping, and so on - can be salvaged, and the student, having
recognized the purposes of morality and having learned how much weight to give to various
moral values in differing circumstances, can be encouraged to develop a healthy respect
for morality.

s. Moral decisions are a subclass of human life decisions, generally distin
guished by a particular kind of inner conflict. Only a limited amount of class time
should be spent in trying to distinguish moral from non-moral decisions. The important
task is to learn how to make sound decisions, all things considered.
6.
In making sound decisions in the area of interpersonal morality, one should
strike a balance between providing for one's own needs and providing for the needs of
others. On the contrary, they should be shown that the major concern of ethics is to
try to arrive at mutually beneficial arrangements or "happy compromises" in the light of
more ultimate life goals; and they should be given practice in developing such arrange
ments and compromises.
7. Also, in making sound moral decisions, one must face up to the fact that,
normally, one can help only a limited group of people. Moral principles that require us
to treat everyone alike are seldom useful. Students should learn how to determine the
population to which particular acts of kindness and unselfishness ought to be directed.
8. While sound moral attitudes and behavior are undoubtedly an essential ingre
dient in total world harmony and well-being, they are only an ingredient, and must be
supplemented by appropriate institutions of various kinds with adequate built-in reward
structures. Students should be made aware of the limited scope of morality, and of its
c c,,-,,·,cc,:;-::i o ;-is with other realms of inquiry and p::c. ctice. They should constantly be en
couraged to pursue problems in political theory, law, economics, social theory, psycho
logical theory, education, and so on. They should be encouraged to develop an overall
theory of man and society. This will be of value in itself, and will also help them to
gain more adequate perspectives on the nature and purpose of morality.
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IF WE DO NOT SPF.AK OUT ON BEHALF OF MANKIND, WHO WILL?
by
Warren L. Ziegler
( Re printed by permission from Pennys Forum, Spring-Summer, 1971, pp. 18-19.)

Mankind is in desperate need of a new capacity; to invent the future, We must
lea rn to engaq e in political social, human acts of invention which might produce a future
better than tl.1e present, which is the product of past inventions. All of us, rich and
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poor, black and white, teacher and student, manager and worker, government official and
citizen, must develop a new set of skills and attitudes for which we have few human and
institutional precedents.
This need, which I have described as desperate, arises from a perception of the
future based upon unthoughtful acts of invention we are now undertaking. What do I mean
by "unthoughtful" acts of invention? Just this-we have not yet learned how and why to
pay attention to the unanticipated and unintended consequences of decisions we take in
the present.
Some of these decisions occur in social and political affairs, taken by govern
ments and legitimate authorities.
Q:>nsider, for example, the decision in the 19S0's to
build a nationwide network of superhighways, at a cost of over 70 billion dollars.
The
consequences of that decision have locked us into a transportation mode which will be
very difficult to break. That decision has now, in the decade of the Seventies, power
fully reduced our governmental capacity to invent alternative modes of mass transporta
tion which move people as efficiently, with more safety, and without the consequence of
further ecological deterioration.
some of these decisions occur in the fields of science and technology. Such de
cisions we are more inclined to call "inventions" or discoveries.
Scientific and tech
nological breakthroughs now in the making promise to confront us with a set of human and
societal problems unprecedented in their moral, organizational, human consequences.
Item: Within the next ten years or so, we may well possess the scientific capa
city to "clone" a human being. Without going into technical explanation, this means that
it will be possible to reproduce a genetically-identical twin or any person on the globe
... or an entire race of such "twins."
Questions: Who is going to decide which person is so full of grace, virtue,
beauty, courage, intelligence, strength, wisdom that he or she deserves to be reproduced
identically? How are we going to decide?
Item: Within a decade or so, it will probably be possible to control the behav
ior of human beings by radio-electronic stimulation of the brain, in such a way that the
individual so-controlled believes he is acting out of his own volition or free will, as
an autonomous person.
Questions: How shall we use this technique? Should we use it or even permit it
to be developed? can we control its application in a way which will benefit mankind ra
ther than lead us into a subtle system of slavery in which we continue to believe we are
free?
Item: Within a decade - probably less - we shall possess computers which can
respond in behavioral terms to standard IQ tests and score 150 or better.
Questions: How do we develop the wisdom to utilize this electronic intelligence?
For what purposes shall we use it? Will it enable us to solve complex social engineering
problems? Shall we end up-or want to end up-as print-outs from a computer program?
These items are merely suggestive.
It is possible to add literally hundreds more
to the list of forecasts of important scientific/technological breakthroughs which repre
sent the discovery and application of knowledge to the condition of man in society.
Some of these decisions are neither governmental nor scientific/technological,
and we rarely call them inventions because most of them are not.
They are "people" de
cisions, involving masses of human beings. No one person or organization has either the
authority or the power to pay attention to the long-term consequences of these people
decisions. But in the long-run, they are the most powerful, the most consequential, the
most difficult to forecast and deal with. In our society, many of these decisions repre
sent consumer behavior. We are just beginning to learn how millions of individual con
sumer choices and producer decisions (by giant corporations, farmers, small businesses)
bring with them unintended and unanticipated consequences which waste, pollute, irre
versibly destroy our natural environment and resources.
But the worst and most unforgivable decisions of all are those which result in
the waste, pollution, denigration, destruction of our human environment ... which means
people. Wars, brutality, violence, discrimination and injustice result from our apparent
incapacity to invent new forms and kinds of individual and collective behavior. We have
not yet learned how to free ourselves from that oppressive weight of tradition, institu
tion, and culture where i t no longer assists us to deal with the formidable social
changes which represent fundamental breaks or, as Peter Drucker calls them,
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"Discontinuities" with the past.
We must learn new models of how and why to live together on this shrinking globe.
But if models from the past are inadequate to this task, then we must learn how to invent
them. Unless we learn how to invent "alternative futures," the least surprising future
will emerge from the past like an uncontrollable behemoth, forcing us into desperate sit
uations in cities, nations, and the good ship earth, where sheer physical survival be
comes our sole need and purpose. Survival is an old ethic, which we all understand. But
can we invent a new ethic?
The plain fact is that we no longer have to look to science fiction to titillate
our imaginations about the future. Science fiction has come to life. We no longer have
to attempt to forecast what the future will be like. we are living and inventing that
future right now.
But will it be a futurJ we want? Will i t be our future ... or somebody else's?
Are we now co l onizing the future-the last frontier of mankind--in the same way that past
generations made decisions whose unanticipated and unintended consequences we are now
living, many of them to our detriment? In short, can we now begin the new, main business
of life; inventing a human future?
There are many difficult problems to understand and solve before we can provide
satisfactory answers to these questions. Ultimately, these answers will represent a new
consensus about the good, the true and the beautiful in human affairs, the content of a
new ethic. But first we must pay attention to here-and-now problems. One major problem
lies in the ai:ea of values, about which in our society, and perhaps throughout the world,
we increasing~y disagree. One remembers the traditional caution: you can't argue about
values, for there is no basis for disputing what one person values as against what an
other person values. Values are neither true nor false, in the scientific sense. Values
do not emerge as the conclusions of solely scientific or intellectual inquiry. They are
a composite of an extremely rich and complex interaction of social tradition, inherited
cultural belief, spiritual perception, affective need and procivity, and intention or
will.
This complex mix of social and individual forces takes on specific meaning in
situations of growing up, education and socialization, love, sex, marriage, politics,
economy (meaning production, distribution and consumption) .•. a host of acts and institu
tions which, if we examine them closely, we discover what i t is we really value.
What we value we learn by observing what we say and do. Values are symbolic cat
egories-ideas , notions, articulated feelings, if you will - which enable us to rank be
haviors and events and discover which we prefer and which we don't.
The central problem
is simply this : when we observe ourselves in the living, breathing, acting present, we
find that our traditional consensus about values is rapidly eroding. Disagreements about
wha t we should do, in any given situation, have become exacerbated. we have begun to
recognize that traditional beliefs about what is good no longer produce agreement when
applied to spE,cific life situations. Consider, for a moment, some evidence:
(1) the
rapid shift in values held by some members of the present youth generation, resulting in
so-called "radical" behaviors on campus, in high school, with drugs and sex, in communes,
in politics, in economics and ecology;
(2) the opposing judgments among our citizens
a bo ut Vietnam;
(3) the increasingly volatile conflict within our populace about whether
or no t black and other minority groups are to be treated as full-fledged citizens of so
ciety, in political, economic, human terms;
(4) disagreements about social priorities
f or the allocation of our resources ... to ending urban deterioration, to supporting con
t inued space exploration, t o clean up our living, drinking, breathing spaces, to provide
post-secondary education for everyone, youth and adult.

we might find it useful to recognize that resources are not solely economic.
They comprise more than money , machines, goods, jobs, economic production. Indeed, our
most important resource is ourselves, our human resource, a marvelous wealth of intelli
g ence, will, energy and emotion. For a century or more, humanresourceshave been allo
~a ted. mainly towards building a powerful economic engine to produce a "better" life, an
American" way o f life. Now we discover our lack of clarity about what is "better," in
deed about what is "American." we discover that traditional beliefs about what is good
f or us no lon;;ier serve equally well, among all of us, to guide and justify our choices
and behaviors.
Indeed, the notion that resources extend far beyond a conventional economic and
m~terialistic definition is itself an attempt to move into a new mode of social inven
t~on. Consider, for example, the vast, untapped experience and wisdom collected in our
0
d ~eople. We relegate them to the scrap heap of no work, no job, no love, no place,
:~ time. But if that rare quality -wisdom- resides in any age-cohort, are these not
: very people to whom we might first look? What marvelous contributions they might
ma e to the scores of thousands of day-care centers which, in this decade, we shall
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develop for our infants. What stories they could tell, what patience they could provide,
what simple acts of loving, teaching, reading, and learning games they could give to in
fants who have not yet "learned" to denigrate age, who have not yet adopted, like the
rest of us, the value of false youth and physical vigor.
Consider the vast reservoir of energy untapped in those millions of our citizens
who, because of poor training, racial discrimination, an under-employment economy, have
no "jobs" and are therefore ronsidered less than human. Can we not invent the social in
stitutions within which that energy is given an opportunity to apply to a huge range of
unfinished or scarcely started tasks which would help us beautify our human, social and
physical environment and make it habitable for human beings?
We do not value these resources. We do not value these human beings. That tells
us what our values are, and sets the problem. New social inventions depend upon our will
ingness to investigate new priorities, to open ourselves to alternative interpretations
of what is to be valued, to recognize that we must mix the good we take from the past with
new ideas about the good we shall learn to discover for the future.
How are we to invent new values? Our accumulated knowledge and experience in
education, in psychology, and in ethics, enables us at least to begin to break down that
task into more specific components.
It is these romponent behaviors which must become a
part of the education of our children, as well as of ourselves.
I call this, for want
of a better term, " inventive education," and I believe we must implement i t in all the
forms and kinds of schooling and education in which scores of millions of infants,youth
and adults are engaged. What are the characteristics of this inventive education? That
we scarcely kr.ow. But it would appear to rontain some mixture of the following:
(1)

A psychological capacity to deal comfortably with uncertainty and ambiguity.

(2)
Intuition: a process of inventive, pre-conscious insight which we mustpro
mote and accept even though i t still withstands clear scientific explanation.
(3) §Ynthesis: a capacity to develop new canbinations and meanings from old
components and ideas, to "see the forest for the trees."
(4) Moral Courage: a skill - to be learned from practice and imitation- and
willingness to speak out against all forms of human injustice perpetrated by man against
man.
(5) E~ological Courage: an ability to speak out against all forms of man's in
justice to his natural environment.
(6) Self-governance: an understanding amongst us all, but particularly teach
ers, students a nd administrators, to clearly distinguish between spurious administrative/
organizational power and the genuine authority of great ideas and hard facts.
(7) Choice: A disposition to choose among alternatives with practical wisdom,
which means, among other things, not to protect youth and adults from the consequences
of wrong choices.
(8) Futures-cognition: Being openminded about the future, seeking not to colo
nize it but to tolerate, indeed celebrate the alternative futures invented by colleagues,
friends, strangers, other groups and nations.
(9) 1h~mos: The Greek word, the marvelous notion which we might translate as
spirit, w i l l , - ~ u rag e, whi ch enables us to harness and bring into balance our intel
lect and our appetites.
(10) The Questi ve Spirit: The development of our capacity and willingness to
seek after the good , the true and the beautiful when we are now all very unclear about
what these qualities mean in human affairs.
(11) Mankind Itself: When all is said and done, the content of inventive educa
tion and its sole purpose to teach our children and ourselves that it is right, it is
proper , it is possible and it is necessary to speak out on behalf of mankind, future arrl
present. For if we do not, who will?
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VAWES AND OUR YOUTH
by
Gordon

w.

Allport

(Reprinted by permission from Teachers College Record, (December 1961), Teachers College,
Columbia UnivEirsity, New York, pp. 211-219.)
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one aim of education is to make available the wisdom of the past and present so
that youth may be equipped to solve the problems of the future.
If this is so, then we
have good groi:,nds for a feeling of consternation concerning the adequacy of our present
educational procedures. The reason is that in the immediate future, the youth of today
will have to live in a world very unlike the world of the past from which our store of
wisdom has beEm drawn.
SOME PROSPECTS
Think of the vastly changed nature of life in the future, for which we have
little relevant wisdom from the past to call upon:
1,
The new generation of students will have to face an ever increasing domina
tion o f life by science, by technology, and by automation.
(One thinks of the story of
two cows graz:ing along the roadside. An immense milk truck passes with the painted leg
end: Pasteuri~:ed, Homogenized, Vitamin B Added. One cow turns to the other and says,
"Makes you fe<::,l inadequate, doesn't it?")

2.
longer in a
quarters of
segregation

n,e new generation will have to recognize the impossibility of living any
state of condescension toward the colored peoples of the world (about three
the world's population). centuries of comfortable caste discrimination and
are from here on impossible to maintain.

3. The coming generation will have to deal with a population explosion whose
predicted magnitude staggers our imagination.
4.
I1. will need a completer understanding of world societies and their marked
di f ferences in values.
In the past, we could be politely ignorant of such places as
Af rica, Latin America, and Asia in a way that is no longer possible.
5.
I1: will have to create a world government or, at least, an effective confed
e ration to forestall the threat of thermonuclear war.

6. As if a planetary world view were not difficult enough to achieve, the com
ing generation may have to develop an interplanetary point of view.
(I find this pros
pect especially alarming because we seem to be solving the problems of outer space be
f ore those of the inner space of mind, character, and values.)
It is no wonder that this preview of problems confronting our youth throws us
educators into a state of self-scrutiny bordering sometimes on panic. Where can youth
f ind the needed equipment? Are they sound enough in mind and morale?
Sometimes our dismay finds an outlet in gallows humor. They tell of the benevo
lent lady who saw a depressing specimen of the very young generation sprawled on the
curb o f a city street, swilling down cans of beer. Greatly shocked, she asked, "Little
boy, why aren't you in school?" "Cripes, lady," he replied, "I'm only four years old."
And they tell the story of the London bobby. London police, we know, are well
trained for social work, even for psychotherapy.
This bobby's beat was Waterloo Bridge.
He spotted a man about to jump over and intercepted him.
"Come now," he said. "Tell me
what is the matter.
Is i t money?" The man shook his head.
"Your wife perhaps?" An0ther shake of the head.
"Well, what is i t then?" The would-be suicide replied, "I'm
:orried about the state of the world."
"Oh, come now," said the bobby.
"It can't be so
fad. Let's walk up and down the bridge here and talk it over." Whereupon they strolled
o r about an hour discussing the state of the world, and then they both jumped over.
Humor helps us put our dilemma into sane perspective, but it does not solve the
p roblem. The vague apprehension we feel has led to certain empirical studies of the
values of toda Y ' s you th , with
.
.
results, alas, that are not reassuring.
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ASSESSING VAWES
1
Not long ago, Professor Phillip Jacob undertook to survey all available studies
concernin;J the values held by college students. He found a marked uniformity among them.
Fully three-quarters of the students were "gloriously contented, both in regard to their
present day-to-day activity and their outlook for the future." Their aspirations were
primarily for material gratifications for themselves and their families. They "fully ac
cepted the conventions of the contemporary business society as the context within which
they will realize their personal desires." While they will not crusade against segrega
tion and racial injustice, they will accept non-discrimination when i t comes as a "ne
cessary convention in a homogenized culture." They subscribe to the traditional virtues
of sincerity, honesty, and loyalty, but are indulgent concerning laxity in moral stand
ards. They normally express a need for religion, but there is a hollow quality in their
beliefs.
They do not desire to have an influential voice in public policy or government.
Their sense of civic duty stops at the elementary obligation of voting. They predict
another major war within a dozen years, but they say that international problems give
them little concern and that they spend no time on them. Only a minority value their
college education primarily in terms of its intellectual gains.
They regard it as good
because it gives them vocational prepartion, social status, and a good time. Such is
flabby value-fibre that Jacob discovers among college students of today.
The picture becomes more vivid when viewed in cross-national perspective. James
Gillespie and I, in a comparative study2 of the values of college youth in 10 nations,
asked students to write their autobiographies of the future ("My life from now until the
year 2000") and also gave them an extensive questionnaire. The instrument was translated
into nine different languages.
In comparison with youth of other nations, young Americans are delightfully frank
and open, unsuspicious and cooperative. Their documents had no literary affectation
(and, I may add, little literary quality). But the most important finding was thatwith
in these 10 nations, American students were the most self-centered, the most "privatis
tic" in values. They desired above all else a rich, full life for themselves, and showed
little concern for national welfare or for the fate of mankind at large.
The context of
their outlook was private rather than public, passive rather than pioneer. The essential
point is made clear by two excerpts, the first drawn from the autobiography of a Mexican
girl, 18 years of age, and the second from a Radcliffe student of the same age:
Since I like psychology very much, I wish, on leaving this school, to
study it, specializing in it and exercising it as a profession.
I shouldn't
like co get married right away, although like any woman I am desirous of
gettir~ married before realizing all my aspirations.
In addition, I should
like to do something for my country-as a teacher, as a psychologist, or
as a mother. As a teacher, to guide my pupils in the best path, for at
the present time they need solid basis in childhood in order in their
future lives not to have so many frustrations as the youth of the present.
As a psychologist, to make studies which in some way will serve humanity
and my beloved country. As a mother, to make my children creatures who
are useful to both their country and all humanity.
Now follows the Radcliffe document.

Its flavor of privatism is unmistakable:

Our summers will be spent lobster fishing on the Cape.
Later we'll
take a look at the rest of the country-California, the Southwest, and
the Chicago Stockyards. I want the children, when they get past the
age of ten, to spend part of the summer away from home, either at camp
or as apprentices to whatever profession they may show an interest in.
Finally, I hope we will be able to take a trip to Europe, especially
to Russia, to see what can be done about Communism.
Many critics have called attention to the same American value predicament. Our
current social pattern, they say, is almost completely geared to one objective alone,
namely a profitable, expanding production. To insure expanding production, there must be
more and more consumption. Hence comes the expensive glamor of our advertising and its
control of our mass media. The sole objective seems to be to stimulate the accretion of
goods. Self-respect and status, as well as comfort, are acquired in this way. Someone
has called our national disease "galloping consumption." Half a century ago, William
James saw the peril and was much worried by what he called "the American terror of pov
erty." He saw there was truth in the jibes that other countries direct at our "materi
alism."
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HOPE IN UNEASINESS
Now a high standard of living is not in itself an evil thing. All the worldwants
what we already have. But the single-minded pursuit of production and consumption has
brought a dulling of other values. One consequence is symbolized by the scandal of rig
ged quiz programs. These were in the service of advertising, which in turn was in the
service of a profitable expanding economy. Another consequence is the accumulated froth
of our TV, radio, and movies. Another is the widely discussed conformity of the organi
zation man, as well as the futile rebellion of the beats. An especially peppery critic,
Paul Goodman,3 has shown that the starved lives of juvenile delinquents and of young
people caught in the organizational grind are at bottom much alike. Both are attracted
to the cult of easiness and aspire to nothing more than amiable mediocrity. Both styles
of living fail to prepare youth for the problems that lie ahead for themselves and for
the nation.
All this familiar criticism is irritating; yet the fact that i t flourished is a
hopeful sign. We suspect it may be too harsh. I am inclined to think so. It is rash
indeed to indict a whole generation. At worst, Jacob's gloomy picture held for three
quarters of the college students studied, but not at all for a vital and far from negli
gible minority. And even though the gloomy generalizations have some truth in them, are
the assets given fair attention? I myself have some favorable impressions, although one
man's view is not reliable. But youth today appears to enjoy a certain freedom and flex
ibility that was not common in the more rigid days of our parents and grandparents.
I
even have the impression that there is less neuroticism among students now than among
those of a generation ago. What is more, young people, I find, are not blind to the
world changes that are occurring. Their apparent repression of the challenge is due
largely to their bewilderment =ncerning proper paths to take. (And one has the feeling
that our own statesmen in Washington are no less bewildered.) All in all, these are
hopeful signs that should not be overlooked.
VALUES AND THE SCHOOL
Another hopeful sign is the fact that many teachers are asking, "What can we do
to be helpful?" They know, and we all know, that the ability of the school to give
training in values is limited. For one thing, the home is vastly more important. A
home that infE,cts the child with galloping consumption, that encourages only canned re
creation and has no creative outlets, can only with difficulty be offset by the school.
Another limitation lies in the fact that the school is ordinarily expected to mirror cur
rent social values and to prepare the child to live within the existing frame.
It is an
unusual school system and an unusual teacher who even wish to transcend the current
fashions of value.
But assuming that we have an unusual school system and an unusual teacher, what
values shall they elect to teach? If they do not choose to follow the prevailing fash
ions, what standards shall they follow? The ancient ~mans were fond of asking, "Who
will judge the judges?" and ''Who will guard the guardians?" Can the guardians turn
perhaps to standard discussions of "the aims of education?" Such discussions are num
erous, abstract, and often dull.
Their weakness, I feel, is their effort to formulate
absolute goals, vistas of abstract perfection.
The result is often a series of plati
tudes or generalizations so broad as to be unhelpful. Of course we want to develop
"good citizenship"; we certainly want to "free the child's intellect. 11 These and all
other absolutes need to be reduced to concrete, stepwise processes before they can guide
us in the strategy of teaching values.
The teacher must start with the stiuation as he or she finds it and in concrete
instances sharpen the value-attributes of the lesson being taught. To a =nsiderable
extent, these value-attributes can be drawn from the codified wisdom of our nation. We
cannot neglect the value of profitable production and high living standards, for all our
vocational and professional education contribute to this end. But the codified wisdom
of our unique society extends far beyond the obsession of today. Our values include al
so such matters as respect for civil liberties. Does the school accent this value?
They ~nclude approval for individual initiative, for philanthropy, for compassion. And
they imply much concerning civic duties that are the reciprocal of civic rights. What
mu st we do to deserve our precious cornucopia of freedom? Vote? Yes. But voting does
no good unless the voter is informed above the stereotyped level of the mass media. He
~us~ also pay taxes willingly. Do schools and colleges teach the young to pay a glad
_ax.
I wonder. To me the most disturbing finding in Youth's Outlook on the Future lay
1
th e elaborate talk about one's right to a rich, full life and in the almost total
~
si 1 ence regarding one's duties.
I am saying that in the first instance teachers should choose the values they
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teach from the whole (not from a part) of our American ethos. Deep in our hearts we know,
and most of the world knows, that our national values, derived, of course, from Judeo
Christian ethics, are about the finest mankind has yet formulated.
In no sense are these
values out of date, nor will they go out of date in the world of tomorrow. Yet many of
them are badly rusted. Unless they are revitalized, however, our youth may not have the
personal fortitude and moral implements that the future will require.

THE LARGER ANCHOR
Excellent as the American Creed is as a fountainhead of values, i t does not con
tain them all,
It says nothing explicity, for example, about intellectual curiosity.
And yet surely schools exist to augment this value.
The most severe indictment of our
educational procedures I have ever encountered is the discovery that a sizeable percent
age of graduates of our colleges after completing their formal education never afterward
read a single book.
There are other important values that are not spelled out in our American Creed.
I am thinkin;J of those details of human relationships that make all the difference be
tween boorishness and brotherhood in the human family. As our population increases, it
becomes more and more important to teach the elements of the new science of human rela
tions which go far toward smoothing the roughness of common life by leading us to respect
effectively the integrity of the other fellow.
I recall a teacher of English whose class
was studying The Merchant of Venice. She turned a wave of incipient anti-Semitism in her
class to a sound lesson in values. Shylock, she explained, was like the resentful, self
seeking portion of every person's nature. we are all potential Shylocks. But while
self-love is prominent in all of us, we are so constructed that it need not be sovereign
in our natures.

To return for a moment to the relation between home and school-the former, as I
have said, is far more important. Recognizing this fact, some people say, "Well, let's
leave the teaching of values to the home and to the church. Schools can't do much of
anything about the matter."
This position is untenable.
If the school does not teach values, it will have
the effect of denyin;J them. If the child at achool never hears a mention of honesty,
modesty, charity, or reverence, he will be persuaded that, like many of his parents'
ideas, they a~e simply old hat. As they grow toward adolescence, children become criti
cal of the teaching of both parents and the church. They are in a questioning stage. If
the school, which to the child represents the larger outside world, is silent on values,
the child will repudiate more quickly the lessons learned at home. He will also be
thrown onto peer values more completely, with their emphasis on the hedonism of teen-age
parties or on the destructiveness of gangs. He will also be more at the mercy of the
sensate values peddled by movies, TV, and disk jockeys. What is more, some homes, as we
have said, give no fundamental value training.
In such a case, it is only in the school
that the chi lcl has any chance at all of finding ethical anchorage.
This brings us to the hardest question: How does the teacher, the instructor,
the professor, handle his assignment in the classroom? How is it possible to teach
values, including the value of intellectual curiosity?
THE MEANING OF VALUE
Before tacklin;J this question, we must pause to define what we mean by value.
You will recognize that I am using the term psychologically, not in its objective phil
osophical sense. Values, as I use the term, are simply meanings perceived as related to
self.
The child experiences value whenever he knows that a meaning is warm and central
to himself. Values, to borrow Whitehead's term, are "matters of importance" as distinct
from mere matters of fact.
So much for definition. Now the hard-pressed teacher is given a solid substan
tive curriculum to teach. The curriculum in its original state consists of mere matters
of fact. And on the number of facts absorbed the pupil's standing depends.
It takes
virtually all of a teacher's time to convey factual information and grade the pupil on
his achievement. There is little time left to transmute these matters of fact into mat
ters of importance, let alone teach all of the moral and social values we have thus far
been discussing.

The curriculum itself is not, and should not be, a direct aid. Prescribed in
struction in values would be laughed out of court. we have recently been bumped by Sput
nik headformost into core subjects. Get on with science, mathematics, language! Away
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with courses in folk-dancing, personal adjustment, and fudgemaking!
I agree that value
study has no place in curriculum planning, but not because it is a frivolous subject rather, because it is a subject too hard and too subtle for curriculum makers.
Education for values occurs only when teachers teach what they themselves stand
for, no matter what their subject is.
If I were to write a treatise on the teaching of
values, I would give most of my emphasis to the moral pedagogy that lies in a teacher's
incidental comments, to the obiter dicta.
The hard core is central, but the hard core
has a penumbra of moral significance.
I mentioned the teacher of English who made a
value-lesson out of Shylock.
I recall also my college professor of geology who paused
in his lecture on diatom ooze to say to us,
"Others would not agree with me, but I con f ess that whenever I study diatoms, I don't see how anyo ne can doubt the existence of
God because t:-1e design and behavior of these protozoa are so marvelous." Is i t not in
teresting how we all recall the obiter dicta of our teachers, the penumbra of value they
point out to us, surrounding the hard-core data? We remember them better than the sub
ject matter itself.
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Why does the student remember them so well? No current theory of learning seems
able to tell us.
I suspect it is because values, being matters of importance to the
self , are always warm and central and ego-involved and therefore claim priority on our
a ttention. The child, being value-ripe, cannot help being impressed when the teacher be
tr a ys excitement and enthusiasm for a mode of thought or for the content of the subject
being studied.
True, the youngster does not, and should not, adopt the teacher's values
ready-made; but the teacher's self-disclosure leads the student to self-discovery.

f-

1n

I

l

What wouldn't we give if we could develop intellectual ardor in every child for
hard core subjects? Why is it that for most pupils arithmetic, spelling, physics, re
main forever full matters of fact and never become a meaning perceived as related to the
self? One reason, I think, is that the weary teacher fails to convey his own sense of
the importanc•~ of the subject to the student.
If he did so, he would, as I have said, at
least fix att,mtion upon the value-potentiality of the subject.
Anoth, ir reason perhaps is that not all of a teacher's obiter dicta are wholesome.
Some, indeed, may be deeply damaging, though the teacher may be innocent of any such in
tent. Sometimes we hear incidental (but still attitude-forming) remarks like this one:
"All right now, children. You have had a good time playing at recess; now settle down to
your English :... esson." Play is recognized as a matter of joyf ul importance. English, the
teacher is saying in effect, is a mere routine matter of fact.
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VAWES AND LEARNING
I think our educational psychology has been mostly wrong about the process of
learning - or perhaps not so much wrong as woefully incomplete. At the beginning of his
learning career, a young child cannot, of course, be expected to feel adult enthusiasm
f or the intellectual content of his studies. He does his work in the first instance to
a void a scolding or because he has a habit of obeying instructions. Soon he finds added
incentive.
The teacher - really in the role of mother - gives praise and love ("Susan,
I am proud o f you").
There is a great deal of such dependency in the learning situation.
Love and soci a l reward (as well as some fear of punishment) sustain the processes of at
tention and re,tention. When the child puts forth intellectual effort, he does so in or
der to obtain a gold star, commendation, or other symbols of love.
All tl:.ese incentives are extraneous to the subject matter. The youngster does
not learn it because it is a matter of importance. When he leaves school or college, he
loses these extraneous suppo rts. He finds his love relations directly; they are no long
er a reward fer intellectual effort. Hence, intellectual apathy sets in, and, distress
ing to say, nc further books are read.
In such a case as this, intellectual curiosity was never tied to independence,
o n~y t o extraneous supports. At some point in the schooling - and the earlier the better
- intellectual activity should become not a second-hand but a first-hand fitting to the
;ense o f self. At the beginning, all learning must be tied, perhaps, to specific reino rcements; but if the dependency is long continued, authentic curiosity fails to develop.
It would be going too far to put the blame for intellectual apathy onto our cur
rbent teaching of educational psychology. Yet I am inclined to feel somewhat punitive
amatt
out this ma tt er. Psychology has not yet settled down to the problem of transformin;i
a t ers of fact - whose acquisition current learning theories explain fairly well - into
u onomous matt ers o f importance•
.
. at all.
wh:i.ch
they do not explain
Our emphasis has been on learning by drill and by reinforcement.
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Such "habit

acquisition" receives all the emphasis. But the learning theory involved postulates a
continuing dependency relation (extraneous reinforcement). When the relation terminates,
the habits of study simply extinguish themselves. I am surprised, therefore, that stim
ulus-response psychologists do not see this consequence of their own theory.
Insofar as
teachers employ an educational psychology of this order, they are not likely to break the
dependency relation, which belongs properly only to the earlier stages of schooling.
Matters of importance, I strongly believe, are not acquired by drill or by rein
forcement.
They are transformations of
ts and skills from the "opportunistic" layer
of personality into the ego-system itself.
Once inside the ego-system, these habits and
skills turn into true interests and utilize the basic energy, the basic spontaneity, that
the organism itself possesses.
They are no longer sustained as "operant conditionings"
by outside rewards. The interest, now being the very stuff of life itself, needs no
outer supports.

ha9t

FUNCTIONAL AUTONOMY
I have called this process of transforming means into ends, of changing extrinsic
values into intrinsic values, functional autonomy. Concerning this concept, I am often
asked two questions:
How do you define "functional autonomy, and how does functional
autonomy come about?"
For a definition, I offer the following:
Functional autonomy refers to any ac
quired system of motivation in which the tensions involved are no longer of the same
kind as the antecedent tensions from which the acquired system developed. 5 To answer the
question of how functional autonomy comes about requires a more extended and technical
discussion.
I can only hint at the direction of my answer. Neurologists are gradually
discovering a basis for what I would call "perseverative functional autonomy." I refer
to the "self-sustaining circuits," "feedback mechanisms," and "central motive states"
that are now commonly recognized to exist in the nervous system. This line of discovery,
I find, provides a partial answer to the question. But I believe we have to go further
and call on the concept of self. Values, we have said, are meanings perceived as relat
ed to the sel:f. Functional autonomy is not a mere perseverative phenomenon; it is, above
all, an ego-involved phenomenon. Besides admitting an opportunistic layer to person
ality, which :i.s the exclusive concern of most current theories of learning, we have no
choice but to admit also a "propriate" layer. It is in this layer that all matters of
importance reside.
The goal of the educator, then, is to shift the content of the subject he teaches
from the opportunistic (matter of fact) layer to the propriate. But there is no sure
fire, mechanical strategy to use.
The best general rule, one that John Dewey saw clearly,
is to strive ceaselessly to integrate routine matters of fact into the growing experience
system of the child himself , It would take a long treatise to specify various detailed
strategies of teaching that help achieve this goal.
Let me focus on only one aspect of this topic, upon a canmonmistake that teachers
make.
I myself am a continual offender. It is to present students with our own care
f ully thought out conclusions when they themselves lack the raw experience from which
these conclusions are fashioned.
This particular error is inherent, for example, in the lecture system. Instead
of lecturing on comparative religion, for instance, it would be much better to require
all students to attend services of worship that are unfamiliar to them. If raw experi
ence is present, then perhaps a lecture may be effective. M..ich of the intellectualy
apathy we complain about is due to our fault of presenting conclusions in lieu of first
hand experience. To us, our well-chiseled conclusion, summing up a long intellectual
struggle with a problem of knowledge or of value, seems like a beautiful sonnet . To the
student, it may be gibberish.
The fallacy of giving conclusions holds both for subject matter and for values,
A lad of 15 cannot profit from the fully fashioned philosophy of life of a man of SO. To
register at all, a statement about values must fall precisely on his present growing
edge.
Teaching, then, is not the art of offering conclusions, however hard won and
valid they may be. No teacher can forcibly enter the students' proprium and plant a
functionally autonomous motive. He can at best open channels of experience and, by his
obiter dicta, sometime lead the student to see _ the value-potential in the experience.
The theory of personality that we need to guide a more fully developed educa
tional psychology will teach us something important about our basic verb "to educate."
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It will show us that only at the outset of learning is i t a transitive verb. By drill,
by reward, by reinforcement, the teacher does indeed educate the child - in matters of
fact.
But true maturity comes only when the verb is reflexive. For in matters of im
portance, where values lie, the growing individual alone can educate himself.
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If this definition seems too technical to be immediately helpful, see Ch. 10 of
pattern and Growth in Personality for a more extended treatment of functional autonomy.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
VALUES IN THE EMERGING AMERICAN CIVILIZATICi,

Y,

by
Philip H. Phenix

,e
(Reprinted by permission from Teachers College Record, (April 1960), Teachers College,
Columbia University, New York, pp. 355-366.)
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My task is to delineate the value system upon which our educational efforts of a
decade or two hence may be built - to characterize some of the dominant commitments and
purposes which we may reasonably expect will guide Americans of 1970 or 1980 as they seek
to perpetuate and improve their civilization.
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A well-nigh impossible task this is, not only because the prevailing values em
brace all aspects of a culture but also because the pace of contemporary cultural trans
formations is so breath-taking and because the most serious unresolved conflicts of our
plural civilization revolve about differences in values. Yet, speculative and tentaive
though the effort must necessarily be, it should be made, for values are the sould of
civilization. Apart from the values by which we make our choices, things and activities
are empty of meaning. In particular, since teaching and learni~ necessarily presuppose
guiding commitments, we cannot think about the future of American education without some
forecast of values in our emerging civilization.
What do we mean by the word "value"? TWo distinct meanings are in common use by
layment and scholars alike. According to the first, a value is anything which a person
or ~ersons actually approve, desire, affirm, or exert themselves to obtain, preserve, or
ass:st. According to the second meaning, a value is anything which ought to be approved,
des:r~d, and so forth, whether or not any given person or persons in fact do adopt these
positive attitudes toward it. Values in the first sense are human preferences which can
be systematically described by the regular tools of empirical inquiry such as those em
~loyed in sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Values in the second sense are not
bacts at all, but ideals, standards, or norms by which actual human preferences are to
_e a~p~aised; they are not obtainable by empirical inquiry but by revelation, rational
inftuition, personal decision, or social convention usually contained in the traditions
0
the civilization.
. What Americans actually do crave in 1960, or will desire in 1970 or 1980 obvious 1 Y is a n d wi· 1 1 be far different
from what they ought to want. A popular demand for
amusement
and
t
•
.
.
.
.
11
di .
.
ranqui izers may make these things
more valuable in
the first
sense than
r:fcip 1 ined skill and sympathy for those who suffer, but in the second sense the order of
P
erence
may be Jus
· t th e reverse. Agreement between the desired
.
would
b
and the desirable
e found only in a society of saints, and we cannot yet claim to have achieved that
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condition.
Necessary though this distinction is, I do not think we must simply choose be
tween the two meanings of value.
Instead, they must be maintained in constant reciprocal
tension. Acknowledgment of desire without ethical criticism by a standard of obligation
simply confirms the status quo. On the other hand, affirmation of ideals without regard
to actual human wants or interests makes these standards irrelevant and ineffective.
The two contrasting conceptions of value are particularly evident in educational
practice. Value in the sense of what people actually want underlies education emphasiz
ing the felt needs and interests of the learner. Value in the sense of what people ought
to want underlies education emphasizing discipline, standards, and tradition. I am con
vinced that wa need not choose the one or the other, but that the educator's task is to
secure continuity between the interests of the learner and standards of excellence which
transcend the immediate desires of the immature. This goal can be realized only if there
is a basic harmony between informed desire and the truly excellent; that is to say, only
if human longings provide clues to and directions toward ideal values and if ideals are
confirmed and verified in the fulfillment of enduring human wants.
Tue distinction between values as actual desires and as desirable goals has im
portant bearings on the question of changes in values. Actual wants are modified along
with the conditions of society and culture. Many of the things people value today, such
as automobiles and the thirty-hour week, were not values for earlier generations simply
because these objects of desire did not then exist as genuine possibilities. Over the
next ten to twenty years our rapidly changing technical civilization is bound to intro
duce many new things which will be desired, thus significantly modifying the actual value
system of American society.
On the other hand, normative values - ideal standards - are independent of or
less dependent on particular cultural changes. According to some thinkers, there are
certain "ultimate" values which are absolute and unchanging. Thus, they would say, the
values we should live by and educate for will be the same in 1970-1980 at a profound
level will be the same as those of today or of a century or a millennium ago, but they
will necessarily exercise their power in human life in the new shapes of things in years
to come, and to that extent will be different values.
I forsee and welcome the increasing unification of the descriptive and normative
concepts of value. We are going to be increasingly dissatisfied with values which are
presented either as detached eternal principles or as the shifting interests and conven
tions of particular cultures.
Tue realization is going to grow that the proper ideals o f
civilization must find their justification in the facts of human nature.
The humanly
valuable is that which sustains the most complete actualizing of the potentialities res
ident in human nature. Thus I predict that the educationally significant values of futu re
decades will be established increasingly on a humanistic and scientific foundation and
that the old polarity of absolutism and relativism in values will disappear.
I believe that empirical investigators of man and society - social scientists and
psychologists - will more and more become concerned wtth the ethical consequences of their
inquiries; that is, with the salient facts about human nature, its potentialities, and
the necessrry conditions for their fulfillment which these studies reveal.
I believe
further that these scientific investigations will increasingly be confirmed, corrected,
and supplemented by the traditionally humanistic studies, so that there will emerge at
length a unified and coherent idea of man and his possibilities which will become the
basis for a secure knowledge of human values. As the years pass I forsee the disappear
ance of the boundary between those who investigate facts - the scientists - and those who
purvey ideals -- the prophets, mystics, and moral philosophers.
I envision, not long
hence, a time when aspirations will be disciplined by a knowledge of the humanly actual
and possible ,rnd when scientific inquiry will be devoted to the discovery and realizatio n
of the summum bonum.
What can now be said, in a tentative way, about the realistic ideals which shou ld
guide us Americans a decade or two hence? What do humanistic and scientific inquiries t o
date suggest as values appropriate to the era into which our civilization is now moving ?
Here I can only suggest in broad outline the values I see emerging, with only passing ref 
erence to the evidence for their rootage in the facts of human nature.
The b,,sic values are human personality and its social concomitant, democracy.
The emerging American civilization for which we should struggle is founded upon the twin
ideals of fre~dom and responsibility; that is to say, of maximum personal realization
within the context of social justice. Furthermore, because personality is social in it s
very essence, personal fulfillment and social equity are complementary aspects of one
personal-social value.
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PIVOTAL VAWES
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These are still high abstractions. They need now to be more precisely analyzed.
To this end, I suggest that human realization encompasses four pivotal values; namely,
intelligence, creativity, conscience, and reverence.
These are the pillars of selfhood
and democracy.
These are the value-foundations for American education of 1970-1980 and
beyond.
INTELLIGENCE
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First, then, intelligence. Human beings are of the species homo sapiens.
It is
by virtue of :intelligence that man is distinguished from the lower animals.
Reason is
the sovereign tool by which all the achievements of culture are possible. The capacity
to make, to decide, and to worship - all the other values which we shall discuss - de
pend upon rational insight. We must awaken to the realization that primary concern for
intelligence does not mean an exclusive aristocratic intellectualism. Democracy pre
supposes full development of reason in all members of society o No other ideal of human
organization places so high a premium on intelligence. When a so-called democracy in the
uncritical pu :rsui t of equality develops anti-intellectual mediocrity and commonplace
ness, that society is on the road to degradation and ultimately to subversion by clever
and unscrupulous tyrants.
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We shall need to value highly the ability to think clearly and cogently, to dis
criminate meanings with precision, to argue validly and to detect the fallacies in inval
id arguments, to know good evidence from bad, and to use sources of knowledge responsi
bly. Scientific methods must become widely understood and the spirit of critical inquiry
must suffuse our common life. At the same time, we will come to see that not all compe
tent thinking proceeds according to the canons of deductive logic or of experimental in
vestigation in the natural sciences. The specific and unique methods of thought in the
social and psychological sciences, in historical study, in philosophy, literature, and
the other art:; will be recognized and appropriately applied.
There must arise a new dedication to the ancient ideal of truth, to the fullest
possible correspondence between word and fact, between symbol and act. More and more the
fabric of civilization will be woven of verbal symbols, and correspondingly important
will be the preservation of integrity in the employment of these instruments. Our pre
sent-day carelessness with language and our commonly practiced hypocrisy and deceit must
promptly be sEien in their true light as exceedingly virulent poisons to civilized exist
ence, and a renewed respect for words and their responsible employment must speedily de
velop.
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Of particular urgency is the establishment of the intellectual integrity of the
mass media of communication. As never before in human history, time and distance have
been annihilated by instruments for the transmission of symbols, and the whole life of
mankind has bE,en made available to each person, wherever or whoever he is, by these com
mon agencies c,f information.
The simple and settled symbolic environments of the past
have been replaced by a complex and rapidly shifting envelope of sight and sound com
pacted of elements from far and near. For this unprecedented and surprising development
our traditiona l patterns of judgment and control do not suffice. What has commonly been
re g arded as an interesting "fringe benefit" of modern technology, to be employed for the
more efficient conduct of old business or for amusement, must henceforth be recognized as
what it is: the most potent and most pervasive culture-forming and character-forming in
f luence in modern society.
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From this recognition will spring tomorrow's demand for a keener sense of respon
sibility for truth in what is published and broadcast.
The concept of freedom of speech
th rough the mass media must be re-examined to ascertain the limits beyond which freedom
in th is public domain becomes dangerous license and a means to the most profoundenslave 
ment _of others. At the same time, a premium must be placed on the cultivation of criti
cal_Judgment in all citizens, so that they may better sift truth from falsehood and ex
ercise selectivity in what they attend to and accept.

CREATIVITY
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_After intelligence, the next pivotal value is creativity. Human beings are not
~nlyd thi nkers and knowers but also makers. No person can achieve his full measure of manoo unless he en
·
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gages in acts of creation. Such creativity is thus in essence anesthetexperience
• • i 1zat1on,
·
.
.
.
produ
t·
· M:>de rn c1v1
with
its
concern for power and sheer quantity of
with~ i~n, _has tended to neglect the qualitative dimensions of experience. Obsession
ec anism has dulled our sensitivity to significant forms.
Meaning has been
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sacrificed to efficiency, and life has thereby been impoverished. The feeling of depth
in appreciation of delightful things has been replaced by the superficial and partial
understanding necessary for technical mastery and manipulation.
These dehumanizing tendencies in contemporary culture should give way before a
growing awareness of the importance of the es the tic - of beauty and elegance, of good
taste and culcivated style. Especially as we move into an age in which machines will
take over from human beings most of the chores which have hitherto kept us from the free
choice of qualitative enjoyment, the need to recognize the importance of the creative
arts in the enhancement of human life will become evident. Esthetic resources will no
longer be chiefly for serious pursuit by a professional elite or for the amusement of the
idle rich or of the ''beats." They must be ingredients in the common life, raising i t
above the commonplace to new levels of immediate significance and satisfaction.
One of the features of modern Alllerican culture which most clearly betrays our
present lack of concern for quality of experience is the disintegration of manners. In
the name of equality, modernity, and democracy traditional patterns of social conduct
have been abandoned and customary modes of showing respect and consideration have become
matters of individual choice rather than of social constraint.
I forecast a revived interest in manners. We shall once again realize that cus
tomary acts of deference and traditional styles of deportment are not necessarily undemo
cratic, but aJ:e in fact essential to democratic culture. Manners may be hypocritical and
humiliating to others or they may be sincere and exalting. An urgent task for the future
of Alllerica is the formation of a code of expected behavior which will vividly express
that respect :for each person's dignity which is the wellspring of democratic order.
Such
a code will be based upon a due regard for significant functional differences. We must
not connnit the blunder of confusing equality of personal right and dignity with identity
of social function.
This renewed emphasis on the ennobling formalities of life will provide sorely
needed social symbols for the celebration of our common life. We are today ceremonially
impoverished. For the future we require an array of vivid and familiar acts with which
to express ove,rtly the convictions by which we live as a people.
In quite a different way, the value of creativity will be acknowledged in a fresh
assessment of the significance of work. Because man is by nature a maker, he must ful
fill his being through productive labor. Because he is by nature social, he must serve
others in exchange for their efforts on his behalf. In past eras of human history the
attitude toward work has been at best ambiguous. For many if not most people it has been
regarded, often not without justification, as a burden or a curse rather than as acre
ative opportunity. As we consider the future of our civilization, it is then not unnat
ural to expect that many will value highly the progressive emancipation from labor which
advancing machine production makes possible.
I believe such a simple extrapolation from
the past is quite mistaken, and that values for the new age must not include escape from
work but a restoration of the ideal of work as creative vocation.
Modern man is haunted by a feeling of emptiness, despite the ceaseless busyness
of his existence. His days are filled with activity, he travels quickly and produces
things efficiently, but he is gnawed by a sense of meaningless and futility. Why? In
large part because he does not find in his daily occupation sufficient opportunity to
realize significant purposes which are truly his own. He regards himself as an inter
changeable part in an impersonal social mechanism.
Therefore, high on the agenda for tomorrow's American should be the rediscovery
of authentic vocation. The next generation must be enabled to experience widely what the
creative minority have always know:
the joy and salvation in significant work.
Thiswill
require a reduction in the value assigned to mere speed and efficiency of production.
Modern concepts of narrow specialization will have to be revised in favor of broader in
dividual grasp of the total productive process. Prevailing patterns of centralized in
dustrial organization and hierarchical control will need to be altered to permit a higher
degree of individual participation and responsibility.
Complementing the value of true vocation there should be a reconstruction of the
ideal of play. The long-term purposes of work require supplementing by the immediacies
of recreation. Human creativity has a rhythmic character.
It does not retain its zest
and freshness under the demands of unremitting work.
Its fruition depends upon the per
iodic alternation of short- and long-range activities. Yet, properly conceived, play is
not merely surcease from work.
It should not be regarded simply as temporary release and
relief from the burdens of the job.
Its value lies in the contrast in type of creative
engagement it affords.
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Perhaps the onset of the do-it-yourself age gives some hint as to the quality· of
play we shall increasingly learn to prize. Surely the spirit of man the maker cannot
long find satisfaction in cheap amusements and in watching other people play. Nor will
the mul tiplic.c1. tion of manufactured gadgets for young or old answer the deeply felt need
to exercise the capacity for free, imaginative experiment and construction. We are
waking up to the obvious truth that the joy of play is in the playing, not in merely ob
serving what others do or in possessing what others have made.
creative play for the future, I submit, will pe marked by simplicity- perhaps
even by a touch of the ascetic. As life in so many respects necessarily becomes more
complicated, we shall yearn for some experience of plainness. As the marvels of tech
nology mutiply about us, we shall long for some unprefabricated crudeness to which we
can individually and personally lend form and refinement. As pain and hardship are pro
gressively lifted from us, we shall seek in play some chance to prove our physical cour
age and power to endure.
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Finally, play is necessary to democracy, for it is one of the clearest expres
sions of freedom.
Man who do not know how to play are slaves, not free men. Further
more, any form of play which is dictated by society is not truly play, because it is not
free.
Recreational activity in accord with the democratic ideal grows from individual
choice or consent.
It is a measure and mark of an open society in which the unique qual
ities o f each person are recognized and encouraged.
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To intelligence and creativity we must add
I turn now to the third great value.
the value of conscience, or moral purpose. To make moral choices is fundamental to human
nature. To be free is to be able to choose. Freedom is perfected as choice follows the
p ... :i.n ciples required by the facts of human nature and potent:i.a:i.i i.y.
For convenience, let
us consider some of the crucial elements in the moral conscience by reference to man's
relationships first to nature, then to himself, and finally to other people in his en
vironment.
One of the most critical re-evaluations American are going to be forced tomake,
a nd that no long hence, concerns our employment of natural resources. The technical rev
o lution o f modern times has put in our hands unprecedented powers of exploiting nature.
Man has becom~i the major force in geologic change. He has g ained mastery of material
things, tamed the wild energies of the cosmos, and turned erstwhile natural enemies into
servants of his will.
At length the realization is dawning that nature's bounty has limits and that man
h a s responsibilities for the wise administration of his natural estate. Even though the
continued growth of cities will continue to take our people away from the soil and from a
life which automatically breeds respect for the earth as the source of all material well
being , I am confident that a more vivid awareness of our dependence on nature is inevit
a ble. We shall not much longer be able to take abundant material resources for granted.
We shall need to deal quickly and decisively with the population explosion . The volun
tary limitation of family size must be widely encouraged. Respect for individual dignity
and worth dictates that procreation be regulated by due concern for the optimum balance
between population a nd resources. Here is an issue in which the practical consequences
of a belief ir, the basic value of human personality are vividly apparent.
Parallel to this heightened valuation of nature must be increased respect for the
human organisrr. and greater co n cern f o r its healthful functioning. We have mistakenly
tended to regard the inges tio n of materials into the body, whether in the solid, liquid,
or vaporous sta t e , a s no t mor all y significant . As more is learned about the consequences
of overeating , d rinking, and inhaling various substances, the value of choosing the whole
some and avoiding the noxi o us ones will become clearer. I hope and expect that in the
1 97
0' s we shall be well on ou r way toward an assessment of diet, alcohol consumption,
tobacco use, and drug employment which will be founded upon well-tested knowledge of
human
phy sio
· 1 ogy and p sycho logy rather than upon the pronouncements of faddists and ref
ormers or upon aversive reactions to moralistic zealots. Eating, drinking, and smoking
a r1 matters of moral conscience, not merely of personal taste and inclination. A high
~a ue for our civilization should be the cultivation of healthful habits and social en
orhsement of the same witho ut any imputation of dreariness or intolerance on account of
sue advocacy.
si ·t· 1'-t:>S t of the claims of conscience involve social relationships. Perhaps the most
gni bicant. of these concern sex an d f ami· 1 y l"f
· is
·
·
ide
1 e.
In no domain
the formulation
of an
1
a S~ simple extrapolation of present tendencies more misleading than in the ethics of
sex.
ince FrPud, and mo re recently Kinsey, the idea has become commonplace that fairly
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uninhibited sexual activity best meets the needs of human nature.
I do not think the
most searching analysis of the psychology of sex supports this evaluation. I anticipate
a growing, informed conviction as to the importance and healthfulness of appropriate dis
cipline of sexual drives.
I believe attention will move away from the view .of sex as a
natural animal appetite which should be regularly gratified to one in which the spiritual
and personalistic dimensions of sex are regarded as paramount, so that direction and con
trol of the biological impulse become the crucial considerations.
Democracy in sexual relations will not, as some incorrectly assume, mean license
and promiscuity. On the =ntrary, it will mean the use of sex as a way of serving and
honoring another person - as the expression of self-giving devotion to one with whom a
unique, enduring, and profound relationship of mutual fidelity and support has been estab
lished. Thus, the monogamous family with marriage for life will remain as a fundamental
of the democratic ideal.
We shall also need to reconsider some current assumptions about the equality of
the sexes. While the trend toward equality of occupational opportunity for men and
women probably will not and most likely should not be reversed, a greater value should be
placed on the differences between males and females. Democracy does not presuppose iden
tity and interchangeability of persons, as in a collectivist society, but rather the or
chestration of differences into a rich and harmonious social commonwealth. We need to
examine much more thoroughly the ways in which the special qualities inherent in male
ness and femaleness may be employed for the enhancement of life.
We should grow in our appreciation of other differences too.
Conscience does not
require equality in all things, but equity in accomodating qualitative variation. Each
person should have an opportunity to develop to the full his special talents. None
should be constrained to conform to others, and condemned to mediocrity, on the strength
of a simple (and quite undemocratic) egalitarian dogma.
Still, this affirmation of individual differences in no way negates the tradi
tional and enduring American opposition to social classes.
The classless society is an
authentic part of our democratic ideal. we acknowledge differences, and we grant the
technical usefulness of classifying people by such indices as age, sex, income, place of
residence, and occupation. But we know, or ought to know, that such groupings are ab
stractions, valid only for limited statistical purposes, and that they do not represent
real lines of division between actual people. Such designations as "middle income,"
"southern," and "manual worker," for example, do not mark people off into separate sub
species of the species homo sapiens, justifying total treatment as a class, including
aspects of life other than the special characteristics defining each group. We must hold
high the importance of treating each person on his own merits, recognizing his unique
array of characteristics, each of which puts him in a classification with others similar
in that one nispect. Every person is abstractly classifiable in an infinite number of
ways, but no one should ever be identified concretely and personally, and dealt with
totally, as a member of any class or group.
A particular vivid illustration of the ideal of classlessness is found in the
principle of racial equality. In few if any other matters of social concern is moral
conscience more surely guided by the empirical study of human nature than in race rela
tions. Such study reveals with great clarity how superficial are the characteristics by
which one so-called "race" is distinguished from another, how fundamentally alike we all
are under the skin, and to what a major extent alleged inborn racial traits are in fact
produced by alterable social conditions. While the scientific study of human nature does
not automatically prove the value of human personality or the desirability of brotherly
attitudes, it at least exposes the falsehoods upon which most racial prejudice rests,
demonstrates the baneful social and psychological consequences of racial discrimination,
shows the compatibility of non-discriminatory policies with the known facts of human in
heritance and development, and helps to supply the means for eliminating the sources and
effects of racial bias.
The already growing realization of racial equality in all of the major spheres of
social life - economic, residential, legal, political, educational, vocational, and reli
gious - must continue as a key imperative for the moral conscience of America.
With respect to economic values generally, I believe that material accumulation
is likely to diminish as a dominant goal for many Americans.
It should become apparent
that wealth can be burdensome as well as satisfying and that material goods do not in
themselves produce felicity. Human beings thrive not on surfeit but on modest suffi
ciency . Nevertheless, private ownership and control of property, within limits, must
continue as a basic democratic value. The sphere of social control of property rights,
through taxation and government ownership or regulation, cannot without severe damage be
indefinitely extended. We need to reaffirm limited private ownership, not merely as a
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means of guarding individual security and insuring personal incentive but also as a vis
ible symbol of the freedom of the human person and of his integrity and inviolability.
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At the same time, and on the same principles, we shall insist upon the right to
the means of healthful subsistence of persons who, because of their age or through mis
fortune or incapacity of any kind, are unable to earn a livelihood. We should also so
organize our economic life that material rewards beyond the subsistence level are in
proportion to social contribution.
Under our conditions of increasing economic complexity and interdependence we
shall of necessity place increasingly high value on the ability to manage economic re
sources knowledgeably and equitably. We shall depend very heavily upon those who both
understand the intricacies of the economic machine and are dedicated to the ideals of
distributive justice. But we cannot rely upon managers or bureaucrats alone, however
wise and just. The security and prosperity of our material existence rest ultimately
upon the assumption by each citizen of moral responsibility to do his work with dili
gence and, when required, to render a scrupulously honest accounting of his financial
stewardship.
rvving now from economic to political morality, it should certainly be evident
that the awesome problems of our corporate life necessitate an upward revision in the
importance assigned to political life and leadership.
Politics must cease to be regard
ed as the characteristic domain of scoundrels and opportunists.
The ideal of statesman
ship as a high (if not the highest) calling must be reinstated. Furthermore, we must
dispel the pseudo-democratic notion that all men are equally competent to govern, and
abandon our p€:rilous practice of electing to positions of high leadership commonplace
men and women with whom we feel at ease but who do not inspire our profound admiration
and respect. Representative government ought to mean that our elected officials repre
sent us not as we on the average are, but as we aspire to be, and this requires calling
to public service men and women of the most extraordinary ability and character.
It is one of the truly astonishing facts of modern history that American consti
tutional government, though devised for a newly formed, sparsely settled agricultural
society, stil] persists in its essential features nearly two centurees later as an ef
fective instrwnent for the control of our present populous industrial commonwealth. We
hold now as firmly as ever to such basic American democratic principles as a majority
rule, minorit~ rights, and the separation of powers. What remains is the concrete appli
cation of our political ideals under the altered conditions of the new age.
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Tulo current problems are particularly urgent. First, in a world where decisive
governmental action must sometimes be taken q.iickly, there may not always be time for the
relatively slow deliberative processes of representative assemblies to operate. It is
likely that we shall need to give higher value in the future to freedom and flexibility
of executive action, still reserving to the legislative and judicial bodies - ultimately
to the people as a whole - the right and duty to review, revise, and recall. Such an
enhancement of executive prerogatives goes hand in hand with the aforementioned insis
tence on the selection of superior persons for positions of leadership.
The second problem is related to the first but opposite in emphasis. Our enor
mous size and power tend to create in the average citizen a sense of political impotence
and hence indifference. We need to recapture in the megapolitan age the high value of
individual civic responsibility that characterized the citizens when all government was
done in the town meeting. This can be achieved only if we as a people resist the trend
toward indefinite centralization of government in all fields and reserve to states and
local communities well-defined and significant powers and responsibilities.
To the same
e nd , ~twill also be important to preserve the local stake in federal government through
th e vigorous pursuit of the honored activity of party politics.
A final aspect of social conscience is concerned with world responsibility.
I
need not elaborate the obvious importance of world-mindedness. National and local provincialism
is be c o ming
·
·
· 1 y d'ff'
· our interdependent
·
Tr
increasing
1. 1.cu1 tan d d angerous in
world.
av~l abroad is just now coming within the reach of most Americans. Overseas military
sembrv7c~, bu~iness in other countries, governmental foreign service, and student travel are
co 1.n1.ng with ordi nary t ouri· sm, wor 1 d news coverage, visits
· ·
· ·
from citizens
of other lands,
an d numerous int ercu lt ura 1 exchanges to make Americans
.
. .
.
vividly
conscious
oi other places
an d peoples.
but
T~is world-knowledge and these world-associations add richness to our experience
1
emb a so impose heavy demands and create fresh conflicts. Our moral horizons must now
ownracet_all peoples. We shall now have to value the security and welfare not only of our
na ion but of man k.i n d everywhere. The value assigned
.
to national self-preservation,
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with its concomitant exaltion of armed might, must be exceeded by devotion to human
welfare everywhere and by the untiring determination to create a family of nations living
in peace and cooperation.
The preservation of world order is, in fact, the primal imperative for modern
man. With the present destructive powers at the disposal of all major nations, civili
zation and all of its values will be destroyed unless general armed conflict can be
avoided.
In the event of war, none of the values previously discussed would have any
practical worth, for there would exist no tolerable physical basis within which they
could re realized. From this fact the fundamental value of measures which will secure
reasonable global stability is readily evident.
One of the ways in which world peace is today being promoted is through the study
of other cultural traditions. While I do not doubt the contemporary worth of this under
taking, I venture the somewhat unorthodox prediction that large-scale cross-cultural ex
plorations will become less and less useful, because a world culture will emerge and at
length envelop and absorb all prior cultures. At the risk of being charged with hope
less provincialism, I further predict that this world culture will be largely character 
ized by the scientific outlook and modern democratic ideals. This speculation rests on
the conviction that science and democracy are substantially more in accord with the fact s
and potentialities of human nature than most nonscientific and nondemocratic cultural
systems. This viewpoint suggests that the values suitable for America's future may also
be in their major outlines values for the coming world civilization, and thus for all
mankind. Americans should not be ashamed to have a mission in the world, provided it is
performed in humility and in full obedience to the principles of critical inquiry and
democratic persuasion.

REVERENCE
The last of the four fundamental values is reverence.
Intelligence, creativj~y,
and conscience are undergirded and completed by reverence. This is the office of re
ligion, broadly conceived.
By religion I mean concern with and devotion to the ultimate,
which may be understood and symbolized in many ways, as in the great historical reli
gions (and outside of them also). The ultimate refers to the sources and ends of our
being, to the matters of supreme worht - of life-and-death import - and to our attitude
toward experience in its depth and totality. As I see it, human nature is inescapably
faced with religious questions. Reason forever drives beyond finite understanding, the
human powers of creation unceasingly seek to plumb new depths of being, and conscience
remains unsatisfied with its proximate forms of justice.
Reverence is the perception of
the inexhaustible wellsprings of truth, beauty, and goodness, and devotion to the ever
fuller realization of these values.
Reverence is the saving grace and the generative power of civilization. It saves
us from the arrogant presumption that we ever possess perfect knowledge, unsurpassable
loveliness, or absolute righteousness.
Its infinite ideal lures us ever on to the higher
levels of civilized achievement.
Reverence is also the final guardian of democracy, be
cause it refutes the absolute claim of any person or group of persons.
It submits every
person and system to the judgment of superior and yet unrealized possibilities.
That the trend of our times is toward increased religious interest is generally
agreed. How much of this is a retreat from the anxieties and stern demands of the pre 
sent age into the ready-made answers of traditional faiths it is difficult to estimate.
I suspect that much of the alleged religious revival of our times does not spring from
reverence. Nevertheless, I do believe that modern men are groping toward reverence.
They desperately want to experience a devotion to something more than their own small a nd
pitiable lives and their own frail and fallible institutions. I believe that in the
1960's, 1970's and 1980's, as in all epochs of human history, reverence will be the con 
summatory human value, and that all the ideals of our civilization will find theirprope r
ground a nd goal in the vision of holiness.
IMMANENT JUSTICE IN CHILDREN: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERAIDRE AND ADDITIONAL DATA
by
Gene R. Madinnus

1

(Reprinted by permission from The ..x>urnal of Genetic Psychology, 1959, pp. 94, 253-262,)
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INTRODUCTION

In his book, The r«>ral Judgment of the Child (10), Piaget presented a theory con
cerning the development of moral judgment.
In general, he outlined systematic changes
with age in children's moral judgments. These changes are a function of age insofar as
the child's chronological age defines the nature and quality of his social relationships •
Specifically, Piaget emphasized the importance of the progression from the constraint ex
ercised by the unilateral authority of parental discipline in early childhood to a rela
tionship of cooperation existing among peers in the later childhood years.
one aspect of the transition with age in moral judgment is a change in the child's
notion of justice. The young child tends to emphasize the rightness and necessity of
strict punishment and the importance of submitting to parental dictates; later he is con
cerned with equality among peers and with types of punishment that more nearly "fit the
crime." Piaget examined a number of aspects of the child's developing sense of justice.
111ese include the child's attitude toward the necessity and efficacy of physical punish
ment; the child's selection of various types of punishment, reflecting his position re
garding expiatory punishments as opposed to punishments by reciprocity; his belief in
immanent justice; his notions pertaining to distributive or equalitarian justice; and
finally, the child's judgment in situations which pit the demands of adult authority
against the child's desire for equality of treatment among siblings and pee,rs.
11J.e present paper is concerned only with the child's belief in immanent justice.
Piag et attributed the child's belief in the inevitability of punishment to adult con
straint. Children are often made to feel that accidental falls and minor injuries are
punishments because their parents have said, "It serves you right"; "That will teach you
to be careful"; or , "God made it happen to teach you a lesson." Piaget noted elsewhere
( 8, p. 24 7) the tendency in children to regard the whole world as aware of their mid
deeds, and thE!ir tendency to feel that they are being seen and watched by objects in the
u niverse, such as the sun and the moon.
The child's belief in the moral necessity of the
physical laws which g o vern the Universe is related to his belief that everything in na
ture is "constructed, intentional, and coherent (9, p. 216)." Since the child also tends
t o ascribe o mniscience to adults, the commands which he receives from them are regarded
as a part of the system of laws governing the Universe.
Consequently, children are led
to believe that nature and objects in the physical environment are accomplices of their
parents in guaranteeing the infliction of punishment for any and all wrongdoing.
Chil
dren's belief in the existence of automatic punishments which emanate from things arises
primarily, then, from the unilateral relationship existing between children and adults.
Later, through experiences which show that wrongdoing may go unpunished and virtue may
go unrewarded, through the discovery of the imperfection of adult justice, combined with
the child's intellectual development, belief in immanent justice diminishes.
Piaget (10, p. 251) listed the following percentages of children at the various
age levels who affirmed the existence of immanent justice: age 6, 86 per cent; ages 7-8,
7 3 per cent; ages 9-10, 54 per cent; and ages 11-12, 34 per cent.
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B.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERAIDRE

A number o f investig a tors have attempted to verify Piaget's findings on other
social and etbnical groups , and to identify various factors related to the development of
relativistic 1hinking in the moral judgment area. Only the studies and the sections of
the studies dealing with immanent justice will be discussed.
. In an investigation of moral realism in American children, Lerner (4) obtained
value Judgmen1s from 389 children in the first six grades of the public school system of
an eastern community. Children from two different socio-economic levels of the city were
used; one group came from the upperclass residential districts and the other group was
drawn f rom the poorer section populated primarily by people of foreign extraction.
~ r ner,asked o ne questi o n pertaining to immanent justice. His findings agree with
:1aget sin showing a decrease with age in the number of children expressing a belief in
:~anent justice.
'lhis decrease was more pronounced, however, among those children from
e better socio-economic group.
Liu (5), at Columbia University, investigated the influence of cultural background
. d gment o f children.
.
.
.
. moral
. on the mo ra1 JU
He attempted to define
differences
in
1
rea ism responses between Chinese- and non-Chinese-American children which could not be
accounted for by diffe rences in
. inte
.
11 igence
·
.
.
.
ad
and socio-economic
status.
Ll.u
also found
ecrease in beli f ·
•
.
.
non-ch·
.
e in immanent Justice from age 6 to 12 but at each age level more
ing
ine se children revealed a belief in immanent justice.
Liu concluded that decreas
mora 1 realism is not due to age maturity alone.
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Abel (1) employed Piaget's technique to study the moral judgments of mentally
retarded girls. Comparisons were made between groups in terms of institutionalization,
length of institutionalization, and mental age.
The subjects were 94 subnormal adoles
cent white girls with chronological ages ranging from 15 to 21 years and mental ages from
6 through 11. Seventy~four of the subjects were institutionalized at a New York state
institution for mental defectives; the other 20 were attending trade adjustment · classes
in the Manhattan High School for Women's Garment Trades. In the comparison between the
institutionalized girls and those living in the community, it was found that approxi
mately twice as many of the former gave responses which indicated a belief in immanent
justice. A greater percentage of those institutionalized over six years expressed a
belief in immanent justice as compared with those institutionalized under one year. No
difference in response was found between· two groups equated for chronological age but
differing in mental age.
MacRae (6) administered a questionnaire containing moral judgment qu'e stions drawn
from Piaget's work, and other similar · questions, together with a set of questions about
the child's social relations (background variables), to a group of 244 boys between the
ages of 5 and 14. The questionnaire included two stories designed to elicit the subject s'
position with regard to belief in immanent justice. Although in general MacRae found a
decrease over the age range in the children's belief in immanent justice, the trend was
not consistent. For both stories, a smaller percentage of the five- and six-year-olds
gave responses which were scored as indicating a belief in immanent punishment than did
the nine- and ten-year-olds.
Al though Dennis (2), in his work with Hopi Indian children, was primarily con
cerned with the concept of animism, he also questioned his subjects regarding their be 
lief in immanent punishment. Ninety-eight subjects, 43 girls and 55 boys, between the
ages of 12 anci 18 years were examined. Dennis found that 64 per cent of his youngest
subjects indicated a belief in the immanence of punishment. This figure decreased mark
edly with age, standing at 47 per cent for the 14- and 15-year-olds, and dropping to only
9 per cent among the 16- and 17-year-olds. These percentage figures were uniformly high
er than those found by Lerner (4) on white ciildren, but were below those obtained by
Abel (1) on institutionalized feeble-minded girls of comparable chronological ages.
Dennis concluded that t he differences in the rate at which early ideas concerning animi sm
are abandoned in Hopi and white communities may be due to a variety of cultural factors
which remain, as yet, unidentified. Dennis contended, however, that "the earliest ideas
of children are uniform in all societies and are the product of universal child experi
ences and of mental maturity (2, p. 35)."
As a part of the Indian Education Research Project of the Committee on Human De 
velopment of the University of Chicago and the United States Office of Indian Affairs,
Havighurst and co-workers (3) studied the moral and emotional development of Indian chi l
dren.
In the overall field project; 902 Indian children from six Indian tribes in the
age range from 6 to 18 years were studied. One part of the larger study is pertinent t o
the present discussion.
concerning immanent justice, the authors attempted to test
Piaget's hypothesis that, in contrast to children in modern societies, children in prim 
itive societies become more rather than less rigid in their moral ideas as they grow
older because these societies exercise an increasing amount of moral constraint on them .
Thus, if these societies have a view of the world order which includes a supernatural
power that watches over men and rewards and punishes their actions, then belief in im
manent justice will be as strong in older children as it is in younger children or per
haps even stronger. The findings in this study showed that there was either an increase
or no change with age in the children's belief in immanent justice for most of the group s
studied. With the exception of one of the Indian groups, the proportion of the 12- to 18
year-olds indicating a belief in immanent justice was approximately 85 per cent. At the
younger ages the proportion believing in innnanent justice tended to be smaller. These
data seem to substantiate Piaget's theory concerning belief in immanent justice in primi
tive societies.
They do not, however, agree with D3nnis's (2) findings in his study of
Hopi children discussed above in which he found a marked decrease with age in belief in
immanent justice.
To test the hypothesis of a relationship between belief in immanent justice and
degree of acculturation, Havighurst divided the people from one of the Hopi communities
into three groups with differing degrees of acculturation. The three groups were hardly
distinguishable in their percentage of immanent justice responses. These investigators
concluded that, rather than looking to the concept of primitive cultures subject to va ry
ing degrees of influence from a modern culture for an explanation of these results, "we
must look for total environmental factors within each group of Indians and of whites to
explain the results given by that particular group (3, p. 153)."

In discussing these results, Thompson (11) argued that the basic religious orien
tation of these people concerning the nature of the Universe and man's relation to it is
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deeply rooted in the tribal past and persists regardless of changes in the group's eco
This would seem to account, at least in part, for
nomy or exposure to white cul tu res.
the lack of n?lationship between the degree of acculturation and belief in immanent justice,
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In sum, a number of investigators have sought to verify and extend Piaget's find
ings concerning changes with age in children's belief in immanent justice.
These studies
have supported Piaget's data regarding a decrease in belief in immanent justice with age .
In a comparison of children from two different socio-economic levels, Lerner found this
decrease to be more pronounced among the children from the better socio-economic group .
Liu, contrasting Chinese- and non-Chincese-American children, reported that more non
Chinese than Chinese children revealed a belief in immanent justice at each age level
from 6 to 12. Abel's comparison of the responses of two groups of mentally-deficient
girls showed little relationship between mental age and belief in immanent justice. Abel
interpreted the differences which she found between institutionalized girls and girls
living in the community as indicating the constraining influence of an institutional at
mosphere. Though MacRae found a decrease in belief in immanent justice from age 7 to 14,
this trend was reversed at the five- and six-year leavels where the percentage of sub
jects expressing this belief was comparable to the 11- to 12-year level. Dennis found a
higher proportion of Hopi children expressing a belief in immanent punishment than is
usually found among white children.
The decrease with age in this belief which Dennis
found was not supported by Havighurst' s findings in a study of six American Indian tribes.
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PROCEDURE

Description of the Subjects

TWO hL.ndred and forty children, 30 boys and 30 girls, at each of the following
four age levels, 6, 8, 10 and 12, served as subjects in the present study. The subjects
were selected from the lower socio-economic groups, specifically from Classes V, VI, and
VII according to the Minnesota Scale for Paternal Occupations (7). Children from these
groups were u~.ed so that the sample would be as comparable as possible to that used by
Piaget who studied children from "the poorer parts of Geneva" (10, footnote, p.37) .

2.

Method

EightE•en story-situations and questions drawn from
each subject individually. The subjects' responses to the
batim by the e•xaminer. Only those two items pertaining to
cussed in this paper. The two stories which were employed
tion with regard to belief in immanent justice were:

Piaget were administered to
questions were recorded ver
immanent justice will be dis
to elicit the subjects ' posi

Story I
There was once a little boy who didn't mind his mother. He
took the scissors one day when he had been told not to. While he
was trying to cut some paper, he cut his finger.
Why did he cut his finger?
If his mother had said it was all right if he used the
scissors, would he have cut himself just the same?
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Story II
Once there were two children who were walking by a house in
the country.
There were some apple trees out in the yard in front
of the house. No one was around so they went into the yard and
stole some apples. Suddenly a man came out of the house and ran
af~er them. He caught one of the boys but the other one got away.
This one crossed a river on a rotten bridge and he fell into the
water.
Why do you think the boy fell into the water?
If he had not stolen the apples but he had crossed the river
on that rotten bridge, would he have fallen into the water anyway?
Why?

5

ry-

2

dicated F~llowing Lerner's method of scoring, a plus was given those responses which in
as fo
t fat th ~ subject conceived of the accidents described in each of the two stories
O
· ·
al fornns 11 • punishment a d ministered
by the object s themselves, or by God, or by the "morce
·
•
.
sponses wh·in h the
. Univ e r se th rough these obJects
. A minus
score was assigned
those re·
f or examp 1 e, a minus
·
·
sponses to ic
St 1.nvolved . a rat·iona 1 exp 1 anation;
was given
those reory II which stated that the boy fell into the river because the bridge was
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rotten.

D.

RESULTS

The subjects' responses to the two stories are tabulated in Table 1. Although
the number of subjects revealing a belief in immanent justice decreased with age for
Story I, the opposite trend is indicated for Story II.
The chi-squares for the two
stories are not significant, however.
The sex difference for the stories was likewise
significant.

Number of + and

TABLE 1
Valuations at Each Age Level for Stories I and II
Story I

Age

+

6
8

37
32
30
27

10
12

Story II
-t

X

23
28
30
33

= 3.57

44
45
37
37
X

ns

E.

16
15
23
23

= 4.36
ns

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Whereas Piaget found that 86 per cent of the six-year-olds whom he questioned
affirmed a belief in immanent justice, only 62 per cent of the children at this age level
in the present study indicated such a belief in response to Story I . An examination of
the answers which the children gave in response to the question, "Why did he cut his f in
ger?" provides a partial clue to the comparatively small percentage found in this study.
The rational explanations offered by the six-year-olds seemed to indicate that they we re
drawn from the child's personal experiences. The following are representative of this
type of response:
"Because he might not was careful." "Maybe he was too little." "May•
be they slipped." "The scissors were sharp." "Because he didn't watch what he was do 
ing." The situation described in the story seems to be one which is well within the e x
perience of the children at this age level.
In other words, the children did not need tc
invoke the operation of a supernatural force to account for the misfortune which befe ll
the boy in the story.
The mishap could be accounted for on the basis of a commonplace
experience.
An exmination of Table 1 shows that a smaller percentage of children at each ag e
level evinced a belief in immanent justice for Story II than did so for Story I. A com
parison of the contents of the two stories throws some light on this discrepancy.
In
Story I no rational explanation is provided to account for the boy's misfortune which
occurred while he was in the act of cutting up some paper. In Story II, on the other
hand, mention is made of the fact that the bridge on which the culprit crossed the rive r
was rotten.
In the latter story, then, the subject need not resort to an explanation of
the punishment inflicted based on the intervention of a supernatural force operating
through objects in the environment; rather, he can utilize the information presented to
him to account for the incident. It would seem that the tendency for children to exp l a iil
occurrences on the basis of a supernatural vigilance and conspiracy depends in part upo n
the amount of information which is available to them in a given situation.
The results of the present study do not corroborate Piaget's conclusion that t her
is a marked decrease with age in the number of children who believe in immanent justice.
Although it is apparent that the percentage figures differ from one story to another,
Piaget did noc tabulate separately the result obtained from different stories, and, i n
fact, it is not clear from which stories the results given were obtained. A similar c rit
icismmightbe leveled at the other studies (1, 2, 3, 4) which employed only one story i n
an attempt to determine the number of children at various age levels who believe in im 
manent justice. The present findings indicate that the point of view which a child ex 
presses varies depending on the story used so that any percentage figure is specific t o a
particular story. Before one could speculate or theorize about differences in the be lie1
in immanent justice among various cultural, ethnic, and other such groups, one would ha VE
to be concerned about the differences obtained from the same group by stories which va ry
in content. An attempt to specify precisely the reasons for this would seem to be the
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most fruitful problem for future research in this area.
In summary, the present findings indicate that a child's expressed belief in im
manent justice is dependent upon a number of such factors as the meaningfulness of the
situation to him, the presence or absence of rational alternative explanations, the range
of his experiences, the concreteness of the young child's thought, and so forth .
The
possible importance of specific parental teachings will be discussed briefly in the next
section.
F.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTI-IER RESEARCH

It was found that a number of six-year-olds responded to Story I (a child cuts
himself with scissors) on a very concrete level; the incident described was within their
range of experience. It might be postulated that whether or not a child demonstrates a
belief in immanent justice depends upon whether or not the situation described is within
his range of experience and understanding.
It would follow that the more foreign and
remote the situation is from the child's experience, the more likely it will be that he
will give an immanent justice type of response.
To test this, two groups of items could
be developed: in one group, the incidents described would be placed in contexts mean
ingful to the child; the incidents in the other group would be placed in contexts alien
to the child's experience.
Toe thesis is that children tend to explain events in super
natural terms when the situation is unfamiliar to them.
Toe present study also found that children tend to be less likely to give super
natural explanations of incidents in stories where an alternative rational explanationis
provided.
It was argued that whether or not a child invokes the operation of a super
natural force to explain an event depends upon the amount of information which is avail 
able to him.
To test this, stories which are essentially similar except for the presence
or absence of a rational explanation could be administered to a group of children, and
the number of children expressing a belief in immanent justice for the two types of
stories could be compared.
Although Piaget seemed unclear in his position regarding the importance of adult
teachings in producing an "immanent justice" type of thinking in children, it would seem
that parental attitudes in this respect are significant determiners of the child's tend
ency to explain punishment and other such events in this manner. A possible method to
get at such a relationship would be to formulate subtle items appropriate to the adult
level in order to assess the parents' way of thinking.
It would be hypothesized that
adults do differ in this regard and that this influence the child's tendency to consider
punishments as automatic and inevitable.
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G.

SUMMARY

A review of the literature concerning Piaget's notion of immanent justice re
vealed that the various studies supported Piaget's findings which showed a decrease with
age among children in belief in immanent justice. Several environmental factors affect
ing this belief were identified.
In the present study, 240 chlldren, 30 boys and 30 girls, at each of the follow
ing four age levels, 6, 8, 10 and 12, were administered a questionnaire consisting of
st0 :ies drawn from Piaget's work.
The subjects were selected from the lower socio-eco
no11U.c levels . The data obtained from the two immanent justice items included in the
questionnaire were presented and discussed.
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Although the number of subjects revealing a belief in immanent justice decreased
from age 6 through age 12 for Story I
the opposite trends was found for Story II.
Ten
tative explanations for these results'were found in the nature of the stories themselves.
It was concluded that a child's expressed belief in immanent justice is dependent on s
sue~ factors as the meaningfulness of the story described, the presence or absence of
rational alternative explanations, and the range of the child's experiences.
Several suggestions for further research in this area were discussed.
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TEACHING STRATEGIES FOR IDRAL DILEMMAS:
AN APPLICATION OF KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF IDRAL DEVELOPMENT
TO THE SOCIAL SnJDIES CLASSROOM*
by
Ronald E. Galbraith and 11lomas M. Jones
(Reprinted by permission from Social Studies Curriculum Center, carnegie-Mellon
University, 1974.)
American schools used two general methods of moral education during the first
half of the twentieth century. One method stressed direct educational procedures, such
as telling students that honesty is always the best policy. Its adherents argued that
teaching students a ''bag of virtues" (such as honesty, responsibility, etc.) could pro 
mote sound character development , just as prescribed patriotic ritual could allegedly
insure good citizenship. Advocates of these explicit procedures wanted young people t o
internalize particular social, political, and moral imperatives. The second method of
*
In 1972 the Social Studies Curriculum Center at Carnegie-Mellon University and
the Laboratory of Human Development at Harvard received a three-year grant from thew .
Clement and Jessie v. Stone Foundation. This grant supports research designed to app ly
Harvard psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg's theories of moral development to the social
studies curricular materials developed at CMU. The joint staffs have written and tes t
ed new materials, devised a variety of teaching strategies, and developed teacher prep 
aration programs. During the present academic year, the work of the project is under 
going an extensive field test which involves forty-eight school classes in a wide var 
iety of schools. The results of this evaluation will be available early in 1975.
The fo.llowing article reports the preliminary conclusions of the staff of CMJ' s
Social Studies Curriculum Center about classroom applications of Kohlberg's theory. We
wish to thank the Stone Foundation for the support which has made our research possibl e.
Professors Edwin Fen ton and Barry K. Beyer have made substantive contributions to this
article as well as numerous editorial suggestions. The authors are Staff As-sociates in
the Social Studies curriculum Center and candidates for the Doctor of Arts degree in
history at carnegie-Mallon University.
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moral education stressed three indirect educational techniques.
First, teachers pro
vided adult models for their students. Through their daily activities, teachers dem
onstrated expected norms of behavior such as cleanliness and neatness. Second, the
classroom environment established by the teacher socialized students to accept certain
values , Punctuality, obedience, and orderliness may serve as examples.
Third, curric
ulum materials contributed to incidental teaching of values. For example, in social
studies classes students learned about values such as honesty, responsibility, and pa
triotism by studying the biographies of famous American statesmen.
During the past decade educators increasingly stressed new approaches to moral
education which emphasized valuin;i.
They described these approaches by terms such as
value clarification, value analysis, the analysis of controversial issues, humanistic
education, and concern for the student's self-concept. Within the social studies,
these new approaches replaced both indoctrination and the incidental methods of moral
education frequently used before the 196O's.
THE THEORY OF COGNITIVE IDRAL DEVELOPMENT

8.

Concurrent with the introduction of these new methods of value education, re
search began on a theory of cognitive moral development.
This theory focused on the
ways in which individuals reason about moral issues. Lawrence Kohlberg, a Harvard psy
chologist, led research efforts in the field. His findings have evoked considerable
interest among social studies educators who wish to apply the theory of cognitive moral
development to social studies curricula.
Educators frequently ask two significant questions about the theory of cognitive
moral development and its relationship to social studies education. First, what is cog
nitive moral development? second, what types of materials and classroom processes must
a teacher know in order to use the cognitive moral developmental approach to moral education? This article will attempt to answer these two questions.
·
Developmental psychology has discovered that mental processes develop in invari
ant sequences through a series of stages. For example, most educators know Piaget's
stages of cognitive development. Cognitive development means that an individual's
thinking or reasoning changes or matures. Cognitive moral development, Kohlberg's con
tribution to the field, posits that an individual's thinking about matters related to
morality also changes or matures through an invariant sequence.
The increase in matur
ity involves the growth or development of a more rational system of reasoning about sit
uations involving moral conflicts. Cognitive moral development stresses constant ex
amination of the reasoning behind reactions to moral conflicts.
Kohlberg's theory of cognitive moral development indicates that an individual's
thinking about moral situations matures according to a specific sequence which he pre
sents in three levels, each consisting of two stages:1
Level One:

:h

Pre-Conventional

t
o-

At this level an individual's moral reasoning results from the consequences
of actions (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) and from the physical power of
those in positions of authority.

to
f

Stage One:

Decisions result from a blind obedience to power, an attempt to avoid
punishment, or an attempt to seek rewards.

st age 'lwo:

Decisions result from a desire to satisfy one's own needs and occasion
ally the needs of others. Individuals view reciprocity as a matter of
"you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." Reasoning involves little
consideration of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

ly
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Level Two:

Conventional

At th is level an individual's moral reasoning involves consideration of the in
:ere~t of others (family and peers) and a desire to maintain, respect, support, and
JUS t ify th e existing social order.
s

Stage Three:

We
l e,
s

in

Stage Four:

Deci~ions r~sult from a desire to please and help others and
~eceive their approval in return. Behavior is frequently
Judged by intention--"he means well" becomes important for
the first time.
Decisions result from a desire to maintain the existing
authority, rules, and social order.
Right behavior
45

consists of doing one's duty.
Level Three:

Post-Conventional

At this level an individual's moral reasoning incorporates moral values and prin 
ciples which have validity and application beyond the authority of groups. Moral rea
soning becomes more comprehensive and reflects universal principles.
Stage Five:

Decisions result from recognition of an individual's rights within
a society which has a social contract. As a result the individual's
reasoning emphasizes the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis
upon the possibility of changing laws.

Stage Six:

Decisions result from an obligation to universal ethical principles
which apply to all mankind. The universal principles of justice,
reciprocity and equality of human rights, and respect for the dig
nity of human beings as individuals serve as a basis for individual
reasoning.

Kohlberg derived his stages of moral reasoning empirically from longitudinal
studies in the United States. He gathered data from the responses of 75 American males
to moral dilemmas. He interviewed each subject every three years between adolescence
and adulthood. As a result of these studies, Kohlberg concluded that moral development
occurred in invarian sequence through the stages in Kohlberg's scale.
Cross-cultural
studies involving middle class urban males in the United States, Taiwan, and Mexico;
and lower class peasants living in villages in Turkey and Yucatan confirmed the devel
opmental theory. Despite divergent cultural, social, and religious backgrounds, the
subjects moved through the same stages of moral development in the same sequence. While
the rate of movement varied between cultures, the basic concept of universal stages of
moral development emerged clearly. In the late 1960's and the early 1970's, Kohlberg
and his colleagues continued their research into moral development in prisons, religious
schools, elementary schools, secondary schools, and colleges.
These studies confirm basic principles about the nature of cognitive moral de
velopment. Individuals move through the stages sequentially. Each individual must go
through the preceding stage before moving on to a higher stage of moral reasoning.
Stages cannot be skipped. A person may understand and become attracted to moral rea
soning at thii next higher stage; however, an individual will translate reasoning sev
eral stages higher into his own stage-related manner of thinking about a moral issue.
Kohlberg's studies also establish a clear relationship between chronological age and
the level of reasoning. Although children and adolescents move at varying rates of
speed through the stages, pre-adolescents usually attain a pre-conventional level, adol 
escents achiiive the conventional level and adults move toward the post-conventional
level of reasoning ,2 However, individuals can become "frozen" at any level. Actually,
less than 20 percent of the adult population reasons at the post-conventional level .3
The research of Kohlberg and his colleagues has also established that students
who participate regularly in discussions of moral dilemmas often begin to articulate
reasoning at higher stages of development. This evidence indicates that exchanging rea
soning during a group discussion of a moral dilemma can stimulate moral development
through the stages. A good group discussion of a moral dilemma depends on three vari
ables:
a recognized moral dilemma, a leader who can help to focus the discussion on
moral reasoning, and a classroom climate which encourages students to express their
moral reason:i.OJ freely.
The explanation of a moral dilemma, the lesson plan for teach
ing a moral dilemma, and the teaching process outlined below have been developed and
tested with these three variables in mind.
A dil~?mma presents the class with a moral problem. A dilemma usually involves a
story or situation which presents a central chara cter with a choice.
The dilemmas are
moral because students must think about the rig htness or wrongness of various actions
which the characters in the dilemma may take. Here is an example of a moral dilemma f or
a social studies class: 4

HELGA'S DI LEMMA
Helga and Rachel had grown up together. They were best
friends despite the fact that He l ga's family was Christian and
Rachel's was Jewish. For many years, this religious difference
didn't seem to matter m ch in Germany, but after Hitler seized
power, the situation changed. Hitler required Jews to wear
armband with the Star of David on them. He began to encourage
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his followers to destroy the property of Jewish people and
to beat them on the street. Finally, he began to arrest
Jews and deport them. Rumors went around the city that many
Jews were being killed. Hiding Jews for whom the Gestapo
(hitler's secret police) was looking was a serious crime am
violated a law of the German government.
One night Helga heard a knock at the door. When she
opened it, she found Rachel on the step huddled in a dark
coat. Quickly Rachel stepped inside. She had been to a
meeting, she said, and when she returned home, she had found
Gestapo members all around her house. Her parents and bro
thers had already been taken away. Knowing her fate if the
Gestapo caught her, Rachel ran to her old friend's house.

s

t

Now what should Helga do? If she turned Rachel away,
the Gestapo would eventually find her. Helga knew that most
of the Jews who were sent away had been killed, and she didn't
want her best friend to share that fate. But hiding the Jews
broke the law. Helga would risk her own security and that of
her family if she tried to hide Rachel. But she had a tiny
room behind the chimney on the third floor where Rachel might
be safe.
Question:

e

LS

L-

Should Helga hide Rachel?

A good moral dilemma should have three characteristics. It should present a
real conflict for the central character; it should include a number of moral issues for
consideration ; and it should generate differences of opinion among students about the
appropriate response to the situation. Helga's Dilemma involves three such issues: the
obligation to one's friend and family, the concern for authority and the law, and be
lief in the sanctity of human life.
After confronting a moral dilemma, which may be presented through a reading, a
f ilm, role-playing, or other media, students must respond to a question about what they
think the main character should do.
Each position which the character might adopt has
some normative support. For example, notice the conflicting norms implied by terms in
the following question which refers to Helga's Dilemma: Should a Christian girl in
Nazi Germany break the law and jeopardize her family by hiding her Jewish friend from
the Gestapo? This question provides the initial focus for a discussion because it en
courages students to offer yes or no opinions which may be supported by a variety of
reasons at all six stages of the Kohlberg scale.
These reasons become the primary focus
of a discussion, and the discussion becomes the major vehicle for moral development.
A LESSON PLAN FOR MORAL DILEMMAS

a

Members of the staff of the Social Studies Curriculum Center at Carnegie-M:?llon
University have developed a teaching plan for leading discussions of moral dilemmas.
The plan includes three parts: a list of general instructions for presenting the origi
nal dilemma; a series of alternative dilemmas to use in case the original dilemma fails
to ~r~mote controversy; and a list of probe questions. Usually students take different
positions on what a character in a dilemma should do. At other times they may all
adopt the same position. Disagreement about what a character should do as well as
~bout reasons for this action leads to lively moral discussion. Hence, a lesson plan
includes a series of alternative dilemmas which a teacher may see if students appear to
agree on the initial action decision. Although alternative dilemmas involve the same
st0
:Y, th e same characters, and the same moral issues, they change the situation de
sc:ibed in the original problem in an effort to promote disagreement about what the
main character should do.
The following lesson plan for Helga's Dilemma provides an
example of the general instructions and includes several alternative dilemmas:
Teaching Plan for Helga's Dilemma
PART I:

ORIGINAL DILEMMA

Distribute the Class
Handout which describes Helga's dilemma. Make sure that the stu
de~ts understand the
terminology in the dilemma and can state the nature of the dilemma
which Helga faced.
Determine by a show of hands or ;n
Hel
h
~
some other way how the class feels about whether
ga 5 ould hide Rachel.
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If the class divides with no less than one-third of the students on each side of the
issue, choose one of the four strategies listed in the overall instructions for teach
ing moral dilemmas and proceed with the discussion, skipping the alternative dilemmas.
PART II:

ALTERNATIVE DILEMMAS

If the class agrees that Helga SHOULD hide Rachel, one of the collowing alternative
dilemmas can be used to provoke disagreement.
A.

Suppose Helga had only met ~chel once and did not know
her well. What should she do in that case?

B.

Suppose Helga's father and mother heard what was happen
ing at the door and told her not to let Rachel in the
house.
In that case what should she do?

If the class agrees that Helga SHOOW NOT hide Rachel, one of the following alterna
tive dilemmas can be used to provoke disagreement.
A.

suppose that several of Helga's friends were also hiding
Jews from the Gestapo. What should Helga do in that case?

B.

Suppose Helga heard the Gestapo coming and knew that
Rachel would be sho on sight within a few minutes if
she did not hide her. What should she do in that case?

When the class divides over one of these alternative dilemmas, choose one of the strat
egies and proceed with the discussion.
After different students recommend particular actions for a character in a dilem
ma, the teacher focuses class discussion on an analysis of their reasons. Discussion
should focus on the examination and exchange of reasons which students give for sugges t
ing a particular action, such as hiding Rachel or refusing to hide her.
Leading a suc
cessful group discussion sometimes involves the use of appropriate questions, called
probe questions, which can help students to think about moral reasoning. A lesson plan
for a moral dilemma includes a list of probe questions designed to elicit additional
reasoning about the moral problem under discussion. Probe questions also help student s
focus their thinking on a particular issue within the dilemma.
Finally, probes also
provide the teacher with appropriate questions to use if the discussion lags. Teachers
may use one or more of these questions, but they should feel no necessity to use all of
them.
The following probe questions appear in part three of the lesson plan for Helga 's
Dilemma:
PART I I I:

PROBE QUESTIONS

1.

What is the most important thing that one friend owes to another?
Why?

2.

Should a person ever risk the welfare of relatives for the welfare
of friends? Why?

3.

Should a person ever risk his or her own life for someone else?
Why?

4.

Is a person ever justified to hide someone who is fleeing from
the authorities?

5.

From Rachel's point of view, what should Helga do?

6.

From the point of view of Helga's father, what should Helga do?

THE TEACHING PROCESS
The Carnegie-Mellon University group has identified four steps in a teaching pro
cess for leading a good discussion of a moral dilemma. Teachers must help students to
· confront a moral problem involved in a dilemma, to state a position on the dilemma, to
test the reasoning behind their position, and to reflect on their reasonir-KJ and that of
others during a discussion.
The following diagram represents the four main steps of the
teaching process and also shows various sub-steps.
The circles in the center of the
diagram indicate what the students should do during each discussion; the branching
circles or sub-steps indicate activities which the teacher should initiate.
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DIAGRAM OF THE TEACHING PROCESS
FOR TEACHING A MORAL DILEMMA
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1. Confronting a moral dilemma:
The teacher presents the dilemma to the stu
dents, helps the class to clarify terminology or conditions in the dilemma, and assists
the group to understand the moral aspects of the problem. This step usually takes only
a few minutes.
2. Stating a position on the original or the alternative dilemma: The teacher
next encourages each student to think about and take a position on the dilemma.
The
initial question posed by the dilemma focuses on the "action" which Helga should take- 
to hide Rachel or to refuse to let her in. The discussion will focus on the "reasoning "
for the action--why should Helga hide Rachel; or, why turn her away? Students must de
cide both what to do and why to do it. Teachers can help them to make the decisions in
three ways: by giving them a few moments to think about the issues, by asking them to
write down both what the character should do and why she should do it, or by encourag
ing students to brainstorm reasons for the alternative courses of action.
Next the teacher may ask for a show of hands to determine whether a difference
of opinion exists among class members.
If the class divides over the recommended
action, a teacher should continue with the discussion. Usually a 70/30 split of opinion
indicates a sufficient interest in the dilemma situation. If the class seems to agree
on a course of action, the teacher should introduce an alternative dilemma from the
lesson plan to stimulate more interest and disagreement and promote a better discussio n,
Step two should take no more than five minutes.
3.
Testing the reasoning for a position on the dilemma:
This is the most im
portant step in the teaching process. It gives the members of the class an opportunity
to test their reasoning against the thinking of others. Each class session usually in 
volves a full class discussion; however, deploying students in small groups for several
minutes can help to involve more students in the discussion, generates additional rea
sons, and helps to focus on the "best" reasons for action. Meeting in small groups
prior to a full discussion gives each person a chance to think about and share reasons
in preparation for an exchange among all class members.
Toe task of a small group usu
ally involves the preparation of a defense for a particular position by listing of all
of the best reasons for recommending a specific action. We have developed several stra 
tegies for small group sessions. Here are two of them:
Strategy A
Divide the class into groups of five to eight students.
Each group should consist of individuals who agree about
the appropriate action on a dilemma.
Have the members of
each group work out a list of reasons for holding the posi
tion that they do. After the groups have worked for a
period of time on this initial task, have each one select
three reasons which reflect the best reasoning for their
position on the moral dilemma and arrange these in prior
ity . You should move from group to group helping each
group develop its list of reasons. After approximately
fifteen minutes of group work, ask the recorder from each
group to report on the final list of best reasons. Since
you will have several groups working on listing reasons
for opposing positions on the moral dilemma, a general
class discussion focused on moral reasoning should follow
the reporting of the groups . Encourage students to chal
lenge one another's reasoning and to help focus the dia
logue on why individuals believe one reason is more appro
priate than another.
Strategy B
Organize the class into small groups with each group includ
ing members who do not agree about the action of the dilemma.
Ask the members of each mixed group to discuss their positions
and the reasons for their positions in order to produce a list
containing the two best reasons on each side of the issue. One
of the objectives of this strategy is to have students discuss
the dilemma from each position on action with the taks of the
group focused on reasoning rather than on the initial position.
A full-class discussion of Helga's Dilemma should include both exchanges among
the people who disagree on what Helga should do ("action"), and discussion of points of
view about why she should do it ("reasoning"). For example, some students may agree
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that Helga should not hide Rachel, but disagree over the appropriate reason for not
h"ding her. A typical class usually includes individuals at different stages of moral
1
d velopment. A moral dilemma will evoke different reasons from individuals. This dif
f:rence in reasoning can be related directly to a difference in stages of development:

;i "

stage 1:

"If Helga lets Rachel in she might also get into
trouble with the Gestapo."

stage 2:

"Helga shouldn't let her in because Rachel prob
ably wouldn't let Helga in if she got into trouble
with the Gestapo."

stage 3:

"Helga has an obligation to her family. She will
really let them down if she gets them all in trouble."

stage 4:

"Helga has an obligation to obey the laws of her society."

stage 5:

"Friendship is not the issue.
If Helga was really
concerned about the problem in her society, she should
be helping all the Jews in order to protest the govern
ment action. She should not hide Rachel unless she
intends to hide other Jews and to make a public protest in opposition to putting Jews in concentration
camps."

n

,n

n.

V

Although the students should do most of the talking, teachers should pose appro
priate questions to clarify reasoning. They might also alter the nature or perspective
of the dilemma to check for consistency of reasoning by using a probe question: From
the point of view of Helga's father, what should Helga do? This step in the teaching
process should take approximately 30-35 minutes.

4. Reflecting on the reasoning discussed during a class: The final step of the
teaching process involves summarizing of reasons presented during the discussion. The
teacher may ask students to think about the different reasons which they have heard dis
cussed and to select the one which they feel represents the best response to the moral
problem. The objective is not to reach consensus within the class but to think about
reasoning. The teacher may also ask the students if they think there is a "right" an
swer to the moral problem. Such a question may provide an opportunity for the teacher
to introduce some additional reasoning which the students did not volunteer. However,
the teacher should not present additional reasoning as "the best reason" or as "the
answer" to a moral problem. Instead, teachers should help students to reflect on al
ternative responses to moral situations. When a good moral discussion class ends, stu
dents should feel that it is incornple te.
They should leave the classroom still wonder
ing about the best response to a difficult moral problem.
THE CLIMATE IN THE CIASSROOM

This approach to moral education depends on a particular climate in the class
room, In order to lead a successful moral discussion, a teacher must establish a =m
:fortable medium between a highly structured discussion and a free-flowing "rap" session.
Mo~al development occurs primarily because students at a higher stage present arguments
which attract lower stage students. The teacher must maintain the focus of the student
exchange and encourage students to express themselves freely. A teacher should not cen
sure a student for a low stage response but should encourage interaction with students
at other stages.
This teaching process stresses particular roles for the teacher and the students.
acher~ who lead discussions of moral dilemmas do not have an "answer sheet" and should
not th
donunate
the v~r b a 1 exchange. Teachers should reflect conf1dence
.
.
as
.
1n
the students
e maJor contr1butors to the discussion. They should develope techniques which encourage
student s t O t a lk directly
·
.
.
Lead
to other students w1thout
go1ng
through the· teacher.
·
h ld 1n
· di. cate a s1ncere
•
·
·
·
•
commerst of a moral dis cuss1on
sou
1nterest
1n
l1sten1ng
to the
en s of student s.
-.....
•
•
clarif
u,ey s h ould ask students to summar1ze
a ser1es
of =mments or to
·
.
neitherY conflicting
. d
.
reason1ng
presented by members of the class. In this
role, teachers
represen~nh?ctr 1 nate students with a bag of virtues nor foster the assumption that values
dealing w·t~ghly personal and relative matters. Instead, they facilitate a process for
l.
student values in a developmental fashion.
To

Thi
of Kohlber:,teaching process has been designed in light of Kohlberg's findings.
Because
issues in a : ;~s7arch, we know that individuals develop their thinking about moral
e inite sequence and that some development occurs naturally as one becomes
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older and more intellectually mature. We also know that a person may understand and
become attracted by reasoning at the next higher stage because it appears more adequate,
consistent, and integrated in the face of additional moral situations. Preliminary
results of ongoing research indicate a correlation between the higher stages of moral
reasoning and individual action in a moral situation. However, the research also re
veals that each person matures in moral reasoning at an individual pace and may not
reach the higher stages. Our current research with tiss process of teaching for cogni
tive moral development suggests that dialogue focused on moral issues can encourage
thinking about moral decisions and that some movement toward a higher stage may occur
as a result.
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SIDDIES CLASSROOMS
The reason for posing moral issues in the social studies classroom seems quite
clear. Social studies teachers have an obligation to help students develop learning
and inquiry skills, an understanding of analytical concepts, and a base of knowledge
about society. Social studies teachers also have an obligation to help their students
by encouraging questioning and intensive interaction concerning social and moral issues.
Cognitive moral development offers an excellent vehicle to accomplish this objective.
The strong base in empirically derived research established by Kohlberg and his col
leagues has led to a teaching process which avoids both indoctrination and value rela
tivity.
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DO VAWES CHANGE?

YES!

RE-EVALUATION OF Oill VAWES
by

Ronald Mi.zus

(Reprinted by permission from Penny's Forum, Spring/Summer, 1972, p. 16.)
"Values" is an elusive concept. When used in a discussion or a presentation of
ideas, the term often conveys comfort to the audience addressed, for, after all, we are
all in favor of everyone having values, preferably our own. But what is judged to be
significantly worthwhile in life varies from culture to culture, society to society,
person to person. The concept itself begs many questions and issues. One can tell more
about a person's values in any given situation by what that person does rather than by
what that persons says.
Yet, that statement itself begs a question:_ how can we always
be sure of another's motivations and meanings?
rt is one of my assumntions that all values are relative to at least three ex
perienced facts:
the sense of self (I-ness); the existence of others; the environment
of Nature. These three given aspects of reality are not created by me, but my percep
tiou of them and their continuously changing and complex interrelationship shapes them
in part. For I bring to those experiences my imagination, memory, wants, needs, atti
tudes, goals, knowledge, willing, beliefs, behavior, emotions, and biological inheri
tance. To some extent, each of us creates a personal and unique reality.
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It is our search for values-as-common-good which prevents our private realities
from random clashing and mutual destruction.
It is possible, of course, to go to either
extreme of value-as-common-good: Political oppression, war and fanaticism when it is
overstressed; psychosis or character pathology when it is understressed .
There will al
ways be stress between individual freedom and social order, but this tension can be cre
ative, especially in a society which allows and protects a pluralism of values. I am
claiming then, that- it is a social good- a value - for us to take seriously the pur
suit of meaning-in-community in order to maximize both societal and individual well
being. Indeed, I recognize and accept for myself a long list of values, virtues or
goods (versus evils).
I expend an extraordinary amount of my time, emotional and in
tellectual resources, and psychic energy trying to actualize certain deeply held values
which have to do with personal growth, group joy, and world community.
However, even if I did believe that there are unchanging values in life and the
universe, such a philosophical conviction would provide small comfort and little direc
ti~n for me. I do not believe that there are values outside of persons which are in
tyited from a Platonic realm, or divinely revealed, or which are applicable to all per
sons and that valuing is a complex process involving creation, risk and courage; values
are not something you have but something you do.
In other words, I hold values to be
experiential and situational. We have a choice in the worldview which we will choose as
our~ and act upon in spite of the awareness of the demonic potential of all idealogies.
It 15 ours to evaluate, risk, decide and act. Every value is created the moment it is
chosen, willed and expressed. Friendship, for example, is not a thing which exists be
tween ~wo people; it is a constantly changing relational dynamic which deepens or dies
accor~ng to what each person brings to the other to share something of who they are at
th
at time. And that identical constellation of evaluating, risking, deciding and acting
may
·
·
·
·
Th never again oc cur, 1 eaving
tha t particular
moment o f being
~nd response unique.
meo~~h I may use past experiences, resources, memory and institutional supports to guide
a d rough new experiences, I nevertheless face "new occasions which teach new duties"
1
bnut
am left in my aloneness to choose among my many value-concepts in order to contrie
the t·to any situat·ion th e most creative human response of which I am capable. Most of
condi~e,_of course, I am not confronted with such momentous decision-making; habit,
surviva1ninfg, character and personality help me, for better or for worse, in the quiet
0
each day.
But the time 5
t •
requirer d"
cer ainly are numerous enough when I encounter experiences which
times to~ ~ca~ re-eval~ation of old values. There are times to hold on to friends and
sionate se: t em_go; times to endure suffering and times to fight it; times for pas 
f or controvean~ ~imes_for g~ntle sensuality; times for disciplined reflection and times
rsia action; times for involvement and times for detachment; times to trust
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and times to withold trust; times for privacy and times for openness-in-community.
And so we could go on and on, not merely imitating the rhetoric of Ecclesiastes, but
being painfully aware of the paradoxes, absurdities, ironies, inconsistencies, and un
predictabilities of living which make us vulnerable to hurt and which make it impera
tive that somehow we find the courage to be in spite of all insecurities and anxieties.
In our eagerness to hold on to old values in their old contexts we will find no t
security but cultural and personal stagnation. As the late Abraham Maslow expressed it
(Easlen Papers, 1968, "the self-actualizing person, for_ the most part, transcends the
values of his culture." Religious and educational ins ti tu tions which have responsi
bility for the nurture of youth and adults should embrace the potential of the future
and prepare people to =nfront it not with shock but with confidence based on emerging
values- values which individuals should have the dignity to discover within themselves
and through their own experiencing.
The process of education is basically value-venturing, but institutions of edu 
cation seem distrustful of the capacity and desire of learners to explore, discover,
experiment, and create. Educators often seem more secure in the role of technicians of
stereotyped truths and values rather than participating in an on-going valuing process.
The quest for a hierarchy of values or a set of values is, I believe, misleading be
cause it misses the more critical issue of developing the individual's ability to util 
ize value-making criteria in ever-changing contexts. Even a value framework at one
maturational stage of a person will not be the same value framework of another matur
ational stage of that same individual. And, certainly, the values of the contemporary
generation are not identical to those of its preceeding generation, for new times bring
new challenges which require new responses.
The contemporary movements for world com
munity, alternative lifestyles and people's liberation contain the promise of a higher
order of human being. We can create that reality if we do not fear value-venturing.
DO VALUES CHANGE?

VALUES AS A CONSTANT

NOi

by
David R. Mace
(Reprinted by permission from Penny' 's Forum, Spring/Summer, 1972, p

17.)

I find discussion of values as exasperating as discussions of love, and for the
same reason-because the words have no precise meaning, so that every speaker invests
them with meanings of his own.
I therefore propose in this article to present a con
ceptual framework that can be understood even by relatively young children. It may be
philosophically vulnerable, but it is pedagogically serviceable.
In order to think clearly and communicate intelligibly about this subject, I
find I need to consider my relationships to others at three levels - of values, of
standards, and of behavior. At the top level, clouds in the sky represent vaiues
they are ethereal and relativeiy formless. At the next level, boxes represent stand
ards - they are rigid and clearly defined. At the lower level (down-to-earth) people
interacting represent behavior.
These three concepts are normally inter-related. The values are the ultimate
ideals and goals of mankind, which do not undergo basic change.
The standards represent
the atcempts of human communities and groups to make rules which will ensure that the
values are preserved and expressed. Behavior represents the manner in which individual
men aud women interact with each other, normally by conforming to the standards in order
to preserve the values.
Now let us look at each of these three levels a little more closely. The val ues
in my view, do not undergo basic change.
They are integrally associated with the goa ls
of human life.
I hold that man has evolved beyond the animal ievel at which first sur 
vival, then immediate gratification, are the only consciously sought goals. The deve l
opmen. of the human imagination enables man to step out of the narrow confines of the
immediate present and to contemplate ' tne past and the future.
Thus he sees his life
moving onward and, hopefully, progressing upward. He dreams of preserving the goods he
has and of gaining greate r good s in the future.
Thus he takes comman of his destiny
and plans ahead.
But I cannot plan my life on an individual basis.
I am bound to others who
travel with me.
They and I stand or tall together. So I must work out with the members
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of my family, tribe, or nation some agreement about our corporate goals.
process of defining our values.
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In this process, we are not free to follow unfettered imagination. There are
conditions that must be met for mutual survival.
This is even true of the animal world,
as prince Kropotkin demonstrated in his Mutual Aid. Unless individuals cooperate in
seeking group ends together, they create conditions in which their individual ends are
finally defeated.
The conditions that must be met represent the values, They can be
described in different ways. some would say the basic value is justice., others would
say it was love. We often speak of beauty, truth and goodness as values; and though
they may be associated with quality of life rather than with survival, they are valid,
because man's goal is to do more than survive.
we can speak of these values in many words, and that doesn't matter. The clouds
do not need fixed forms.
But they are inherently immutable, because they represent the
conditions which must be met if human communities are not to degenerate or perish. We
see a good example in microcosm of a human community degenerating for lack of values in
William Golding's book Lord of the Flies.
It would be theoretically possible to have a human community so dedicated to its
values that behavior would not need to be prescribed or controlled, but could be left
to individual responsibility.
ntis is the policy prescribed by situation ethics, and
it can be realized in a really good family and even for a time in a larger community.
But up to now in human history, there have been too many immature and perverse indivi
duals to make it practicable to give them total freedom and trust them to live by the
community values. So it has been necessary to establish standards. These are the boxes
in our diagram and they represent customs, rules, and codes that interpret the correct
behavior which will lead to the preservation of the values. The boxes have rather dif
ferent shapes in different communities, varying with the circumstances in which people
have to live. The boxes have to be rigid in form so that all concerned can see clearly
what the law is that they have to obey. But in spite of this rigidity, standards are
always having to be modified to meet special cases and changing circumstances. This is
specially true in a time of cultural change like that through which we are now passing.
Our standards today are in confusion. But it is inaccurate to say that this means we need
no values. It is simply that we are in the process of re-interpreting how our immutable
values can be most effectively reflected in behavior under the new conditions in which
we are living.
The hope of many today is that we may be able, in a free and pluralistic society,
to dispense with rigid standards and follow the situational mode of living in direct
individual response to our ultimate values. This represents a novel and daring experi
ment. Theoretically, in a world of really mature people, there is no reason why this
should not be possible.
In practice, at this stage in human development, the difficul
ties are formidable.

ARE THERE UNIVE«SAL VAWES?
( Reprinted by permission from penny's Forum, Spri ng/Summ~:i:, 1972, pp. 22-23.)
AN INTERVIEW WITH DOROTHY LEE
On a brisk, Fall day in September I drove to Connecticut to interview
Dorothy Lee. This is one experience which would have been valuable
for all of us. Miss Lee was at her summer home deep in a wooded area
and. we sa t in
· f ront of a roaring fire and chatted for a good 4 hours '
(w~th a short break for lunch). While listening to the tape to write
~his article, the whole day became so vivid to me; the wind was blow
ing outside and the fire and food gave off very pleasant aromas.
I
only r:gret that all these sensory experiences cannot be conveyd on
the printed page.
The interview was so in
· t eresting
·
. .is verbatim.
that much of it
I
express my sincere th ans
k to Miss
.
Lee for a very memorable day.
-Grace Richardson
Before we
t •
.
have 5 t
ge into talking about values, I would like to say that the reason I
opped writi
·
you talk in
. ng is that people read an article as if you were the authority. When
an interview, such as this one, you can talk tentatively. Sometimes people
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will say that a certain article helped them to think - but oftentimes they've used the
information instead of thinking.
They need to recognize that the author may be search 
ing also.
Are there universal values held by all cultures?
I think to ask me this question is irrelevant to the knowing of value.
I like
to distinguish between cultural values and value.
The cultural values would be a soci 
ety's attempt, successful or not, to express value. Value for me means good -not
morally good - not morally good or virtue, but good in the sense of true.
There is basic to all existence the value of being me, of being unique, of wha t
has been referred to as human dignity.
But along with the value of being human is the
value of community.
By connnuni ty I mean the other pe·rson or persons around me. For a number of
groups (the ones we have called "primitive"), community also included the air, water,
rocks and trees. This is why they didn't pollute or destroy because they loved their
community and were responsive to it. To respond to my community I must be sensitive to
it; that is, I must sense my community.
It is my community, my parents when I'm firs t
born and others later, who enable me to grow in tiis sensitivity.
The value of human dignity cannot exist without community. For instance, I dorl t
believe I can actualize my dignity unless my community recognizes and honors it. I can
feel proud that I am I - not arrogant, but proud -when you recognize my existence.
Many African groups have praise songs - the mother will have a praise-phrase fo
a little child. This phrase simply greets the existence of the other person (honors
and recognizes him). For me, this human dignity and community are absolute values.
Every society has its own different forms of expressing these values.
In our
own society we have many sub-cultures, including the culture of the young, who have
their own way of expressing these values. When people make lists of values it is these
forms which they are talking about.
The forms are what I would call the secondary level of values and i t is at thi s
level whj r.h I can sa_y some values are good and some are not .
I can judge them only b e
cause some of these forms (or values) do actually infuse one's life with true value arxl
some do not. For instance, in our society we have been valuing competitive success or
even just success. A mother is proud of her son, not because he is this person, but
because he has been successful in making money, earning grades, playing football, or
whatever. Even a baby will be priased for having achieved something.
This is our way
of trying to express or recognize human dignity. A lot of people are looking for suc 
cess so that they can be proud of themselves.
I feel that this form is bad and that it
goes against human dignity in itself. Many of our values are this way - against human
dignity.
Everyone wants to be - to have dignity and to be proud of what he is. We, the
community (the mother, the teacher, the neighbor, the friend) instead of honoring a
human being-· just as he tries very hard to do something or just as he loves or just as
he walks down the street - or just as he is - we set standards to measure him by. What
great thing has he achieved? In this way we s1op him from valuing his own dignity. we
teach him not to seek who he is, not to increase and strengthen and recognize what he
is, but rather to do something so he will please someone.
A study was made recently on athletic group sports. It was found that this com
petition does not teach people anything beyond the particular athletic form.
Competition
when it is competition for success only, is a travesty of competition when it is there
to make the individual stronger than he would be without it. For instance, with the
Sioux and many Indians, a young boy would choose an older boy who was a great runner an
run against him - not because he wanted to win but because if he had somebody going
faster than he was he would have to push himself more than if he were dependent upon
himself.
That competition was there to help the individual really exercise his entire
being. This is competition for human dignity and for this I need community (people
with whom I am relating).
This is what I mean when I say that a culture has its own interpretation of
value. Sometimes its interpretation can be wrong or bad because in the long run it
doesn't help the individual enhance his dignity.
AnothE!r thing I have learned from the Indians is that while I am strengthening
myself for my own dignity, I am also strengthening myself for the community. When I 3111
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responsive to my communit~, I realize that if I am strong, the whole community will bene
fit from my str ngth.
This strengthening of the physical and spiritual being was not done
as a selfish thing.

7

one thing I would like to pick up on is the value of difficult work.
In a form
er issue of your magazine i t was men:ioned that now many women w~nt to work for mone~
ther than as volunteers. When Indians worked at a hard task, i t had two related aims
~ trengthening themselves (not allowing any part of their emotional, physical or spiri
tu!l being to be slack) and enriching the community. Children and adolescents sought out
such tasks on their own.
In our society, women who may be ~ccepting work w ich ~as ~oth
.
to do with the self and probably does not have any meaning except the money i t will
~n?ng have gone very far from their own honoring of themselves and also from community.
V0r~un;eer work can be demanding - like running against someone who goes • much faster than
you do, and it can also be a loving response to the needs of the community.
This is one place where I feel the younger generation is questioning our inter
pretation of the old values. They are the ones who say they are not going to work for
money, they want to find something which is meaningful, truly needed by the community,
and hope that i t will pay enough to live on. What they mean by meaningful work is some
thing which is consistent with their own human dignity - so that when they go to bed at
night they can feel proud, rather than ashamed.

:>rl t
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DO

you think, then, that human dignity is the only universal value?

fo

Human dignity is a universal truth as well as a universal value.
I believe that
everyone is born with human dignity -but that i t is oftentimes not recognized or ex
pressed within a culture.
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A book which I would like to recommend is Never in Anger by Jean Briggs who
lived with an Eskimo group for about two years. From the very beginning of a child's
life, she found that the dignity of the other person was taken as a matter of course and
that the guiding of the child in the rules of behavior was done in such a way that the
individual was not belittled or degraded.
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Is human dignity a value which has been recognized throughout the history of
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I think that it has always been, and I do not know at what point i t has been
overlooked. By human dignity I don't ever mean being good to you.
I mean just recog
nizing you as existing as a human being.
In our society we do not allow people to have their own individual style.
In
school we try to teach everyone to be the same. We give an assignment and everyone has
to finish it by a certain date. But people are different; each has his own rhythm, his
o~n quirk, his own special curiosity. Someone may take a full week to mull over an as
signment and then write quickly. Someone else has to do i t day-by-day. We try to teach
people not to be individual. Even when it comes to handwriting. As teachers we have to
read papers written by students.
I used to ask my students to type everything because I
~ould read their papers faster.
But the question is - what is the priority? If read
~ng _f~st is the priority, that's one thing. But if getting across to my students that
i ndi viduality is paramount, then I will take the time to read their handwriting· this is
th
e priority.
In our society, anything which is individual, or which is what 1' call a
part
of it.
human dignit Y, is
·
·
·
b ecause it
·
·
ognize
no t a priority
tak es too much time
or energy to rec-

com
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But if students are permitted to do everything the way they want to do it,
~ouldn't we have chaos? What then, do you suggest is the role of education and educators
1.n preserving indi viduali:;:t::-y?:;:_:----".;;c.,'--=-.::.....,,_...;;...:::......;::.::.......ac.:::..::...:.....=..:::_...::..:.:.:::......::.=c:::.......:::..::_.:::..:::.::..:::::.==:_::::.::~=====
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means worki ng w1.·th people so that they really want to do what they like to do
do.
Hum It b.
work har:nb ~ings are challenged by the difficult, but many children lose the desire to
them_ and ~hor~ they come to school; their families try to make everything easier for
to the sup
atks partly for the parent's sake. For instance, a mother who could walk
ermar et with her hild
f
.
.
hen she is w lki
.
c
pre ers to drive because walking takes too long. or,
if time 1.· 5 t ak
ng wi th her child, she's always saying - -"come on, hurry up 11 whereas
a en a child wi· 11 discover
·
spared, or as
many things while walking. The child is' being
1
ent I have gi would say, cheated, of any kind of exercise and exertion. One assign
easy ( "do it thv~n my st udents is to spend one day listening and looking for the word ea 7ier,
·
11
•
•
•
cou 1 d preserve is
th way
t f' it's
.
etc. ) • This
word is
used as a good thing.
If we
oi: di:f:ficult or
~
eeling which the child has of doing things, not because they're easy
ing him maintai wh~tever, but because they're what he wants to do, then we would behelpn 1.s human dignity; and also we would not have to worry about motivating

re

57

him.

If I do what I value, no one has to prod me or hold a carrot before my nose.

In our society, right now, the only place where we don't make things easier is
in individual sports. '!here, people try to conquer the more difficult - surfing, skiing
and dangerous sports. No one pays them for it and oftentimes no one else is watching.
It is not involved with =mpetition with another person.
It's like people who go out
and climb Mt. Everest - no one is making them do it - they are doing i t because they find
it challenging.
If people are in touch with their own dignity and themselves, then what they
want from me as a teacher is to challenge them to think as hard as they can and to choose
the more difficult rather than the easier. By difficult I don't mean hard.
'!here is a
distinction between the two- if I ask students to do something which I want them to do
then it is hard because they are not following their own bent.
If they follow their own
desires it isn't hard. On their own, they will choose the more difficult path - because
that means they are really being alive.
How did we lose this expression of dignity?
This is what our young people are rebelling against today and are trying to find
again. Everything which we have done is to protect ourselves from the piercing qualities
of living - even from great joys. We have reached the point of feeling nothing - of being
anesthetized.
Youn9 people are saying - "This is life and I'm going to live it in all its pain
and joys, etc." They're going back to being human and want to find out what it all means.
What is relevant to the times is life with meaning, caring, loving.
The counter culture is exactly what it says - it's counter the superficial values
of the culture. They don't refrain from bathing so as to force you to like them, how
ever disgusting they are, they are asking - ''What is disgusting about my not bathing?
Isn't the odor of a body, human?"
One of the questions we were concerned about was respect for heritage. What is
happening now with so many people wanting to embrace some of the aspects of their cultur
al backgrounds?
In the past people from foreign countries were forced or persuaded to reject
their heritage in order to be American, and nothing was given to them to take the place
of a feeling for their original culture. All the textbooks in our school systems are
based on the assumption that we are English. If you study literature, you don't study a
Turkish poet or an African novelist. When you study grannnar - it is English - otherwise
you study a foreign language (which could, in fact, be your own).
What's happening now is that people are saying - "My history, which is a part of
me, has been overlooked and treated as if it didn't exist." People want to be honored
for being Greek or Black or Scottish and are therefore seeking their history. When I am
in search o f ~ and~ dignity, then my history becomes important and I don't want some
one else's. To reject your history, means to reject yourself.
How much do you honor other people and how much do you honor yourself?
When you consider all I have been saying, honoring myself and honoring other
people are the same thing.
In both cases I am honoring human dignity. If an individual
has the feeling that his uniqueness is respected, then he will never be afraid that he is
losing a part of himself by doing something which someone else wants.
Additional Thoughtful Statements
We try to avoid the unpleasant, but if we cut one-half of the unpleasant things
out of our lives then we have cut one-half the existence in this area out of life. we
owe it to our human dignity to really experience disappointment, pain, cold, etc. - this
is part of being human.
We usually avoid being involved because it is one of the most effort-demanding
things-it requires that we care.
we should not avoid a situation because it is frightening -if i t is worth do
ing, it is worth being frightened about. we should enjoy it as part of being human and
alive.
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VALUES EDUCATION
by
Gerald Strong

Values are a part of the larger trend in education more commonly referred to as
"humanistic," "affective," "confluent," or "psychological" education.
Humanistic education emphasize the non-academic aspects of a student's growth
and development. The humanistic approach to education aims chiefly at promoting posi
tive self-concepts, increasing achievement motivation, promoting creative thinking and
behavior, fostering better human relations and clarifying values.
our values are of utmost importance.
It is our values that determine the
choices we make and the direction we take in life.
In our highly complexed, individualized society, we are constantly bombarded by
numerous decisions. Today people are confronted with more choices than ever before.
In
Future Shock, Alvin Toffler warns that future generations may be faced with the dilemma
of overchoice. A person who has no value system or a confused value system may not be
able to cope with the dilemma of overchoice. Therefore, it appears imperative that each
individual be assisted in establishing a set of values by which he can make rational de
cisions in unfamiliar situations.
We may feel that we have a well defined set of values, only to realize thatwhen
we are faced with a novel situation or a forced choice between two or more agreeable or
disagreeable alternatives that we become thoroughly confused.
The concept of values education is not new.
There have always been parents and
educators who have searched for ways to assist the youth in constructing a system of
values. Numerous approaches may be used in constructing values. In their attempt to
assist the younger generation in developing values, parents and educators have tradition
ally used such approaches as modeling, moralizing, laissez-faire and values clarification.
The adults who use the modeling approach, attempt t o set a living example for
youth to follow.
This approach requires the adult to set examples in words and in
actions as well as in dress etc. The difficulty with this approach is that our youth of
today are exposed to so many different adults that it is di f ficult for them to select an
appropriate model.
Moralizing is an indoctrinational approach to teaching values. With the moral
izing approach, the adults assume that they know the "right" set of values that everyone
should have. The problem with this approach is that it has become ineffective. In our
pluralistic society, t he youth of today are introduced to many different philosophies.
The youth become confu sed. In the final analysis, they are left alone to make their own
decisions about whose advice to follow or values to adopt. The youth who are reared by
adults who use the mo rali2ing approach in teaching values are not equipped to make ra
tional choices.
They have not had the experiences of selecting what they think is best
and refraining from the "less desirable" values which others are encouraging them to
adopt.
The laissez-fai re approach to values education requires everybody to refrain
from teaching values . The adults who adopt this approach feel that everyone must devel
op their own val ues without a ny assistance.
They feel that everyone will be all right
in the end.
The fallacy of the laissez-faire a p proach is that everything usually does not
come out all right in the end. Our youth o~ t oday do not need parents and teachers to
run their lives, but they do need, and in mo st instances, want assistance in learning how
to make value. judgments.
Values clarification is a process approach to helping people develop a system
of values. The proce ss of values clarification at t empts to assist people in developinJ
their own system o f values. This process allows a p erson to learn about himself, to be
come aware of his beliefs, attitudes, feelings and what it is he values. Values clari
fication does not provide anyone with a set of values, but rather allows a person to dis
cover his own values. The adults who use the process of v a lues clarification are not
concerned with the values a person holds, but rather the process by which a person devel
ops his value s y stem.
The questions that a person must ask to determi n e his own values stem from the

areas of prizing, choosing and acting. By prizing, a person selects the beliefs, be
havior and attitudes that he prizes and cherishes and is willing to publicly affirm
when appropriate.
In the process of choosing, the person must have a free choice to
select from alternatives after the consideration of the consequences of eachalternative.
By acting, a person must decide if he is to act the way he believes. A person should
form a pattern, be consistent and repetitious in his actions.
If a person cannot select what he prizes, make a choice between alternatives
with a knowledge of the consequences and take action on his beliefs with consistency, he
does not have a value system.
The goal of the process of values clarification is to assist people in applying
the above processes of valuing in their everyday lives; to assist people in applying
these processes to the beliefs and behavior patterns they now hold and to those they are
now developing.
To achieve the goal of values clarification, educators must use techniques
which will aid the youth of today in becoming aware of the beliefs they prize and would
be willing to affirm publicly when appropriate. The educators must use materials and
techniques which encourage one to consider the alternatives of thinking and acting. The
learners must be encouraged to consider the pros and cons and the consequences of the
different alternatives in reaching decisions.
The teacher aids the learned in discover
ing whether his beliefs correspond with his actions. If there is a gross discrepancy
between the learner's stated beliefs and actions, the teacher attempts to assist the
student in coordinating the two.
Through simulation exercises, the teacher provides the learners an opportunity
to work their way through life like situations. The learners are encouraged to use these
processes in everyday life. People only learn what they are allowed to do. An individ
ual does not really understand a problem until he has worked his way through it.
It is
only when people are allowed to make their own decisions and evaluate the consequences
of the alternatives that they develop their own system of values.

TOWARD
A IDDERN APPRO/\CH TO VAWES:
THE VAWING PROCESS IN
THE MATURE PERSON
by
earl R. Rogers

(Reprinted by permission from Paul Kurtz, ed., M::>ral Problems in Contemporary Society,
Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1969, pp. 77-95.)

There is a great dea l of concern today with the problems of values. Youth, in
almost every country, is deeply uncer tai n of its value orientation; the values associat
ed with various religions have lost much of their influence; sophisticated individuals
in every culture seem unsure and troubled as to the goals they hold in esteem. The rea
sons are not far to seek. The world culture, in all its aspects, seems increasingly sci
entific and relativistic, and the rigid, absolute views on values which come to us from
the past appear anachornistic. Even more important, perhaps, is the fact that the mod
ern individual is assailed from every angle by divergent and contradictory value claims.
It is no longer possible, as it was in the not too distant historical past, to settle
comfortably into the value system of one's community and live out one's life without
e ver examining the nature and the assumptions of that system.
I n thi s situa t ion it is not surprising that value orientations from the past
appear to be in a state of disintegration or collapse. Men question whether there are,
or can be, any universal values.
It is often felt that we may have lost, in our modern
world, all possibility of any general or cross-cultural basi.s for values. One natural
resul t of t hi s uncertainty and confusion is that there is an increasing concern about,
interest in, and a searching for a sound or meaningfu l value approach which can hold its
own in today 's world .
I share this general concern.
I have also experienced the more specific value
issues which arise in my own field, psychotherapy.
Tue client's feelings and convic
tions abo ut values frequently change du ri ng therapy. How can he or we know whether they
have changed in a soun d direc tion? Or doe s he simply, as some claim, take over the

value system of his therapist? Is psychotherapy simply a device whereby the unacknow
ledged and unexamined values of the therapist are unknowingly transmitted to an unsus
pecting client? Or should this transmission of values be the therapist's openly held
purpose? Should he become the modern priest, upholding and imparting a value system
suitable for today? And what would such a value system be? There has been much dis
cussion of such issues, ranging from thoughtful and empirically based presentations such
as that of Glad,1 to more polemic statements. As is so often true, the general problem
faced by the culture is painfully and specifically evident in the cultural microcosm
which is called the therapeutic relationship .
I should like to attempt a modest approach to this whole problem.
I have ob
served changes in the approach to values as the individua l grows from infancy to adult
hood.
I observe further changes when, if he is fortunate, he continues to grow toward
true psychological maturity. Many of these observations grow out of my experience as a
therapist, where I have had the rich opportunity of seeing the ways in which individuals
move toward a richer life. From these observations I believe I see some directional
threads emerging which might offer a new =ncept of the valuing process, more tenable in
the modern world.
I have made a beginning by presenting some of these ideas partially
in previous writings,2 I would like now to voice them more clearly and more fully.
I would stress that my vantage point for making these observations is not that
of the scholar or philosopher:
I am speaking from my experience of the functioning hu
man being, as I have lived with him in the intimate experience of therapy, and in other
situations of growth, change, and development. To me these seem to express some core
human values which a humanistic ethics can support with confidence.
SOME DEFINITIONS
Before I present some of these observations, perhaps I should try to clarify
what I mean by values. There are many definitions which have been used, but I have
found helpful some distinctions made by Charles r.brris. He points out that value is a
term we employ in different ways. We use it to refer to the tendency of any living be
ings to show preference, in their actions, for one kind or object or objective rather
than another. This preferential behavior he calls "operative values." It need not in
volve any cognitive or conceptual thinking.
It is simply the v a lue choice which is in
dicated behaviorally when the organism selects one object, rejects another. When the
earthworm, placed in a simple Y maze, chooses the smooth arm of the Y instead of the
path which is paved with sandpaper , he is indicating an opera tive value ,
A second use of the term might be called "conceived values." This is the pre
f erence of the individual for a symbolized object. Usually in such a preference there
is anticipation or foresight of the outcome of behavior directed toward such a symbol
ized object. A choice such as "Honesty is the best policy" is such a conceived value.
A final use of the term might be called "objective value." People use the word
in this way when they wish to speak of what is objectively preferable, whether or not
it is in fact sensed or conceived of as desirable. What I have to say involves this
last definition scarcely at all.
I will be concerned with operative values and concep
tualized values.
TI-IE INFANT'S WAY OF VALUING
Let me first
set, a clear approach
others. We can infer
maintain, enhance, or
end. Watch him for a

speak about the infant. The living human being has, at the out
to values. He prefers some things and experiences, and rejects
from studying his behavior that he prefers those experienceswhich
actualize his organism, and rejects those which do not serve this
bit:

Hunger is negatively valued. - His expression of this often =mes
through loud and clear.
Food is positively valued. But when he is satisfied, food is neg
atively valued, and the same milk he responded to so eagerly is now
spit out ·, or the breast which seemed so satisfying is now rejected
as he turns his head away from the nipple with an amusing facial
expression of disgust and revulsion.
He values security, and the holding and caressing which seem to
communica t e securi t y.
He values new expe r ience f or its own sake, and we observe this
in his obvious pleasure in discovering his toes, in his searching
movements, in his endless curiosity.
He shows a clea r negative valuing of pain, bitter tastes,
sudden loud sounds .

All of this is commonplace, but let us look at these facts in terms of what
they tell us about the infant's approach to values.
It is first of all a flexible,
changing, valuing process, not a fixes system. He likes food and dislikes the same food.
He values security and rest, and rejects it for new experience. What is going on seems
best described as an organismic valuing process, in which each element, each moment of
what he is experiencing is somehow weighed, and selected or rejected, depending on
whether, at that moment, it tends to actualize the organism or not. This complicated
weighing of experience is clearly an organismic, not a conscious or symbolic function.
These are operative, not conceived values. But this process can nonetheless deal with
complex value problems.
I would remind you of the experiment in which young infants had
spread in front of them a score or more of dishes of natural (that is, unflavord) foods.
Over a period of time they clearly tended to value the foods which enhanced their own
survival, growth, and development.
If for a time a child go rged himself on starches,
this would soon be balanced by a protein "binge." If at times he chose a diet deficient
in some vitam:in, he would later seek out foods rich in this very vitamin. He was util
izing the wisdom of the body in his value choices, or perhaps more accurately, the physi
ological wisdom of his body guided his behavioral movements, resulting in what we might
think of as objectively sound value choices.
Another aspect of the infant's approach to value is that the source or locus of
the evaluatin9 process is clearly within himself. Unlike many of us, he knows what he
likes and dislikes, and the origin of these value choices lies strictly within himself.
He is the center of the valuing process, the evidence for his choices being supplied by
his own senses, He is not at this point influenced by what his parents think he should
prefer, or by what the church says, or by the opinion of the latest "expert" in the
field, or by the persuasive talents of an advertising firm.
It is from within his own
experiencing that his organism is saying in the nonverbal terms - "This is good for me."
"That is bad for me." "I like this."
"I strongly dislike that." He would laugh at our
concern over values, if he could understand it. How could anyone fail to know what he
liked and disliked, what was good for him and what was not?
THE CHANGE IN THE VAWING PROCESS
What happens to this highly efficient, soundly based valuing process? By what
sequence of events do we exchange it for the more rigid, uncertain, inefficient approach
to values which characterizes most of us as adults? Let me try to state briefly one of
the major ways in which I think this happens.
The infant needs love, wants it, tends to behave in ways which will bring a re
petition of this wanted experience. But this brings complications. He pulls baby sis
ter's hair, and finds it satisfying to hear her wails and protests. He then hears that
he is "a naughty, bad boy," and this may be reinforced by a slap on the hand. He is cut
off from affection. As this experience is repeated, and many , many others like it, he
gradually learns that what "feels good" is often "bad" in the eyes of others. Then the
next step occurs, in which he comes to take the same attitude toward himself which these
others have taken. Now, as he pulls his sister's hair, he solemnly intones, "Bad, bad
boy." He is introjecting the value judgment of another, taking i t in as his own. To
that degree he loses touch with his own organismic valuing process. He has deserted the
wisdom of his organism, giving up the locus of evaluation, and is trying to behave in
terms of values set by another, in order to hold love.
Or take another example at an older level. A boy senses, though perhaps not
consciously, that he is more loved and prized by his parents when he thinks of being a
doctor than when he thinks of being an artist. Gradually he introjects the values at
tached to being a doctor. He comes to want, above all, to be a doctor .
Then in college
he is baffled by the fact that he repeatedly fails in chemistry, which is absolutely ne
cessary to becoming a physician, in spite of the fact that the guidance counselor assures
him he has the ability to pass the course. Only in counseling interviews does he begin
to realize how completely he has lost touch with his organismic reactions, how out of
touch he is with his own valuing process.
Let me give another instance from a class of mine, a group of prospective teachers.
I asked them at the beginning of the course, "Please list for me the two or three values
which you would most wish to pass on to the children with whom you will work." They
turned in many value goals, but I was surprised by some of the items. Several listed
such things as "to speak correctly," "to use good English, not to use words like ain't."
Others mentioned neatness - "to do things according to instructions"; one explained her
hope that "When I tell them to write their names in the upper right-hand corner with the
date under it, I want them to do it that way, not in some other form"
I confess I was somewhat appalled that for some of these girls the most impor
tant values to be passed on to pupils were to avoid bad grammar, or meticulously to

follow teacher's instructions.
I felt baffled. Certainly these behaviors had not been
experienced as the most satisfying and meaningful elements in their own lives.
Toe list
ing of such values could only be accounted for by the fact that these behaviors had
gained approval - and thus had been introjected as deeply important.
Perhaps these several illustrations will indicate that in an attempt to gain or
hold love, approval, esteem, the individual relinquishes the locus of evaluation which
was his in infancy, and places it in others. He learns to have a basic distrust for his
own experiencing as a guide to his behavior. He learns from others a large number of
conceived values, and adopts them as his own, even though they may be widely discrepant
from what he is experiencing. Because these concepts are not based on his own valuing,
they tend to be fixed and rigid, rather than fluid and changing.
SOME INTROJECTED PATTERNS
It is in this fashion, I believe, that most of us accumulate the introjected
value patterns by which we live.
In this fantastically complex culture of today, the
patterns we introject as desirable or undesirable come from a variety of sources and are
often highly contradictory in their meanings.
Let me list a few of the introjections
which are common held.
Sexual desires and behaviors are mostly bad. The sources of this construct
are many- parents, church, teachers.
Disobedience is bad. Here parents and teachers combine with the military
to emphc,size this concept. To obey is good.
lb obey without question is
even better.
Making money is the highest good.
The sources of this conceived value
are too numerous to mention.
Learning an accumulation of scholarly facts is highly desirable.
Browuing and aimless exploratory reading for fun is undesirable.
The source of these last two concepts is apt to be the school, the
educational system.
Abstract art is good. Here the people we regard as sophisticated
are the originators of the value.
Communism is utterly bad. Here the government is a major source.
To love thy neighbor is the highest good. This concept comes from
the church, perhaps from the parents.
Co operation and teamwork are preferable to acting alona. Here
companions are an important source.
Cheating is clever and desirable.
The peer group again is the
origin.
Coca-colas, chewing gum, electric refrigerators, and automobiles
are all utterly desirable. This conception comes not only from ad
vertisements, but is reinforced by people all over the world. From
Jamaica to Japan, from Copenhagen to Kowloon, the "Coca-Cola culture"
has come to be regarded as the acme of desirability.
This is a small and diversi f ied sample of the myriads of conceived values which
values which individuals often introj ect , and hold as their own, without ever having con
sidered their inner organismic reactions to these patterns and objects.
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF ADULT VALUING
I believe it will be clear from the foregoing that the usual adult - I fell I
am speaking for most of us - has an approach to values which has these characteristics:
The majority o f his values are introjected from other individuals or groups sig
nificant to him, but a re regarded by him as his own .
The source or locus of eva luation on most matters lies outside of himself.
The criterion by which his values are set is the degree to which they will cause
him to be loved or accepted.
These conceived preferences are either not related at all, or not clearly re
lated, to his own process of experiencing.
Often there is a wide and unreco gnized discrepancy between the evidence sup
plied by his own experience and these conceived values .
Because these conceptions are not open to testing in experience, he must hold
them in a rigid and unchanging fashion.
The alternative would be a collapse of his

values. Hence his values are "right" change th not.

like the law of the Mades and the Persians, which

Because they are untestable, there is no ready way of solving contradictions.
If he has taken in from the community the conception that money is the summum bonum and
from the church the conception that love of one's neighbor is the highest value, he has
no way of discovering which has more value for him. Hence a common aspect of modem life
is living with absolutely contradictory values. We calmly discuss the possibility of
dropping a hydrogen bomb on Russia, but then find tears in our eyes when we see headlines
about the suffering of one small child.
Because he has relinquished the locus of evaluation to others, and has lost
touch with his own valuing process, he feels profoundly insecure and easily threatened
in his values.
If some of these conceptions were destroyed, what would take their place?
This threatening possiblity makes him hold his value conceptions more rigidly or more
confusedly, or both.
THE FUNDAMENTAL DISCREPANCY
I believe that this picture of the individual, with values mostly introjected,
held as fixed concepts, rarely examined or tested, is the picture of most of us.
By
taking over the conceptions of others as our own, we lose contact with the potential
wisdom of · our own functioning, and lose confidence in ourselves. Since these value con
structs are often sharply at variance with what is going on in our own experiencing, we
have in a very basic way divorced ourselves from ourselves, and this accounts for much
of modern strain and insecurity. This fundamental discrepancy between the individual's
concepts and what he is actually experiencing, between the intellectual structure of his
values and th~! valuing process going on unrecognized within him - this is a part of the
fundamental estrangement of modern man from himself. This is a major problem for the
therapist.
RESTORING CONTACT WITH EXPERIENCE
Some individuals are fortunate in going beyond the picture I have just given,
developing further in the direction of psychological maturity. We see this happen in
psychotherapy where we endeavor to provide a climate favorable to the growth of a person.
We also see it happen in life, whenever life provides a therapeutic climate for the in
dividual.
Let me concentrate on this further maturing of a value approach as I have seen
it in therapy.
In the first place, let me say somewhat parenthetically that the therapeutic
relationship is not devoid of values. Quite the contrary. When it is most effective,
it seems to mi, it is marked by one primary value; namely, that this person, this client,
has worth. He as a person is valued in his separateness and uniqueness.
It is when he
senses and realizes that he is prized as a person that he can slowly begin to value the
different aspects of himself. Most importantly, he can begin, with much difficulty at
first, to sen~e and to feel what is going on within him, what he is feeling, what he is
experiencing, how he is reacting. He uses his experiencing as a direct referent to which
he can turn in forming accurate conceptualizations and as a guide to his behavior.
Gendlin has elaborated the way in which this occurs. 3 As his experiencing becomes more
and more open to him, as he is able to live more freely in the process of his feelings,
then signific&nt changes begin to occur in his approach to values. It begins to assume
many of the characteristics it had in infancy .
INTROJECTED VALUES IN RELATION TO EXPERIENCING
Perhaps I can indicate this by reviewing a few of the brief examples of intro
jected values which I have given, and suggesting what happens to them as the individual
comes closer to what is going on within him.
The individual in therapy looks back and realizes, "But I enjoyed
pulling my sister's hair - and that •doesn't make me a bad person."
The student failing chemistry realizes, as he gets close to his
own experiencing..J'I don't value being a doctor, even though my
parents do; I don't like chemistry; I don't like taking steps toward
being a doc to; and I am not a failure for having these feelings."
The adult recognizes that sexual desires and behavior may be
richly satisfying and permanently enriching in their consequences,
or shallow and temporary and less than satisfying. He goes by his
own experiencing, which does not always coincide with the social
norms.

He considers art from a new value approach. He says, "This
picture moves me deeply, means a great deal to me. It also happens
to be an abstraction, but that is not the basis for my valuing it."
He recognizes freely that this communist book or person has
attitudes and goals which he shares as well as ideas and values
which he does not share.
He realizes that at times he experiences cooperation as meaning
ful and valuable to him, and that at other times he wishes to be
alone and act alone.
VAWING IN 1HE MAWRE PERSON
The valuing process which seems to develop in this more mature person is in some
ways very much like that in the infant, and in some ways quite different. It is fluid,
flexible, based on this particular moment, and the degree to which this moment is exper
ienced as enhancing and actualizing. Values are not held rigidly, but are continually
changing.
The painting which last year seemed meaningful now appears uninteresting, the
way of working with individuals which was formerly experienced as good now seems inade
quate, the belief which then seemed true is now experienced as only partly true, or per
haps false.
Another characteristic of the way this person values experience is that it is
highly differentiated, or as the semanticists would say, extensional. As the members of
my class of prospective teachers learned, general principles are not as useful as sensi
tively discriminating reactions. One says, "With this little boy, I just felt I should
be very firm, and he seemed to welcome that, and I felt good that I had been. But I'm
not that way at all with the other children most of the time." She was relying on her
experiencing of the relationship with each child to guide her behavior. I have already
indicated, in going through the examples how much more differentiated are the individual's
reactions to what were previously rather solid monolithic introjected values.
In another way the mature individual's approach is like that of the infant. The
locus of evaluation is again established firmly within the person. It is his own exper
ience which provides the value information or feedback.
This does not mean that he is
not open to all the evidence he can obtain from other sources.
But it means that this
is taken for what i t is-outside evidence-nd is not as significant as his own reactions.
Thus he may be told by a friend that a new book is very disappointing. He reads two un
favorable reviews of the book. Thus his tentative hypothesis is that he will not value
the book. Yet if he reads the book his valuing will be based upon the reactions it stirs
in him, not on what he has been told by others.
There is also involved in this valuing process a letting oneself down into the
immediacy of what one is experiencing, endeavoring to sense and to clarify all its com
plex meanings.
I think of a client who , toward the close of therapy, when puzzled about
an issue, would put his head in his hands and say, "Now what is it that I'm feeling? I
want to get next to it. I want to learn what it is." Then hewould wait, quietly and
patiently, trying to listen to himself, until he could discern the exact flavor of the
feelings he was experiencing. He, like others, was trying to get close to himself.
In ge ·tting close to what is going on within himself, the process is much more
complex than it is in the infant. In the mature person it has much more scope and sweep,
for there is involved in the present moment of experiencing the memory traces of all the
relevant learnings from the past. This moment has not only its immediate sensory impact,
but it has meaning growing out of similar experiences in the past.4 It has both the new
and the old in it. So when I experience a painting or a person, my experiencing con
tains within it the learning s I have accumulated from past meetings with paintings or
persons, as w,~11 as the new impact of this particular encounter. Likewise the moment of
experiencing contains, for the ma tu:ce adult, hypotheses about consequences.
"I feel now
that I would enjoy a third drink, but past learnings indicate that I may regret it in
the morning." "It is not pleasant to express f orthrightly my negative feelings to this
person, but past experience indicates that in a continuing relationship it will be help
ful in the long run." Past and future are both in this moment and enter in to the valu
ing.
I find that in the person I am speaking of (and here again we see a similarity
to the infant) the criterion of the valuing process is the degree to which the object of
the experience actualizes the individual himself. Does it make him a richer, more com
plete, more fully developed person? This may sound as though i t were a selfish or un
social criterion, but it does not prove to be so, since deep and helpful relationships
with others are experienced as actualizing.
Like the infant, too, the psychologically ma tu re adult trusts and uses the wisdom
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of his organism, with the difference that he is able to do so knowingly. He realizes
that if he can trust all of himself, his feelings and his intuitions may be wiser than
his mind, that as a total person he can be more sensitive and accurate than his thoughts
alone. Hence he is not afraid to say- "I feel that this experience (or this thing, or
this direction) is good.
Later I will probably know why I feel it is good." He trusts
the totality of himself.
It should be evident from what I have been saying that this valuing process in
the mature individual is not an easy or simple thing.
The process is complex, the choices
often very perplexing and difficult, and there is no guarantee that the choice which is
made will in fact prove to be self-actualizing. But because whatever evidence exists is
available to the indicidual, and because he is open to his experiencing, errors are cor
rectable.
If this chosen course of action is not self-enhancing this will be sensed and
he can make an adjustment or revision. He thrives on a maximum feedback interchange, and
thus, like the gyroscopic compass on a ship, can continually correct his course toward
his true goal of self-fulfillment.
SOME PROPOSITIONS REGARDING
THE VALUING PROCESS

Let me sharpen the meaning of what I have been saying by stating two propositions
which contain the essential elements of this viewpoint. While it may not be possible to
devise empirical tests of each proposition in its entirety, each is to some degree capa
ble of being tested through the methods of science. I would also state that though the
following propositions are stated firmly in order to give them clarity, I am actually
advancing thein as decidedly tentative hypotheses.
1. There is an organismic base for an organized valuing process within the
human individual.
It is hypothesized that this base is something the human being shares with the
rest of the animate world. It is part of the functioning life process of any healthy
organism. It is the capacity for receiving feedback information which enables the or
ganism continually to adjust its behavior and reactions so as to achieve the maximum
possible self-enhancement.
2. This valuing process in the human being is effective in achieving self-en
hancement to the degree that the individual is open to the experiencing which is going
on within himself.
I have tried to give two examples of individuals who are close to their own ex
periencing:
the tiny infant who has not yet learned to deny in his awareness the pro
cesses going on within; and the psychologically mature person who has relearned the ad
vantages of this open state.
There is a corollary to this second proposition which might be put in the follow
ing terms. One way of assisting the individual to move toward openness to experience is
through a relationship in which he is prized as a separate person, in which the experi
encing going on within him is empathically understood and valued, and in which he is
given the freedom to e:xperience his own feelings and those of otherswithoutbeing threat
ened in doing so.
This corollary obviously grows out of therapeutic experience. It is a brief
statement of the essential qualities in the therapeutic relationship. There are already
some empirical studies, of which the one by Barrett-Lennard is a good example, which
gives support to such a statement.5
PROPOSITIONS REGARDING
TI-IE OUTCOME OF THE VALUING PROCESS

I come now to the nub of any theory of values or valuing. What are its conse
quences? I should like to move into this new ground by stating bluntly two propositions
as to the qualities of behavior which emerge from this valuing process. I shall then
give some of the evidence from my own experience as a therapist in the support of these
propositions.
3. In persons who are moving toward greater openness to their experiencing,
there is an organismic commonality of value directions.
4. These conmon value directions are of such kinds as to enhance the develop
ment of the individual himself, of others in his community, and to make for the survival
and evolution of his species.

It has been a striking fact of my experience that in therapy, where individuals
are valued, where there is greater freedom to feel and to be, certain value directions
seem to emerge.
These are not chaotic directions but instead have a surprising common
ality.
This commonality is not dependent on the personality of the therapist, for I have
seen these trends emerge in the clients of therapists sharply different in personality.
This commonality does not seem to be due to the influences of any one culture, for I have
found evidence of these directions in cultures ad divergent asthose of the United States,
Holland, France, and Japan.
I like to think that this commonality of value directions
is due to the fact that we all belong to the same species - that just as a human infant
tends, individually, to select a diet similar to that selected by other human infants,
so a client in therapy tends, individually, to choose value directions similar to those
chosen by other clients. As a species there may be certain elements of experience which
tend to make for inner development and which would be chosen by all individuals if they
were genuinely free to choose.
Let me indicate a few of these value directions as I see them in my clients as
they move in the direction of personal growth and maturity.
They tend to move away from facades.
tend to be negatively valued.

Pretense, defensiveness, putting up a front,

They tend to move away from "oughts." The compelling feeling of "I ought to do
or be thus and so" is negatively valued.
The client moves away from being what he "ought
to be," no matter who has set that imperative.
They tend to move away from meeting the expectations of others.
as a goal in itself, is negatively valued.

Pleasing others,

Being real is positively valued.
The client tends to move toward being himself,
being his real feelings, being what he is. This seems to be a very deep preference.
Self-direction is positively valued . The client discovers an increasing pride
and confidence in making his own choices, guiding his own life.
One's self, one's own feelings come to be positively valued. From a point where
he looks upon himself with contempt and despair, the client comes to value himself and
his reactions as being of worth.
Being a process is positively valued.
From desiring some fixed goal, clients
come to prefer the excitement of being a process of potentialities being born.
Perhaps more than all else, the client comes to value an openness to all of his
inner and outer experience. To be open to and sensitive to his own inner reactions and
feelings, the reactions and feelings of others, and the realities of the objective world
- this is a direction which he clearly prefers.
This openness becomes the client's most
valued resource.
Sensitivity to others and acceptance of others is positively valued. The client
comes to appn?ciate others for what they are, just as he has come to appreciate himself
for what he is.
Finally, deep relationships are positively valued.
To achieve a close, intimate,
real, fully communicative relationship with another person seems to meet a deep need in
every individual, and is very highly valued.
These then are some of the preferred directions which I have observed in indi
viduals moving toward personality maturity. Though I am sure that the list I have given
is inadequate and perhaps to some degree inaccurate, i t holds for me exciting possibili
ties .
Let me try to explain why.
I find it significant that when individuals are prized as persons, the values
they select do not run the full gamut of possibilities.
I do not find, in such a climate
of freedom, that one person comes to value fraud and murder and thievery, while another
values a life of self-sacrifice, and another values only money.
Instead there seems to
be a deep and underlying thread of commonality. I dare to believe that when the human
being is inwardly free to choose whatever he deeply values, he tends to value those ob
jects, experiences, and goals which make for his own survival, growth, and development,
and for the survival and development of others.
I hypothesize that it is characteristic
of the human organism to prefer such actualizing and socialized goals when he is exposed
to a growth-promoting climate.
A corollary of what I have been saying is that in any culture, given a climate
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of respect and freedom in which he is valued as a person, the mature individual would
tend to choose and prefer these same value directions. This is a highly significant hy
pothesis which could be tested. It means that though the individual of whom I am speak
ing would not have a consistent or even a stable system of conceived values, the valui~
process within him would lead to emerging value directions which would be constant across
cultures and across time.
Another implication I see is that individuals who exhibit the fluid valuing pro
cess I have tried to describe, whose value directions are generally those I have listed,
would be highly effective in the ongoing process of human evolution.
If the human specie·s
is to survive at all on this globe, the human being must become more readily adaptive to
new problems and situations, must be able to select that which is valuable for develop
ment and survival out of new and complex situations, must be accu;ate in his appreciation
of re·.aJ.ity .i .f . he; .is tq ..make such selections • .The psychologically .mature person as I have
described him has, I believ~, the ·qualities whlch wouia · cause him to value those exper
iences which would make for the survival and enhancement of the human race. He would be
a worthy participant and guide in the process of human · evolution.
Finally, it appears that we have returned to the issue of universality of values,
but by a different route.
Instead of universal values "out there," or a universal value
system imposed by some group- philosophers, rulers, or priests-we have the possibility
of universal human value directions emerging from the experiencing of the human organism.
Evidence from therapy indicates that both personal and social values emerge as natural,
and experienced, when the individual is close to his own arganismic valuing process. The
suggestion is that though modern man no longer trusts religion or science or philosophy
nor any system of beliefs to give him his values, he may find an or9anismic valuing base
within himself which, if he can learn again to be in touch with it, will prove to be an
organized, adaptive and social approach to the perplexing value iseues which face all of
us.

SUMMARY
I have tried to present some observations, growing out of experience in psycho
therapy, which are relevant to man's search for some satisfying basis for his approach
to values.
I have described the human infant as he enters directly into an evaluating trans
action with his world, appreciating or rejecting his experiences as they have meaning for
his own actualization, utilizing all the wisdom of his tiny but complex organism.
I have said that we seem to lose this capacity for direct evaluation, and come
to behave in those ways and to act in terms of those values which will bring us ~ocial
approval, affection, esteem.
lb buy love we relinquish the valuing process. Because the
center of our lives now lies in others, we are fearful and insecure, and must cling ri
gidly to the values we have introjected.
But if life or therapy gives us favorable conditions for continuing our psycho
logical growth, we move on in something of a spiral, developing an approach to values
which partakes of the infant's directness and fluidity but goes far beyond him in its
richness.
In our transactions with experience we are again the locus or source of .val
uing, we prefer those experiences which in the long run are enhancing, we utilize all the
richness of our cognitive learning and functioning, but at the same time we trust the
wisdom of our organism.
I have pointed out that these observations lead to certain basic statements,
Man has within him an organismic basis for valuing. lb the extent that he can be freely
in touch with this valuing process in himself, he will behave in ways which are self
enhancing. We even know some of the conditions which enable him to be in touch with his
own experiencing process.
In therapy, such openness to experience leads to emerging value directions which
appear to be common across individuals and perhaps even across cultures. Stated in old
er terms, individuals who are thus in touch with their experiencing come to value such
directions as sincerity, independence, self-direction, self-knowledge, social responsi
vity, social responsibility, and loving interpersonal relationships.
I have concluded that a new kind of emergent universality of value directions
becomes possible when individuals move in the direction of psychological maturity, or
more accurately, move in the direction of becoming open to their experiencing. Such a
value base appears to make for the enhancement of self and others, and to promote a. pos
itive evolutionary process.
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HELPING CHILDREN TO CLEARIFY VAWES
by
Louis E. Raths and Sidney B. Simon

(Reprinted by persmission from N.E.A • .J:>urnal, October, 1967, pp. 12-15.)

Modern life in the United States is rich with choice s and opportunities, but it
is also very confusing.
It is far more difficult for a child to develop clear values
today than it was in the simpler, more austere life of the turn of the century .
One major reason for this is the change in the family, where, many believe,
values develop.
In recent decades, Americans have seen dramatic, if not frightening,
changes in the family-working mothers (one out o f three) , broken homes (estimated at
one out of five), and geographic mobility (about one family in five moves every year).
Family sharing has decreased. The consequence, we submit, has been a growing confusion
in the life of children.
When the family defaulted , society passed the buck to the schools.
To avoic con
troversy, many schools began to stand for nothing.
Teachers turned toward "teaching the
f acts." Administrators tended to prefer teachers who did not raise issues. In communi
ties consisting of strangers with many different backgrounds, it became easier to have
schools which represented no moral consensus.
The question we must answer today, then, is: What can schools in a heterogeneous
society do in the teaching o f values? Before arriving at an answer, it is necessary to
define the terms and say not only what values are but by what processes people acquire
them.
Individuals have experiences. Out of these may come certain general guides to
behavior- values-which tend to give direction to life. Values evolve and mature as
experiences evolve and mature.
Because values are a part of living, they operate in very complex circumstances
and usually involve more than simple extremes of right and wrong, good and bad, true and
f alse.
Ihe conditions in which values work typically involve conflicting demands, a
weighing and balancing, and finally an action that reflects a multitude of forces.
Since each person's experiences are different, we cannot be certain what values, what
style of life, would be most suitable for any person. we do, however, have some ideas
about what processes might be most effective for obtaining sound values.

we see values as based on three processes: choosing, prizing, and acting. From
t hese we derive seven criteria, all of which must be satisfied if something is to be
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called a value.

An adult who wants to help children develop values should, we believe:

Encourage children to make choices, and allow them to choose freely
Help them discover and examine available alternatives when faced
with choices
Help them weigh alternatives thoughtfully, reflecting on the consequences of each
Encourage them to consider what i t is that they prize and cherish
Give them opportunities to make public affirmations of their choices
Encourage them to act in accordance with their choices
Help them to examine repeated behaviors or patterns in their life.
In this way the adult encourages the process of valuing. The intent of this pro
cess is to help children clarify for themselves what they value.
This is very different
from trying to persuade children to accept some predetermined set of values by limiting
their choices, enforcing rules and regulations, or teaching cultural or religious dogma,
as some of the traditional approaches do.
We have no doubt that such methods have in the past controlled behavior and even
formed beliefs and attitudes, but we assert that they have not and cannot lead to values
in the sense we are concerned with them-values that represent the free and thoughtful
choice of intelligent hwnans interacting with complex and changing environments.
The traditional approaches listed above would receive a low grade in terms of
their effectiveness in promoting such values as honor, courage, self-control, and love.
All have the air of indoctrination: free inquiry, thoughtfulness, and reason seem to be
lost. The approach seems to be to persuade the child to adopt the "right" values rather
than to help him develop a valuing process.
One reason for the continued use of the old methods is that no clear and testable
alternative has been provided. We suggest an approach to clarifying values that rests
on a specific method of responding to things a student says or does. The strategy,
called clarifying response, is to respond to a student so that he considers what he has
chosen, what he prizes, and/or what he is doing.
The clarifying response is usually aimed at one student at a time, often in brief,
informal conversations held in class, in hallways, on the playground, or any place else
where a student does or says something to trigger such a response from the teacher.
Especially ripe for clarifying responses are expressions by students of atti
tudes, aspirations, purposes, interests, activities, convictions, worries, and opinions.
Typical keywords that signal a statement of attitudes include I'm for, I'm against, 1.
think, if you ask me, my choice is, my way of doing it is, I believe.
As a teacher listens to students, he may mentally plus and minus their state
ments-plus for what they are for and minus for what they are against. Students are not
always aware when they have revealed what they are for or against and are quite sur
prised to see their inconsistencies.
Teachers must avoid making students feel they will lose face as they expose their
feelings.
It is essential to maintain an accepting atmosphere and to say sincerely over
and over again, "All of us are inconsistent from time to time, and all of us tend to be
confused about certain things we are for and against. One of the things we hope to learn
is how to think about our attitudes and clarify them."
The purpose of the clarifying response is to raise questions in the mind of the
student, to prod him gently to examine his life, his actions, and his ideas. The respon
ses lead the student to no specific value; he does not need to deliver a "right" answer
to a clarifying response.
All of the exchanges will be brief, for an extended series of probes might give
the student the feeling that he is being cross-examined and make him defensive. Also, a
long exchange might give him too much to think about. The idea is to raise a few ques
tions, leave them hanging in the air, and then move on without moralizing. The student
to whom the questions are addressed, and others who might overhear, may well ponder th
them later. These gentle prods stimulate students, and our research indicates that a
number of such exchanges add up and make large differences in some students' lives.
Miny of the responses will be geared directly to one of the seven valuing

processes: For example, when choosing freely is involved, the teacher may ask, "Where
do you suppose you first got that idea?" or "Are you the only one in your crowd that
feels this way?" If the student has chosen from al terna ti ves, the teacher may say, "Wia t
else did you con sider before you picked this?" or "What's really good about this choice?"
To help the student in choosing thoughtfully, the teacher may ask, "What would be the
consequences of each alternative available?" or "What assumptions are involved in your
choice?"
If prizing and cherishing are involved, the teacher may ask, "How long have you
wanted it?" or "In what way would life be different without it?" Another issue is wheth
er the student is willing to affirm publicly his choice- "Would you tell the class the
way you feel some time?" In reference to acting upon a choice, a teacher may ask, "What
are your first steps? Subsequent steps?" or "Have you examined the consequences of your
act? Questions a teacher might ask in relation to the repeating of an action include,
"Have you felt this way for some time?" "Have you felt this way for some time?" "Has
it been worth the time and money?" "How long do you think you will continue?"
The following brief exchange shows how a teacher may use clarifying responses.
MARY:

Some day I'd like to join the Peace Corps.

TEACHER:
MARY:
does too.

Oh, the chance to be of service excites me, and going to faraway places

TEACHER:
MARY:

Of those two, which is first?

I guess the faraway places part.

TEACHER:
MARY:

What are some good things about that, Mary?

Are you glad that that one. is first?

No, I guess people would respect me more if the service part was first ,

TEACHER: Well, it's been interesting talking to you, Mary, but I must get
back to my papers. Perhaps we can talk about i t another time.
Students are accustomed to having teachers ask questions, both academic-Who
founded Jamestown?- and behavioral-Didn't I tell you to be quiet? These questions, how
ever, have nothing to do with the interchange between Mary and the teacher, with the
clarifying approach which repsects the individual's rights to make decisions.
Because many questions teachers customarily ask are really statements of the
teachers' decisions, students often assume that a question is actually a concealed dir
ective. To combat this, the teacher begins to use clarifying questions at times when the
student knows that the teacher is not trying to disapprove of what he is saying or doing.
The simplest guide in the beginning is for the teacher to use clarifying respon
ses in situations of which he either approves or has no preferences. After students be
come familiar with the clarifying responses, they will begin to use them on one another
and on other friends.
Before defining a clarifying response, it may be helpful to say what it is not.
Clarifying is not therapy.
Clarifying is not used on students with serious emotional problems.
Clarifying is not a single one-shot effort: it depends on a program
consistently applied over a period of time.
Clarifying avoids moralizing, preaching, indoctrinating, inculcating,
or dogmatizing.
Clarifying is not an interview, nor is it done in a formal manner.
Clarifying is not meant to replace the teacher's other educational
functions.
Clarifying is an honest attempt to help a student look at his life and to en
courage him to think about it in an atmosphere in which positive acceptance exists.
Students will probably not enter into the perplexing process of clarifying values for
themselves if they perceive that the teacher does not respect their viewpoint.
If trust
is not communicated, the student may well play the game, pretending to clarify and think
and choose and prize but being as unaffected by the exchange as by a tiresome morality
lecture.
For many teachers, working with clarification of values will mean much less

talking and a lot more listening. Teachers who are able to do this and to ask the right
questions begin to have small miracles happening in their classrooms.
They often see at
tendance go up, grades rise, and interest and excitement in learning crackle. They see
encouraging changes in students who have been classified as apathetic, listless, and in
different.
The teacher fits the clarifying response into the value clarifying method by do
ing the following:
first, looking and listening for statements or actions which suggest
a value issue may be involved (he notes especially children who seem to be very apathe
tic, indecisive, flighty, or inconsistent or who tend to overconform o.r drift from here
to there without reason); second, keeping in mind the goal-youngsters who have clear,
personal values; third, responding to a value indicator with a clarifying question or
comment designed to help the student use one or more of the seven valuing processes.
Though a number of students may overhear a student-teacher exchange and profit
from it, the clarifying response focuses on one student. Some techniques for value clar
ification can be used with a whole group. For example, a teacher may give each member
of the class a value sheet which, in its simplest form, consists of a provocative state
ment and a series of questions.
The purpose of the statement is to raise an issue that may have value implica
tions.
lhe purpose of the questions is to carry each student through the value clarify
ing process with that issue.
since valuing is an individual matter, each student com
pletes the value sheet by himself. Later, his answers may be shared with the teacher or
other students and/or used as a basis for large or small group discussions.
Some value sheets consist of nothing more than a series of probing questions that
are keyed to a common reading or experience.
lhe questions on the value sheet are in the
style of the valuing theory.
Th.at is, the questions do not try subtly to convince a stu
dent to believe what the adult believes but to help him take the issue at hand through
the value criteria.
Among the many other classroom methods which a teacher may use to help children
escape from value confusion are role-playing, devil's advocate (presenting the unpopular
side of an issue), and time diary (each student keeps a record of how he spends his time
and analyzes the record).
How can a teacher begin to incorporate value clarifying into his teaching? We
suggest that he start by working toward a classroom climate in which students feel they
are respected and accepted and feel secure enough to think logically and speak honestly.
At the same time, the teacher must work to eliminate his own tendencies to moralize.
With valuing processes of choosing, prizing, and acting ever in mind, the teacher
experiments, slowly but steadily, to find which strategies fit him and work best with his
students.
In a few months he will be able to see results in the way his students make
and act upon their choices. He may also find he has clarified some of his own values.

WHAT IS VALUING?
by
Nicholas Rescher
(Reprinted by permission from Penny's Forum, Spring/Summer 1972, p. 3.)
Man is a creature that not only does things but thinks about what he does. Ac
cordingly, we do things for reasons- because we regard them as leading to certain bene
fits for ourselves or others. Values represent the ultimate reasons people have for act
ing as they do- their basic aims, objectives, aspirations, ideals. They cover the whole
domain or rational human action and range from our lowest to our most elevated concerns.
The little things in life- the good manners and ordinary politeness of social interac
tion- manifest values no less sharply than the big crises.
Values are intangibles in the final analysis, they are things of the mind that
have to do with the vision people have of "the good life" for themselves and their fel
lows. Each of a persons's values-be i t "loyalty" or "economic justice" or "self-ag
grandizement"- plays a role in his concept of human well-being by providing a standard
by which he assesses the extent of his satisfactions in and with life. Abstract in char
acter, these values manifest themselves concretely in the ways in which people talks and
act, and especially in the pattern of their expenditure of time and effort, in their

actions at work and leisure and in their choices in the marketplace. It is primarily
through these concrete manifestations that values secure their importance and relevance
in human affairs.
Values have to do with the rationalization of behavior-its justification and its
explanation. Precisely because these two key factors o f action and rationalization can
get out of line, we come to the problem of the hypocrite ; the person who verbally sub
scribes to a value but violates it in action. Since we tend to prize authenticity in our
fellows nothing "turns us off" faster toward someone than this form of hypocrisy- talking
a value up without implementing it in action.
Values are worth bothering with because they make a diff erence. When we know
someone's values · we are able to grasp ''what makes him tick." We are better able to un
derstand him and to deal with him.
Ihe possession of diverse values set people apart and
shared values simplify their working together.
As biological organism all men share certain basic values relating to the main
tenance of life, values enshrined in the rules of all civilized societies. But, of course,
social and personal variation makes for a wide divergence in human values.
Values can change. When this happens-when changes in the conditions of life are
such as to cast from the pedestal of the true and genuine some heretofore accepted value
that once belonged there, there lies before us a (Nietzche-reminiscent) "transvaluation"
of values. But, of course,to say this is not to deny that it is unlikely to the point of
inconceivability that many of our historic social or personal values- "justice," "in
telligence," and "kindness," to give just three examples- could ever, under any realist
ically foreseeable circumstances, are likely ever to be dethroned.
Why bother to clarify our values? Knowing our own
learning about ourselves. What sorts of things are really
we striving for and working towards? What sort of a world
being? To the extent that we cannot answer such questions
terms with ourselves. The mark of an immature person lies
"has a great deal to learn about himself."

values is a crucial part of
meaningful to us? What are
do we want to see come into
we have failed to come to
exactly here, in that he still

The single most important fact about values is that t hey themselves can be eval
uated in turn.
There are good values and bad values- cure l o r callous or self-aggran
dizing values and those that are cooperative or kindly o r h umane.
It is especially important to equip children with a "sense of values." They must
not only have values (that is pretty well inevitable) but should have an intelligent at
titude towards them . Not only should they be taught good values, but they should learn
to be critically aware of their own values and o f the need to keep their actual life
style properly attuned to them.
The big values in our lives are called ideals. The importance of having them
cannot be exaggerated. They are the basis of vision and aspiration in our lives. As
the popular song put it, if you don't have a dream you can't make a dream come true, In
the kingdom of nature, man alone has a capacity for spiritual growth- for becoming bigger
than life-size. All significant human achievement, great and small, is the product of
intelligence guided by the vision of an ideal .
Whether we choose t o confront it or not, all of us face the basic question: What
really are my values? It is well worth reflecting about. For it is close to impossible
to come away from such re f l e ction without an enhanced understanding of ourselves and our
relationship with our fellows.
VALUES
by
Richard Reichard

(Reprinted by permission from Richard Reichard , Self-Awareness Through Group Dynamics,
Pflaum/standard, Dayton, Ohio, 1 970, pp. 39-45,)
Definition of Values
This topic could be approached from two points of view.
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Since all values have

moral implications, we might say the topic is concerned with morality. On the other
hand, since all values serve as motivations for actions, the topic could be interpreted
as a study in motivation. In either case, the goal is the same:
to help the students
become more aware of the values that are operative in their own lives and to help them
clarigy the hierarchy of values they presently hold.
It has always been surprising to me to discover that many students, while ob
viously possessing a "set of values" which both motivate them and which they use to judge
the right and wrong of their actions, have never critically analyzed these values. Often
their values have been acquired gradually, as if through familial and cultural osmosis,
The students are not aware that these values have been acquired.
To them it seems they
have always been there.
"That's the way i t is," they remark.
The values they consciously hold are usually in direct conflict with those of
their parents, their religion or the Establishment- a reflection of their rebellion with
the accepted values of the society. Even in this instance, though, students are often
not aware of how they acquired these differing values. Again they feel that "that's the
way it really is."
Thus, a discussion in values should include two things. First, the conscious
awareness of the values that are operative in our lives and the ordering of these values
from most important to least important. Second, an examination of how we develop values
in the first place. The exercise in this lesson aims primarily at becoming aware of the
values we have. Through the discussion that follows, the students should be led to the
second question of how values are acquired.
This latter question deserves a little comment. We tend to acquire values on
several levels. First, through society-which includes for the student his youth culture
of disc jockeys, fads, "what the other kids are doing," etc. In this regard it would
make an interesting study if someone were to examine the effects that youth on the east
and west coasts have on youth in middle America.
It seems that the two coasts (specifi
cally California and New York) initiate much of what eventually becomes "in" in the Mid
west a few months later. The fact is that for the adolescent, who is usually rejecting
the various norms acquired as a child, many of his values come from this peer culture
and from the college culture he aspires to enter. As such, this is neither bad norgood.
What is critical is that young people become aware of how greatly they are influenced by
this youth culture.
A second source of values lies in the various psychological needs the adolescent
experiences, many of which are not conscious. For example, a boy may place a higher
value on athletics than on studies because of his need to be considered "manly" by his
peers. Or an unattractive girl may place a high value on studies to compensate for her
inability to get into the social swing. In these instances, a youth's values may become
quite distorted unless he becomes aware of the kinds of psychological needs that are mo
tivating him.
Th.is can be treated in general terms in a classroom setting, but specific
problems are best handled in a one-to-one counseling situation.
Finally, many of a student's values have been acquired through his family and
through his formal religion training. His surface rebellion against some of these does
not indicate that he is actually free of them. These values are often more operative
than he would care to admit to his parents or to his peers and are often a source of in
ner conflict and guilt. For example, "down deep" he still may hold to traditional values
regarding the importance of religion, but he fears that he would be labeled "pious" if he
expressed these values.
If students are to be both conscious and critical of their own
values, they will have to become aware of these various ways in which they acquire them.
Importance of Values
Since a person's values are at the heart of his actions, the more conscious he is
of them the more conscious- and human-will be his actions. That's the rather obvious
importance of studying values. More immediate, though, is the fact that our society is
undergoing a severe upheaval regarding its own values. The resulting confusion both old
and young experience makes a discussion on the nature of values and how they are acquired
very timely and helpful. While this topic can help put the whole social question of val
ues into some perspective, it also serves to give the student an opportunity to look at
and question his own values.
Problems Related to Values
It is important to keep i~ mind that the topic deals with the nature and devel
opment of values, not with particular values. Certainly, particular values will have to
be discussed by way of example or to demonstrate a point, but the lesson is not intended

to indoctrinate students regarding any particular set of values.
If you give the im
pression that this is what you are about, the chances are good that the students will
turn you off very quickly. For them values are very personal, even if they haven't
thought them through, so you should avoid the idea that you are challenging the values
they do have.
Rather, you are attempting to create a situation in which they themselves
can become more conscious and critical of their values.
Second, since many values have religious origins and overtones, it's important
to avoid giving the impression that you are criticizing or promoting a particular reli
gion.
While common sense makes this obvious to any experienced teacher, it is good to
give yourself a personal reminder, and to make it clear to the students before they be
come defensive about their own religious beliefs.
In some instances, I've seen a dis
cussion on values end up in a religious debate, which ruins the chance to achieve the
goal intended by the topic.
Finally, i t may appear phony to the students to initiate this topic on its own
merits. Often i t is better to use it after some form of debate has begun around a par
ticular value related to another subject. For example, the students may become very in
volved in a discussion of the value their parents place on money.
In that kind of con
text it is safe to raise the question of values in general-what we mean by them, the
values we have, the order we would place them in, how we acquired them.
To start out
cold on the topic of values often produces stereotyped responses which the students feel
the teacher expects of them.
If they begin with a very real question regarding values,
their responses later about values in general are more likely to reflect how they actu
ally feel.
Cultivating an Awareness of Values
We've stressed that the lesson does not deal with teaching particular values.
Values are acquired or learned through a complex of influences, usually over a long
period of time. No one classroom experience is enough to form a person in a particular
value.
But sometimes one class is sufficient to make the students more conscious and
critical of their values, which is what we hope to achieve.
It is after they see the
importance of being aware of their values (motives) and how they acquire them, that you
can afford to initiate discussion on particular values. Such a discussion is what will
keep alive and develop in students a criticalawarenessof values in general and the in
fluences that shape the formation of their values ,
For that reason, it is often best to introduce the general topic of values as
early as possible in a course. This can establish a foundation and a framework of com
mon understanding for investigating the particular values which the course deals with
throughout the year.
Each time a discussion on one of these particular values comes up
- e . g., the value of aesthetic appreciation in a course on literature- you are developing
a more conscious, critical attitude in students regarding the general question of values
in their life.
Suggested Exercise for Experiencing values
Purpose:
To involve the students in the process of examining their values in a non
threatening way and to open the door for a meaningful discussion of values
in general.
Preparation:
If the group is small i t is good to gather the actual items listed below so
the students have something tangible to work with.
However, if you are dealing
with a whole class, divide it into several groups of six to eight and give them
slips of paper with the name of the items listed below:
dollar bill
TV Guide or
aspirin
toy gun (to
car keys
a text book
a Bible
copy of the
a valentine

Movie Guide
represent real gun)
or encyclopedia
Bill of Rights or the Declaration of Independence

Instructions:
1.

Each group is to first come to an agreement as to what value each of the
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objects above symbolizes for them.
For example, aspirin may symbolize good
health, or it may symbolize hallucinogenic drugs. The gun may symbolize
power or it may symbolize self-defense.
2.

After each group has decided what the objects symbolize in terms of possible
values, each individual in the group should arrange the objects according to
his own hierarchy of values.

3.

Next each group should come to an agreement as to how these objects are to
be ordered.
This requires that each individual menti-on his own ordering,
and why he followed it.
·
When several groups are involved, each group can present its list to other
groups for comparison, both of interpretation of the symbols and the order
ing of the values they represent.
It would be interesting to see if any
consensus emerges.
Note:
There is a great deal of learning that can take place in the groups
as they discuss their interpretation of the symbols and the hierarchy
of values, so ample time should be provided. Also, their interpreta
tion of symbols can be very enlightening for the teacher.

4.

When all the comparing is completed you may want to stimulate further dis
cussion by some of the following questions.

Discussion of Values

1.

In discussing the symbolism of the various objects, were you surprised either
by the disagreement or agreement of interpretation? For example, that money
could be approached in so many different ways?

2.

How did you feel when you realized that you were not always in agreement with
others? Did you want to convince them of your interpretation or were you
eager to agree with them? Could you agree with the final list?

3.

How about the ordering of the objects? Did you find it hard coming to agree
ment? Did you have to back down often? Were you able to convince others of
the correctness of your suggestions?

4.

Do you think your final ordering of the objects would be acceptable to your
parents? In what ways do you think they would differ? Do you think they
would have interpreted the symbols differently?

5.

How does your list compare with the values presented to you by your parents,
or by society at large? Do you find there are any serious differences? How
do you feel about that?

6.

Do you think others influence you very much in forming the values you have?
Who? How? Is this a good influence s far as you are concerned? How do you _
judge that?

7.

Do you think someone from a different culture would come up with a different
ordering of the same list of values, for example, a Russian? Is this good
or bad? Does it indicate anything?

8.

Do you think you will change the ordering of these values as you grow older?
Why or why not? What would be areas where you doubt if you would ever
change?

9.

How much do you think our inner needs determine the values that we hold? Do
you feel there are some values that are important to you that aren't repre
sented on the list? What are they?

10.

Do you think, if we re-arranged the groups and did the exercise again, we
would come up with some new values and some new ordering? Why?
A WORLD OF CONFUSION AND CONFLICT
by
Howard Kirschenbaum

How does one know how to guide his life through a world full of confusion and
conflict? How relevant are the moral and ethical standards of the past? Will the new
ones work any better? How does one find himself and build heal thy relationships with
others?
The family, community, school and church used to present a homogeneous environ
ment with obvious and constantly reinforced values. But, today we are bombarded from a ll

sides by many points of view and brought in contact with others with different life
styles from our own.
''Whereas earlier generations slipped through a stage of idealism into an accept
ance of the existing order, more and more of today's youth are not accepting their so
In simplest terms, if would seem that traditional values are not very palatable
ciety.
to vast numbers of today's youth."
"The result, it seems to us, is that more and more of our young people are be
coming valueless, aimless, empty of commitment. That is a frightening state to be in,
for it is not easy to live in aimless drift, feeling that life has no purpose.
This
sometimes leads to psychological damage (a feeling of self as a meaningless unit) and
sometimes to more visible damage (a frustrated, acting out of rage against the institu
tions that helped produce such emptiness)."
Very accessible communication and transportation have caused part of the problem
and have created dilemmas never imagined by traditional societies, where only one set of
beliefs and one set of behaviors were accepted. Advances in technology and changes in
institutions have added alternatives, but have also made visible many inconsistencies in
what we see and hear.
The problem is simply stated: What is to be done with one's life? What does one
value? Once questions mainly for philosophers, in these times of increasing complexity,
change and abundance, they are questions that challenge almost all of us, although often
we move through our lives unaware of them. And, this can be its terrible power: For
they are questions that cripple us as long as they remain unanswered. A growing tragedy
is that they are not usually even asked. Witness the teenager who does little other than
escape to temporary, sometimes desperate, excitements . Witness the job-hopper who seems
unable to find any work satisfying. Witness the student who daydreams, unmoved by the
combined exhortation of teachers and parents. Witness, took the successful adult who
achieves what he was supposed to achieve only to wonder what it was all for:
"if this
is success, why did I want it?"
People who have not clarified for themselves what they value cannot have clear,
consistent purposes, cannot know what they are for and against, cannot know where they
are going and why,
They lack criteria for choosing what to do with their time, their
energy, their very being. They simply are not clear as t o wh a t their lives are for and
are therefore unable or unwilling to marshall up their full intellectual resources for
use in the crucial game of living.
Some typical areas of confusion and conflict in values are:
family

money

religion

death

love

leisure

Eolitics

friendshiE

work

aging

Eersonal

sex
tastes

(music, clothes, etc.)

Given the complexities of o ur time, given the staggering number of choices to be
ma de , given the crying need o f individuals and systems for a direction toward which to
move, is there anything we can do to help each other build a value system by which to
live?
We believe there is. It is one of several important movements taking place to
day in the field o f humanistic education. It is called "the value claridication approach."
To look more clo sely a t the need for "value clarification," let us make use of an
image. Imagine a giant road with persons standing at various points along i t - some in
clusters, some alone , some in motion and some quite immobile. Also imagine a sign above
the road saying, "Clarity o f Relationship To self And To Society." At one end of the
road , we see a smaller sign that says, simply, CLEAR, while the other end is similarly
labelled UNCLEAR.
CLARITY OF RELATIONSHIP
TO SELF AND TO SOCIETY

CLEAR

UNCLEAR

A large cluster of persons are near the Clear end of the road and as we look
closely, each person at this end does seem to be clear about who he is and what his re
lationship is to the society that he is in. Each appears to know what he wants in life
and how to work for it. Although in somewhat different styles, each person in this clus
ter seems to relate to the forces and events and persons around him with considerable
verve, purpose and pride. It's not at all as if these people have "adjusted" to their
environments in any passive sense, In fact, many of them have misgivings about large
parts of their surroundings, but there is a strong interest in dealing with those dis
pleasing elements constructively.
The picture is quite different at the other end of the road. Here, the people do
not seem to be clear about how to relate to the things and people around them . There is
much personal confusion.
Rather than being positive, purposeful, enthusiastic and proud
like those at the Clear end, the group at the Unclear end seem apathetic, flighty, un
certain or inconsistent; they are drifters, over-conformers, over-dissenters or role
players. The Unclear group's members could be viewed as having failed a critical test;
for, to use the words of Hunt and Mataalf "The critical test of a person's insights is
whether they provide him with a set of beliefs about himself in relation to his social
and physical envirornnent which are extensive in scope, dependable in action, and compat
ible with one another." The differences between the lives of persons who pass and fail
this test are dramatic and, we think, important.
One goal of value clarification then is to help people move along this road from
confusion to clarity (Unclear to Clear) using an intellectual approach of choosing,priz
ing and acting upon values.
It helps people evaluate the values and beliefs given to
them in the past and weigh them in light of their personal experiences and of present
day life. Value clarification helps people sort through the thoughts in their heads and
make a conscious effort to determine where they stand and why. For a value system has to
be thought through and chosen by the individual in order to give direction to life.
If
individuals learn to use the process of value clarification, they are likely to behave in
ways that are less apathetic, confused and irrational and in ways that are more positive,
purposeful and enthusiastic.
The first step in the value clarification process is to open up the area, to
stimulate a person to think about value-related issues and to share those thoughts.
(Toe
value clarification strategies, some of which are used in the previous and the succeeding
articles, are effective ways of doing this.) The second step is for the person and the
helping people around him to accept his thoughts or feelings, non-judgmentally. This
step tells him that it is safe to be honest with himself and with others, no matter how
confused or negative his thoughts or feelings might be. The third step is to stimulate
the person to do some additional thinking, so that he moves toward more comprehensive
levels of valuing.
What are these levels of valuing? We see valuing as being a process, and the
seven sub-processes of valuing define the term "a value."
Choosing
1.

choosing freely- -values must be freely selected if they are to be really
valued by the individual.

2.

choosing from among alternatives-only when a choice is possible, when there
is more than one alternative from which to choose, can a value result.

3.

choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alterna
tive- impulsive or thoughtless choices do not lead to values; only when the
consequences of each of the alternatives are clearly understood can one make
intelligent choices.

4.

prizing and cherishing- values are prized, respected and held dear; they
come from choices we are glad to make.

5.

affirming- when we have chosen something freely after consideration of the
alternatives, and when we are proud of our choice, we are likely to affirm
that choice when asked about it.

6.

acting upon choices-where we have a value, we are likely to budget time and
energy in ways that nourish this value.

7.

repeating-values tend to have a persistency, they tend to make a pattern in

Prizing

Acting

life.
In general, the purposes of value clarification are to sensitize people to value
issues, to give them experience in thinking critically about such issues, to give them
opportunities to share perceptions with others and learn cooperative problem-solving
skills and to help them learn to apply the valuing processes in their own lives.
With changes taking place so rapidly and new issues requiring consideration, one
needs to constantly (or at least from time-to-time) re-examine his purposes, aspirations,
attitudes, and feelings if he is to strive toward a life which will be rich and full for
him in the times in which he is living.
It is a never ending quest to sort out what's
important in one's life.
In a worl0 full of. confusion and conflict, what classro om, school, church or home
can afford not to be a forum for value clarification?

VAWES

SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE AFFECTIVE DOMAIN
by
John E. Morris
(Reprinted by permission from School and Society, April, 1972, pp. 228-229.)

The setting is an 11th-grade American history class. The students are taking a
test.
It is near the end of the period, and all but one student has completed the test
and left the room. The lone remaining student is working feverishly when the teacher
walks up to his desk and yells:
"if you don't hurry and turn in your paper I am going
to knock you up beside the head."
The setting is a first-grade classroom. Students are working individually and in
small groups, while the teacher and several students are in the "reading circle." One
child is reading aloud laboriously. The child pauses because she can not pronounce a
word. The teacher ·asks:
"Don't you remember that word? You should because it was in
yesterday's lesson." Then the teacher yells:
"Can't y o u remember anything? Stick out
your hand." The teacher proceeds to give the child a "ruling" because she can not re
member the word.
The setting is a ninth-grade civics class and, since it is Friday, the discus
sion centers around current events. One student just has read from the local paper re
porting the number of people in the county receiving food stamps and decrying the loss of
such virtues as work and individual effort and the evils of the welfare system. The
teacher, anxious to stimulate discussion, says:
"Why is it that you niggers (the class
was composed of about 60% Negroes add 40% whites) seem to be ashamed to spend food
stamps? Yesterday I was in the grocery store (there is only one such store in this com
munity) where some of you and your parents were shopping. You seemed to want to back up
t o the checkout counter. Why?" There were some snickers from white students, and then
silence.
These three actual sce nes portray teacher behavior dominated by their attitudes
and values. The current demand for accountability, with its emphasis on performance con
tracts, performance objectives and educational audits, has concentrated on knowledge
(cognitive domain) and skills (psychomotor domain) while largely ignoring the importance
of the affective domain (attitudes and values). Yet, this area is a major determiner of
o ne's success o r f ailure, not only in school, but in life as well.
In the cases cited,
the teachers may have mastered a prescribed body of knowledge, for each one holds a mas
ter's degree. Also, each teacher possesses a variety of skills, as evidenced by several
years of teaching experience and the appearance of the classroom. Yet, these teachers
are failures, and many others like them fill our classrooms and, in turn, our society
With failures, mainly because of their attitudes and values.1
Why are we so eager to come to grips with the teaching and measuring of facts
and skills and so reluctant to examine the issues and debate the questions which are the
core elements of our society, our continued exis t ence as human beings-in short, our hu
maneness? It is not because we do not know what values generally are held by individ
uals, groups, and institutions in our society , for these have been identified by many
Writers . 2 It is not because we do not have many tools and techniques with which to work. 3
It is not because we are not aware of the value crisis in society, for we have the mass
media to remind us of this constantly.
It is primarily because we do not have the guts
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to examine ourselves and our connnitment to children, the educational profession, and
society, and to act on these commitments.
Values constitute only one area of the school curriculum, but it is the most ne
glec1ed area. Brameld sta~es that " ... values are education's most neglected problem."·
Getzels refers to values as " .•. the central serious issue facing the schools today .... "
He further states that "For whatever else the child may be expected to do in school, he
is inevitably exposed, explicitly and implicitly, to some system of values. And whatever
else the child may be expected to learn as he grows up, he inevitably assimilates~
~ystem of values. Indeed, the nature of his self-identity-his answer to the problem of
who he is and where he belongs- depends on the nature of the values he interiorizes.
Moreover, whether he will it or not- in fact whether we know i t or not- the decisions
teachers and parents make with respect to objective, curriculum, methods, personnel, and
even the buildings we construct, are founded on some system of values, however sublimi
nally these may function in any particular case."
Values are learne_d_, and also unlearned. Since they are learned, they ca:n.. be, and
are, : taught, but there is very little concre~ kno~ledge about· how they are taught or
learned. Anthropologists, psychologists, and specialists in child development have
studied the child in his culture, home , and school, and suggest that he assimilates the
values of his society. Possibly, he imitates the values and attitudes he experiences in
his home, school, neighborhood, and the larger society.
In the early years particularly,
the child imitates the values of those adult models he admires. The teacher serves as a
model, and determines the value tone o f his classroom. Students infer the values of the
teacher from his behavior.
The scenes described above provide many opportunities for
inferences about the values of these teachers.
There should be no doubt that public education collectively, and teachers and
administrators individually, are partially responsible for the value profile of our na
tion's youth. Since there is no prescribed set of values which is superior to another,
and since education stresses individual differences , emphasis should be placed on the
provision for a valuing process. Simon states that this process should consist of a
series of strategies which"· . . raise issues, confront the student with inconsisten
cies, and get him to sort out his own values in his own way and at his own pace."
An
individual school, and an individual teacher within a particular school, then could be
held accountable for the existence and quality of the valuing process provided for stu
dents. Here are some suggestions for the initiation of a valuing process and for estab
lishing accountability within a school.
The school system, and the board of education and superintendent in particular,
should be accountable for establishing objectives within the affective domain consistent
with the connnunity it serves and the larger democratic society. The principal of each
school should be accountable for providing a system for auditing or evaluating the ex
tent to which objectives are implemented and the results of their implementation. A sys
tem should provide for periodic observation for the purpose of recording indicators of
attitudes of administrators and teachers; student opinionnaires constructed by use of
the Q-sort, Likert, or other techniques; analysis of unit and lesson plans to insure that
provisions for a valuing process are provided; analysis of administrative politics and
actions t o insure that provisions for, and support of, stated objectives are provided;
provisions for, and support of, a communications system which is open to students, teach
ers, and the school's publics; and provisions for, and support of policies which make i t
possible for all concerned to participate in the decision-making process insofar as this
can be done within the framework of the school, its functions, and policies.
The teacher
is accountable for understanding the school's objectives as they relate to the larger
democratic society; instituting instructional techniques and methods which offer varied
strategies and alternatives in the process of value clarification; knowing his own value
system so that he understands his own attitudes and behaviors; coalescing his value sys
tem with sound principles of teaching, learning, and human relationships; and consis
tently exhibiting behavior which positively reinforces the objectives of the school and
the larger democratic society.
These suggestions could be used to initiate, over a period of time and by the
school faculty, an index of value effectiveness for a school. Such an index could be
very helpful in determining the contribution of the school to the affective domain.
While this may seem to border on behavioral engineering, it is not intended to do so.
Our primary concern must extend beyond knowledge and skills to include the quality of an
individual's life.
The school can not continue to deny students opportunities to learn
to make choices which are, at least to some degree, a result of their own reflective an
alysis of a situation.
It these suggestion? for initiating accountability in the affective domain were

applied, continually evaluated, and supplemented, the result might not be the instant
production of good citizens. Neither would i t be possible to measure all the efforts a
school or a teacher contributes to the affective domain of the curriculu, and i t is not
necessary to do so. However, to say that what we do or do not do is so intangible that
it cannot be evaluated carefully and critically is to say, in essence, that each teacher
or school is to do as he or it pleases . This is largely what we have done in the past,
and this is what accountability is all about.
For obvious reasons, I have not suggested specific classroom practices for the
development of values, or listed specific moral, democratic, and spiritual values. My
primary concern has been to assert that accountability only for knowledge and skills is
not acceptable; to advance the proposition that administrators and teachers are, or
should be, accountable for their attitudes and values and the resulting consequences of
behavior growing out of these; to present some suggestions f or establishing accounta
bility in the affective domain; and to stimulate some thinking and possible action to
ward accountability in the affective domain.
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VALUES
by
Merrill Harmin
and
Sidney B. Simon
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New York, 1973, pp. 690-698.)

Introduction
There is good reason to wonder if our schools have sufficiently
with value development. We see young people with substantial knowledge
what to do with that knowledge. We see others who chronically react in
unthinking way to almost everything in their surroundings.
In general,
dents who are confused about what their values are or should be.

helped students
who do not know
a negative and
we see many stu

Given the condition of the world, such value confusion is quite understandable.
The contrasts and changes that surround all of us today are dramatic.
Look at these social realities, for example: Support for the arts is hard to
come by. Educated men insist that our leaders twist the truth for their own purposes.
The crimes rate goes up and up.
!barning mobs face riot-trained police. And American
soldiers in foreign lands are accused of rounding up old men, women, and children, and
shooting them.
At the same tine there is new concern for the plight of the American Indian, the
elderly, and the slum dweller. People no longer look aside as the air, streams, and
lakes become polluted. The courts strengthen the individual's freedom of speech. The
rich are asked to pay more taxes; there is new support for the poor. And people are
wondering aloud if America is on the right track.
One can see how it is difficult for students to relate to this inconsistent
world.
Traditional values are not accepted the way they used to be; some students plain
ly reject them. But many students cannot seem to find replacements for traditional
values. The result is often an absence of values. Students are unsure of what to do
with the knowledge they find in school. Some are not sure that knowledge has any use at
all. And some seem to confuse knowledge with wisdom ~d adopt a life-style of either
chronic conformity or impulsive rebellion.I
M:>re precisely, a value problem is indicated for a student if, in the absence of
a prior emotional disturbance, he finds it very difficult to face typical life situa
tions and to make choices and decisions. or if he typically makes choices without the
awareness that some natives may be more worthy than others. Or if he does not behave in
ways that are consistent with this choices and preferences-that is, if there is a gap
be tween his creeds and his deeds.
What Teachers Can Do About Values
There are other ways of characterizing value problems among youth. 2 But however
one sees value problems, the question of what, if anything, teachers can do remains.
That is the subject of this article. What alternatives are open to a teacher who would
help students with value development? We will address that question by listing several
of the more common approaches to values and commenting briefly on each. There is no as
sumption that the list is exhaustive or that any one approachshouldbe usedexclusively,
For example, although the authors favor the last approach introduced, we would use other
approaches in certain circumstances, as we note in our concluding remarks.
Teachers have three main alternatives in dealing with value development. One
alternative is to do nothing about such development. Another is to transmit a pre-exist
ing set of values to students. A third is to help those students find their own values.
Doing Nothing About Values
Some choose the first alternative because they believe that values are the do
main of the family and religious institutions. Others choose i t because, practically,
they do not know what to do.
S>me educators choose to do nothing about value develop
ment because they are trained for and are interested in teaching only subject matter.
A few educators believe that values come from trial-and-error interaction with life, and
that there is nothing a school can do other than provide an array of useful experiences
and encourage students to use those experiences the best way they can.
But the reality of schooling is that it is impossible to do nothing. 3 When a
teacher says that it is important to master a lesson to get good grades to get into col
lege to get a good job to earn a good salary, he is obviously promoting several values
a work ethic, a future orientation, and materialism, to name a few. When a textbook
constantly pairs communism with autocracy and capitalism with democracy, values are
clearly suggested. And, simply, when schools talk about safety, good manners, and good
health, they are usually trying to promote these values. Thus it is unreal to say that
schools should do nothing about values. The question is, should they continue to work
at values the way they currently do?

There is a special problem facing those who would leave the teaching of values
to the family or to religious institutions. M:>st parents probably do not know how to
impart values, and most religious institutions have only minimal impact on the values of
youth. 4 One could, of course, argue that these institutions should learn to be more ef
fective. Until that happens, however, it is unlikely that parents or religious institu
tions will change the way young people perceive and deal with values.
Transmitting Values
Some educators who are concerned with the state of youth's values believe that
we must work more effectively to transmit the values we know are right, desirable, and
good.
They assume that such values are known, at least in part, and that the task of the
educator is to learn better ways of passing those values along to students.
Two general problems face such educators: being certain that their values
really are universally right, desirable, and good; and finding ways to transmit them.
The problem of value certainly is beyond the scope of this article, but it is dealt with
in a book by Abraham Maslow. 5 The question fo transmittal is considered below in a dis
cussion of six common approaches to transmitting values:
the model approach, the reward
and-punishment approach, the explanatory approach, the nagging approach, the manipulation
approach, and the transmittal liberal arts approach.
The M:>del Approach
Some people who assume that what is right and wrong can be identified and com
municated to others believe that one should model desirable val~es. Such people try to
behave in ways that reflect the values they want to transmit.
There is much evidence that modeling has a strong influence on children's be
havior.
If we assume that one absorbs values as one absorbs behavior patterns, we can
say that modeling affects children's values as well as their behavior.
There is a parallel between modeling and what is sometime called imprinting.
Thus some experiences, especially those repeatedly or strongly presented to a suscepti
ble subject, are deeply imprinted in the growing organism.6
The most serious problem for the modeling approach to value development is that,
in our complex society, conflicting models exist for almost every value one could name.
A parent or teacher could model hard work, for example, but a friend or television star
or storybook character might present the opposite model.
The modeling approach by it
self provides no means of helping youngsters deal with the conflicting and inconsistent
models that they are almost certain to perceive in a world drawn closer and closer to
gether by modern communication devices.
The modeling approach is also weak in dealing with values that are only imper
fectly reflected in public behavior.
It is difficult to model certain very personal
values and internal phenomena, such as aspirations, faith, or loyalty.
The Reward-and-Punishment Approach
Some educators believe that one does not so much influence values as shape be
havior.
In the reward-and-punishment approach, the teacher or parent first identifies
desirable behavior and then, by judicious rewards, encourag~ment, and the like, encour
ages the repetition of that behavior. Thus one might reward punctuality, reflective
thinking, and kindness, and ignore their opposites. 7
Sometimes teachers try to develop certain value habits by giving students
materials or activities that channel behavior in desired ways .
For example, a teacher
might give students round pencils and tilted desks to encourage the habit of tidiness;
the built-in penalyt for a pencil left carelessly on a desk is a pencil rolling away.
However, proponents of this approach have the problem of explaining how it can
influence internal operations of humans, operations below the observable behavior level.
One can shape much behavior, but can one shape feelings and thought processes?
A somewhat different problem is that humans are not completely malleable.
Humans have certain innate and early-learned drives and limitations. They have their
own individual processes of thought and evaluation, drives for activity and power, and
needs for self-expression. How does the notion that adults can shape children's behavior
come to terms with children's internal powers and inclinations? What happens if there
is a conflict between the two?8
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The Explanatory Approach
Some educators propose that children be provided explanations such as the fol
lowing for values that are to be promoted:
"If you do not wait your turn, people will not be happy to have you in their
groups."
"If we steal from one another, we will all be insecure about our property."
"If we didn't have rules, aggressive people might take advantage of others."
"If you do that, your conscience may bother you."
The explanatory approach to value development is obviously useful; many students
appreciate knowing the reason for existing standards and adult beliefs. M:>reover, it is
likely that children will more deeply accept those standards and beliefs that are sup
ported by understandable reasons.
Unfortunately, almost all explanation .is bound to be incomplete and to rest on
prior assumptions, which are seldom explained.
"If you do not wait your turn, people
will not be happy to have you in their groups"- the assumption here is that it is val
uable to have people want you in their groups. One could explain this by saying that if
people do not want you, you will be cut off from much human support. But then one may
ask why it is valuable to have a lot of human support.
"One will feel lonely," the re
ply might be.
"Why is it valuable not to feel lonely?" One might ask, in an endless
series of questions.
There is another problem with the explanatory approach. Values presumably in
fluence an individual's decisions, and many decisions we face involve a conflict between
two or more desirable elements. Knowing why honesty and politeness are both worthy does
not often help us when we are faced with the choice of being either dishonest or impolite.
The Nagging Approach
Less :recommended than practiced is what we call the nagging approach. Educators
employing this approach frequently remind students what is right and wrong and what is
expected of them, without attending to whether or not the students understand the rea
sons for those standards. Often this approach is based on the assumption that values
emerge from authority:
"We are in charge here and we know what is best." Although such
educators sometimes praise compliance, they more often punish and . complai~ about devia
tions from accepted standards.
The problems with this method are obvious. Students are more annoyed than edu
cated by this negative approach, and there is the real possibility that educators using
it will find themselves disaffiliated from and "turned out" by their students.
The Manipulation Approach
The manipulation approach is also less often recommended than practiced. Edu
cators use it when they manipulate the environment or the experiences to which students
are exposed so as to favor certain value outcomes.
One manipulatory approach is to withhold knowledge of alternatives from students.
Students might not be told about the alternative of telling the truth sometimes, or of
the alternative of conducting a campaign of persuasion to change a school's policy.
Students might then assume that the choices are between complete truthfulness and com
plete untruthfulness, or between acquiescence and revolution. Teachers probably influ
ence student values more than is usually appreciated merely by restricting the alterna
tives that enter students' awareness.
Another way of manipulating situations is to distort the consequences of certain
actions. When a teacher suggests to a student that he cannot hope to be happy in life
unless he graduates from high school, he is distorting reality in favor of a value that
he wants to promote. M3.ny educators are quick to paint rosy pictures of things they
favor and dark pictures of things they disfavor.
A third manipulatory approach is to restrict a student's experiences in ways
that have value consequences. Some persons prevent racial integration and thus sustain
racial myths. Others restrict the books students read- not because they want to protect
students from emotionally difficult experiences but because they want to insulate them
from sympathetic accounts of certain value positions.
In a sense, it is even manipulatory for teachers to fail to raise controversial
issues in school, for that perpetuates the status quo. Forces for change do not have a
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fair change.
Thus, schools that do not raise such issues as the role of women in soci
ety, the problems of minority groups, and the forms of real political power in the coun
try might be accused of manipulating values.
(sec. 7.8. "Minority Problems," 7.10,
"Curriculum in Perspective." 7.15. "Studnet Power and Student Unrest," and 7.16, "sex
and Drugs.")
The manipulation approach has several disadvantages.
It is uncomfortable for
those who believe that man's rational processes need to be fully utilized.
And it runs
counter to current trends in society, as more people are being exposed to more ideas
through increased communications.
It is increasingly difficult to keep ideas away from
students, to sustain distorted consequences, and to limit student experiences .
The Transmittal Liberal Arts Approach
Some educators believe that right values exist and will be revealed to those who
are immersed in what is often called the liberal arts.
These right values, these basic
goods, might not be the ones currently accepted, it is asserted, but they do exist and
will most likely be found by those who study man's thoughts and accomplishments with an
open mind. Educators who take this position, called the transmittal liberal arts ap
proach, want students to read widely, think deeply, and experience broadly. They trust
that life experiences and thoughtful study provide a route to absolute goods and values.
However, because values are complex and because man's thoughts and accomplish
ments are both abundant and complicated, it is difficult to recommend that the average
student rely upon this approach.
It takes substantial mental stamina and ability, and
much time and energy, to travel this road. While the study of our cultural heritage can
be defended on other grounds, we would not expect it to be sufficient for value educa
tion.
clarifying Values
The two approaches outlined below are not based upon the assumption that abso
lute goods exist and can be known. They view values as relative , personal, situational.
The main task of these approaches is not to identify and transmit the "right" values, but
to help a student clarify his own values so he can obtain the v a lues that best suit him
and his environment; so he can adjust himself to a changing world; and so he can play an
intelligent role in influencing the way the world changes .
Proponents of these approaches have at least two problems. First, they must
learn methods whereby, without promoting particular values, they can help students obtain
values that will work for them and for those around them. Second, they must devise
methods o f controlling behavior so that, while students are in the process of developing
values, they and others are protected against destructive behaviors. The usual soluticn
here is to have behavior rules that are not defended as values, but merely as devices for
protecting individuals and groups against pressures from others.
The Clarifying Liberal Arts Approach
The clarifying liberal arts approach is similar to the transmittal liberal arts
approach; both utilize the records o f man's thoughts and accomplishments. But the pur
p o se of the clarifying liberal a rts approach is different:
it is aimed at exposing stu
dents to the best in the culture so that a student may find the best values for himself
and his environment, not s o that he may discover the "right" values for all times .
In
the clarifying liberal arts a pproach, students read widely, think deeply, and experience
broadly- not fo find universal values, but to f ind themselves.
Unfortunately , it is p robably not much easier to use all of culture to find one
self than it is to use it to f ind eternal truths. Our cultural heritage is too broad,
too complex, and too inconsistent to expect the average student to grasp it and relate it
to his life and times with any degree of comfort and comprehension.
The value Skills Approach
Another approach holds that the problem is not so much helping a student find
values as it is helping him learn skills to continue the clarifying value approach through
out his life, and to apply his values in ways that are personally and socially useful.
Proponenets of this value skills approach often note that the world is changing rapidly
and recommend t.ha t we provide students with skills to change values as the world changes
a nd as student s become more knowledgeable. Noting that it is easy to mouth creed and not
perform the acc ompanying deeds, they recommend that we teach how to apply values in real
situations, so that behavior re f lects value thi nking.
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Pragmatic philosophers after Dewey 9 favor developing in students an experimental
attitude toward life. They believe that value questions should be treated like other
questions, with thoughtful consideration of alternatives and _cpnsequences, both social
and personal. They assert that moral issues are as susceptible to rational processes as
are other issues. Persons who take this position believe that, just as one learns crit
ical thinking skills, so one learns value skills. They often favor in schools a non
moralizing examination of current real-life issues, what is sometimes called the prob
lems approach, usually not in place of academic study, but in addition to it. 10
Some children's readers have been built around value issues and are meant to en
courage value thinking. 11 And some curriculum approaches have been built in this style.
In this connection, special note should be made of the work of Donald W. Oliver and
James P. Shaver. 12 They have identified specific skills useful for dealing with poli
tical controversy, and especially the ethical problems that arise out of such contro
versy. Measuring instruments for those skills are also identif ied.
In general, the purposes of these approaches are to sensitize children to value
issues, to give them experiences in thinking critically about such issues, to give them
opportunities to share perceptions with others and learn cooperative problem-solving
skills, and to help them learn to apply value skills in their own lives.
Some educators approach value skills from a psychological perspective.
Many so
called humanistic psychologists, such as earl Rogers, say that if a person is put into a
supportive social environment and encouraged to tune into his feelings and the feelings
of others, and if he is taught communication skills that minimize communication distor
tion, he will naturally tend to make wise judgments and will use experience to correct
judgments that are unwise.13 Such psychologists place a good deal of trust in man's in
ternal evaluation mechanisms and in the ability of groups who share data to arrive at
wise decisions. A key implication is that teachers should be helped to become more hon
est, warm, and empathetic.
A more comprehensive methodology, built on the positions of the pragmatic phil
o sophers and humanistic psychologists, has identified seven broad value skills and has
gathered a ser ies of classroom techniques to help students learn those skills.
The
skills are (1) seeking alternatives when faced with a choice, (2) looking ahead to prob
able consequences before choosing, ( 3) making choices on one's own, without depending on
others, (4) being aware of one's own preferences and valuations, (5) being willing to
affirm one's choices and preferences publicly, (6) acting in ways that are consistent
with choices and preference, and (7) acting in those ways repeatedly, with a pattern to
one's life. Those skills and the exercises to develop them are presented by Louis E.
Raths, Merrill Harmin , and Sidney B. simon in Values and Teaching.
There are, however, problems with this approach, too. When one focuses upon
processes of valuing and not upon the values themselves, one is faced with the problem
of what to do with students whose processes are faulty, or who for other reasons (some
times emotional pressures) come to adopt values that are, for them or for others, count
erproductive.
There is the additional problem of knowing which skills best prepare persons to
clarify and revise values. Could it be that those who advocate a particular list of
skills are saying that they have found a new set of universal values (which happen to be
in the form of processes rather than products)?
Conclusion
Research on the e ffe c t iveness of the various approaches to values is lacking.
Researchers to date have no t agreed on goals for value education, especially on the bal
ance between value indoctrination and value clarification. They need better measuring
instruments, especially to distinguish values expressed on paper-and-pencil tests from
values woven into behavior.
We conclude from what sketchy research does exist, and on the basis of rather
consistent observations of young people's difficulties with values, that value confusion
is growing in the United sta tes. Teachers can help students avoid substantial drift and
ambivalence by giving them value-clarifying experiences. A combination of the clarify
ing liberal arts approach and the value skills approach is probably best. The former
provides data often useful for making choices, and the latter provides a climate and ex
periences for practicing value choice-making.
M:,dels are also useful, but not as prescriptions of behavior to be emulated.
They are useful as illustrations of what a l i f e ~ be, not what a life should be.
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Students should be helped to examine models critically and to consider what is recom
mended by them, and not be led to believe that they should try to plan their existence
as an imitation of the models.
Explanations are likewise
are delivered as the last word on
certain value, he is being honest
Explanations, as long as they are
tions and not as dogma, encourage

useful if they inform a student's thinking, not if they
a value. When a teacher explains why he supports a
and open and responsive to students' needs to know.
offered as personal or consensual statements of posi
rational processes and thus develop value skills.

No matter what approach to values one takes, there will be some students who will
behave in ways that contradict the teacher's, the school's, or the society's values.
These students must be taught that there are limits to accepted behavior. But they
should not be led to believe that they must accept the values upon which those limits
are based. Thus a student should be told that we cannot accept his disturbing the work
of others, even though we can accept the fact that his disturbing behavior is motivated
by a strongly held value. Of course, we also believe that this position is relative;
sometimes the value that the student is defending is more important than the disturbance
he is causing (as many felt was the case with the black sit-ins at Southern lunch count
ers a few years ago). The point here is that one may view values as situational andper
sonal without believing that society slx:>uld be lawless or chaotic.
Indeed, observations
of children who have learned to be rationally self-disciplined suggest that value clari
fication approaches, based as they are on individual responsibility, are more likely to
produce lawful and orderly environments than are approaches for transmitting values,
which too often leave students feeling confused and valueless.
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VAWE-SEEKING IN THE CLASSROOM:
The Creative Conspiracy of Teacher and Curriculum
by
Nancy W. Bauer

(From "Value seeking in the Classroom: The Creative Conspiracy of Teacher and Curriculum"
by Nancy W. Bauer, from '.reacher's Notebook in Elementary Social Science, Copyright ©
1970 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

In our western, multi-ethnic democracy we value reason and equality within a
framework of freedom. A school curriculum must be structured to examine, discuss, and
build on these values. One of the difficulties for us as teachers in structuring such a
curriculum- a curriculum that teaches about values, for values, and with values- is that
we must be willing to be judged for our teaching efforts by the behavior of the children
when they are not in our classes, thereby finally bridging the gap between the classroom
and the world outside and byond.
What goals should we set up for every child in value-seeking in the classroom?
What goals are we obliged to set because we live in a pluralistic democracy which is en
gaged in the risky task of facing up to the gap between philosophical hopes and our adult
sense of reality?
There are three goals or products we can set of our classroom teaching in the
area of values. Each of these goals exists outside the classroom. Teaching toward them
takes skill; and with skillful teaching the goals can be reached.
What are these goals?
1.

That each child will be a reflective decisionmaker.

Whatever the lottery of heredity and environment provide for him, he should be able to
analyze a problem-situation in his own setting, decide what the issue is, generate enough
alte·rnatives to allow himself and others an educated choice, and then make a choice based
on recognized values and probable consequences. A reflective thinker can not only think
but he can al30 take a realistic and forthright stand and defend it.
2. That each child can think and work toward consensus with others whose self
interest and values may differ from his own.
Majority rule is not enough. There are more than two ways (a winner and a loser) out of
a problem situation. Voting down the opposition often loses them to the total society.
In America and in the world community we need all the skills we can get. We need those
with whom we disagree. A 51% vote is a temporary victory but not a resolution of con
flict .
The Golden Rule is not good enough for a mature society made up of such differ
ing ethnic, racial, and religious groups with such different cultural traits and such
different ways of making a living and spending time. We must teach children so that they
can "do unto others" who may never directly "do unto them."
The goal is sensitive behavior of individuals; recognizing differences in per
ception, values, and life styles- but able to use those differences to create solutions
which will include the skills and insure an active cooperative effort by everyone.
3. That each child will work actively in our society to resolve social issues
in ways that will move us toward two of society's major goals, maximum freedom and max
imum equality.

From the beginning of our history, we have been groups in search of freedom
who disagreed with us. The colonial laws protected the founding group from
to their traits and values.
The Puritans were not seeking consensus within
Groups in America today are politically and economically interdependent and
faced with the need for recognizing that maximum freedom for one individual
anteed by maximum equality for another and that equal freedom is "necessary

from people
challenges
pluralism.
are now
is only guar
and proper."

These are the goals. By identifying them as behavioral objectives of the curri
culum we come face to face with a question continually and understandably asked of teach
ers by parents:
are we pushing certain values?
Of course we are. In a western, multi-ethnic democracy we must. We frankly
value reason and equality within the framework of freedom. A curriculum must be struc
tured to examine, discuss, and build on these values.
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The Ecology of the curriculum. The environment includes two kinds of hope: what the
world needs (the goals) and what the children want (their own motivation). These forces
- the world's needs and the children's wa·nts- operate simultaneously with the forces of
the present: who the child is, who the teacher is, and what the community is. These
forces make up the living environment and must be part of classroom value-seeking or the
teaching effort is either useless or damaging.
It is vital that the curriculum not be used to turn the children against their
parents and the community, even if the parents and community stand against reason, free
dom, and equality.
This may seem like a contradiction but there is an important connec
tion between being capable of reaching goals and at the same time being accepting of the
limitations of others.
If there is to be consensus and resolution of social issues, they
children must learn to strive for goals within the reality of environmental differences.
We are teaching children to respect the speech of their parents and to understand that
those speech patterns are results of their parents' past. We are teaching children tobe
bi-lingual. We now need to teach them to be bi-social in their understanding. How can
we help children to respect their parents, understand what their parent's attitudes are
and why they have them and still work towards our three goals of reason, consensus, and
a free and equal society?
The Process. How is it done? Through a sequence which rombines confrontation withprob
lem-resolving, reflection with action.
seeing meaning in raw data or random experience.
The children must observe a concept being formed from the similarity among
several experiences in different times and places.
For example: By noting that leaders represent norms and values of dominant ele
ments within a group or society, the children learn which generalizations about leader
ship are supportable and how a generalization is uncovered and tested for validity.
The children should investigate the events of their own lives which involve lea·d
ers, and should then test the scientist's generalization in their own environment as well
as in other cases in time and space.
How can it be done? With selected data about leaders in different settings,
showing different ways of getting into office and different values in the uses of their
power; with questioning strategies employed by the teacher which help the child become
aware of the similarities among the data. Here are some questions for awareness: What
roles does each person play in the society? What group did each belong to? Who had
leadership before? How did each of these men berome leaders? Questions for values
awareness through analysis:
Does a leader have to be rich? Does a leader have to be
smart? Does a leader have to be good? To whom? Is there one best way to become a
leader? Questions for values awareness through synthesis: What do all the leaders have
to have? What do all the leaders seem to want?
Wha t has concept-forming, investigating, and testing to do with values education?
Children must learn the role of logic or reason in scientific method so that they can
recognize a point of view arrived at rationally from one that is drawn from inadequate
data or from data contrived to match a prejudged ronclusion.
Value·-seeking witho ut sound, up-to-date knowledge of concepts and the process of
concept-forming out of fact becomes sharing of ignorance.
If children are not armed
with what is known and verifiable, they are at the mercy of the biases of the strongest
of their peers and of their teachers.
If th£?y are studying leadership, then they can understand why some people are
chosen more than others , why leaders who are elected may turn out not to represent the
views of thos£i who voted for them, and why some people who get into office for one rea
son may change their views once in office.
Treating concepts this way is a value in itself. Facing facts in conceptual
structures is traditional armor against the misuse o f facts through fear, for propaganda
p urposes. Selected data and analytical teaching of concepts prepare children for honest
value-seeking on their own.
Value-•seeking without conc epts is wasteful and open to pressure and to attack.
Concepts withou t v al ue-seeki ng, however, is just another form of rote learning which
will not necessarily stick a ,1 will most proba bly bore children who don't see its use
f ulness.
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A Curriculum of Confrontation. Once the children have been involved in concept-forming,
they are still going to ask "so what?"
They are right.
If what they are learning does not help them interact with their
peers, they haven't time for it.
If what they are learning c:besn't help them learn to
resolve social issues with maximum freedom and equality, the world hasn't time for it.
What can the Monday to Friday classroom do about conflict resolution? A great
deal, The teacher can guarantee the children practice in problem analysis, reflective
thinking, and decision-making if the curriculum guarantees i t to the teacher:
a bank of
problem-situations appropriate to the age range of the children; questioning strategies
for helping the children to think through alternatives, v a lues, and consequences; ways
of handling possible hostile, evasive, partial, and irrelevant responses of children;
ways of evaluating the strategies to see if they are indeed helping the children to han
dle issues and values conflicts.
How is it done? A problem-situation dealing, for example, with applications of·
the concept of leadership would be:
"A fifth-grade class is trying to organize a project to turn a messy vacant
lot into a mini-park and garden. l,\k>st of the children in the class like to
play baseball. The best baseball team captain in the area, who is very pop
ular, wants to be chairman of the Park Committee. Several of the class mem
bers think it would be better to choose someone who is better able to per
suade adults, figure out ways to get a new job done, and handle the money
that is needed for the project."
The curriculum o f fers this case to the teacher; she can use it as a case story
(read, taped, or mimeographed), or several children can role-play these hypothetical
class meetings.
The teacher is responsible for confronting the children with the case and help
ing them with a questioning strategy designed to encourage their thoughts and feelings
into reflective modes: What is happening? What does the team captain think? What makes
him think so? What does the other group think? What makes them think so?
Up to this point the questions focus on confrontati o n wi t h differences in views
and behaviors. Each child is forced to compare conflicting vi ews a nd recognize their
origin. Answering ''What makes him think so?" i~ easy and r e alistic. Answers will vary
a s the children vary: Maybe his father tells him he should be chief of everything. Why
shouldn't he be? If he can lead a team, he probably thinks he can lead everything.
Others make him think so because they always do everything he s ays. From this point of
analysis of differences, the children are ready to try t o size up the problem. The teach
er asks: What is the problem? The children's perceptions will cause their responses to
differ:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

That kid who's captain is the proble:im. He's pushy.
No. The park is the problem, Who knows how to make one?
The fuzzy thinkers are the problem. They can't decide whether they want to
be popular or get the job done .
Who should they pick for the job?
It's a dumb problem. Who wants a park anyway?
Toe problem is leadership .

The greater the variety of responses, the more real the problem probably is to
the children. In the discussion s imulated here, the children see the problem situation
from the vantage point of their own experiences and values. Some of them are more ana
lytical than others , some are more verbal, some more able to abstract a core idea.
In each case the teacher has learned something about each child . The somewhat
hostile child (e. above) who refuses to "play the game" is signalling. The teacher now
needs to find out whether his snag is fear of criticism from teacher or peers or lack
of interest in that particular case or worry about whether he will be chosen himself.
Or many other possibilities. Teachers are like physicians, they diagnose from the spe
cific responses that they get. Then they prescribe and evaluate the effect of the pre
scription.
It is the same in helping children seek values.
The teacher can ask the
child:
''What do you think would be a really important project for the class? or "If
the class thinks the mini-park is important, how do you think they should pick a leader?"
Or he can be put in a small group with a close fiend and an active debater or two and be
a sked to come up with a Plan for Getting New Jobs none by a Class.
Each of these ways (and there are, no doubt, many more) accepts the hostile
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response, does not ignore it, and uses it as a diagnostic clue to that child.
This is
individualized value-seeking:
not alone with a programmed packet, but in open discussion
with peers and with the help of a supportive adult.
The children can and should role-play the alternative ways out they can think of
and note the values associated with each alternative.
For example:
Alternative
Values

Pick the team captain or you'll be left out of everything.
Being "in. 11 Being safe.

Alternative

Pick a leader for the task who is really smart, even if
he has no friends.
Getting the task done. Skills.

Values
Alternative
Values

Pick a leader who can do the job and at least plays
baseball with "in" gang; then people will follow.
Getting the task done. Skills.

From open discussion of these alternatives the children can observe that people
sometimes choose the same alternative for different values or different alternatives for
the same values. How often we have found people on our side whose support we really re
gretted!
The Process and the Products. As the children play out their alternatives and observe
the sometimes surprising consequences, they are forced to work at all three of the goals
or products we delineated earlier.
They think reflectively about the problem and its possible solutions. They have
had to opt for a definite decision and stay with it until its consequences were clearly
evaluated by the values it was supposed to enhance.
By wo~king in groups of varying sizes, they are learning to analyze others' per
ceptions of issues. This is absolutely necessary to consensus among differences; children
need practice in looking for alternatives which meet everyone's needs and still get the
task done or the problem resolved.
Active participation, to and through the awesome moment of taking a stand in de
fense of your own values, then becomes a classroom reality and a practiced effort in
real-world situations. The children learn to judge their own solutions by the key ques
tions:
"What difference does it make what he (or you) does? To whom?"
The teacher and the curriculum are partners in confrontation with reality. Rec
ognizing the existence and origins of differences and identifying the impactof decisions
on oneself and others take the children a long way toward empathy. When they do take
action, they will take it knowing what effect it may have on others.
The Questions We Must Face. There are some recurring questions which teachers and cur
riculum designers face in such a strategy: Do the children "have to" debate and role
play such problems? Shouldn't we wait until children ask a values question before bring
ing it up? Is there an obvious moment of value-readiness? This strategy argues "no" for
several reasons:
1. The prejudiced child will bring up a value-laden topic without enough data
organized into concepts for the class to discuss it, leaving the teacher to agree, dis
agree, or worse yet, ignore the child or silence him.
2. The apathetic child will not see the values question as relevant to the use
of concepts. He may learn about people in other societies but not be able to face the
decisions he himself has to make.
3. The frightened child will wait to see where everyone else stands-morality
by consensus.
4.

The quiet, thoughtful child may be troubled and receive no help.

What clo young children know about values? They know a great deal about the
suffering of a values conflict-on the playground, in the family, between home and
school.
Perhaps one can apply Piaget's suggestions that young children need to be

confronted with new points of view in a concrete, active way. 1 That is how they develop
more mature structures, especially through interaction with their peers.
Is everything
open for debate? Is every alternative equally acceptable?
Problems need to be child-centered to be relevant. Placing peer group problems
in the early grades make sense. The first and second grader is more concerned with his
own new learning and his own choices.
If the problem is real, then all alternatives must get an equally reflective ap
proach. Some alternatives cannot stand up to the question, "Does it make a difference?
To whom?" from the point of view of equality and freedom for all. Such alternatives, in
addition to being clearly unfair and unjust, are also obviously impractical in a plural
istic society where we need support.
Does the teacher have to reveal her own opinions?
This is a matter of personal teaching style. Employing the strategy discussed
here, the teacher does not need to choose one way out of a problem, suggest alternatives
beyond the children's experience level, or summarize what "we" think. Value analysis
(What do you think and what makes you think so?) and confrontation with consequences
(What difference does it make? To whom?) will bring each child to his own values posi
tion at his own level of emotion and action.
A teacher who insists on his own view must submit his views to the same questions
and the same scrutiny. Children will learn to insist on that.
The teacher, the children and the parents all have values.
In such a learning
environment all of these aspects of reality can come to the fore without preaching and
without fear of dogma on the one hand or "it-doesn't-make-any-difference-what-anyone
thinks" skepticism on the other.
We have looked at both products and process. Each is inherent in the other.
The reflective individual who is aware of the role of concepts can identify problems and
the reality of his environment. The reflective individual sees problems as opportuni
ties because he knows how to recognize differences and judge alternatives by their prob
able effect on particular values. He is a competent and compassionable decision-maker.
The
learned and
resolve our
analytical,

skills of consensus and the skills of problem-resolving through action can be
practiced. We live in a multi-group society; we must agree in advance to
issues in accord with freedom and eguali ty. Childre;1 can be helped to be
realistic, and courageous.

F001NOTES

1

Equilibration theory and his views on the development of moral judgment.
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A MODEL FOR TEACHING VAWING
by
Thelma F. Adams

(Reprinted by permission from Clearing House, April, 1971, pp. 507-509.)
Should I adopt my parents' value system?
If not, what

~

I to do about choosing my own values?

Alert ·teen-agers are asking themselves these questions today, but far too many
of them are drifting along, following their peers, without defining their own values .
The ne:ct questions, then, follow naturally:
Should teachers, playing the roles of significant adults in the lives of these
teen-a9ers, assist them in identifying their value systems? And if their means
of valuing is inadequate, what ought to be done to improve it?

These two words- should and ought- are the key words in the te ching of valuing, which
is gaining increasing importance in today's educational objectives.
If teen-agers are
to learn what they value, they should be taught what kinds of questions to ask them
selves.
Although the Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II: Affective Domain
(2) was published in 1964, the use of these objectives has developed slowly in the
nation's school systems. Many teachers fear that here they are encroaching on parental
duties; others have not been informed of the needs in this area. Krathwohl, Bloom, and
Masia (2) list the categories in the affective domain as follows:

1.0
2 .0
3.0
4.0
5.0

Receiving (attending)
Responding
Valuing
Organization (including organization of a value system)
Characterization by a value or value complex

In referring to values, the authors define valuing in its usual sense:
"that a
thing, phenomenon, or behavior has worth. 11 If our educational system is to meet the
needs of presentday society, it is important that every teacher, regardless of the sub
ject or subjects he is teaching, have access to Handbook II: Affective Domain as well as
the companion volume, Handbook I: Cognitive Domain (1), before he plans his course ob
jectives.
In both areas the objectives have changed considerably in the past ten years.
For constructing a model in valuing, an interesting book to consider is Two
Blocks Apart, 1965, edited by Charlotte Leon Mayerson, which is available in both hard
bound and paperback editions (3).
School libraries should be able to furnish several
copies of this important little book.
In addition, teachers who wish to instruct stu
dents in learning to value may want to have a classroom set or to have their students
buy individual copies.
M:>st teen-agers who read the book like i t so well that they pre
fer having their own paperback copy if they can afford it.
Using this book as a basis, a unit may be constructed in the social sciences or
the language arts program.
It should be used as early as is feasible in the secondary
school so that the students may begin to have the practice they need in valuing. As a
springboard for this experience-type unit, the teacher should orient the students con
cerning the meaning of values, and with their assistance name realistic reasons for
learning to value.
The next step involves the reading of the book, Two Blocks Apart. As each stu
dent reads through it, he will find a strong identification with some of the qualities
of the two boys, Juan Gonzalez and Peter Quinn, who are both 17 years old and live in the
same New York City area.
Peter is from a white, middle-class family and delivers clothes
for the dry cleaner in his neighborhood to earn spending money.
Juan's family are poor
Puerto Rican immigrants. His parents are divorced, his mother is remarried, and he runs
errands for a social service agency to earn extra money for the family's support.
Mrs.
Mayerson, the editor, is involved in social service work, and through tape recordingswas
able to have the boys describe their family situations, their respective neighborhoods,
their schools, their ideas concerning politics, and their hopes and ideals.
In each of
these five areas the reader is able to see the emerging value systems of Peter and Juan,
which are brought to a climax in the last section, "Hopes and Ideals."
The contrasting values described in the interviews should lead almost every teen
ager into his own search for values. First, Juan is a member of a minority ethnic group.
He has a mother and stepfather, a married sister, and a younger brother; he is very con
cerned with trying to implant important values in his younger brother's life. Peter is
one of four children in a conservative Irish catholic family.
His father has an impor
tant position with a large industrial firm.
Juan lives in a New York Housing Authority Low Income Project, which he hates.
He says it is not safe to live among the hoods in his neighborhood.
Peter lives in a
luxurious apa :rtment house with a doorman in attendance. He describes the atmosphere as
friendly and likes his life there. Concerning school, Juan attended the local public
elementary sd1ool in a 90 per cent non-white neighborhood. He now attends a vocational
high school which offers the automotive course he was advised to take, but he does not
value his school work. He knows he cannot afford college; he says he may join the Navy
and try to learn some other type of work for his career.
Peter attended a parochial ele
mentary school and now attends a strict academic high school for boys who are interested
in preparing for the Ivy League colleges and universities. Almost all of the students in
his school are white.
Juan has a keen interest in politics.
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He spends much of his time talking about

it and developing his political values. He wants to try to help people in the
areas to have a better life.
Peter has little interest in politics. He knows
forms are needed in his community, but doesn't plan to take any active part in
them about. He seems to think that what is needed will come about without his
ance.

ghetto
that re
bringing
assist

Finally, the two boys from distinctly different cultures define their goals and
ideals.
In this section the reader sees their values clearly:
Juan wants to have a
house in the country where he can get away from the aspects of society that have hamp
ered him through the years. Also, due to his insecurity at home and in school, his
goals and ideals change frequently. He wonders whether he should try to rise above his
present class and what he ought to do about his future. Peter has definit educational
goals, but his ideas about a career are changeable. Right now his major goal is to be
accepted by the college his father and brother attended. He admires his older brother
and wonders whether he should follow in his footsteps. If not, what ought he to do about
choosing a career.
Between the two boys who live so near and yet so far apart, one can view two com
pletely differing value systems. Using this basic pattern, many young people will be
able to decide what they do or do not value and from that point they can begin to organ
ize their own value systems. Usually their values will change as they mature, but having
defined a value system, each one will know that he has a place in society and that he
needs to learn more about himself if he is to reach his goals.
The culminating activity of this unit may be handled according to the teacher's
best judgment. Certainly after reading the book there should be discussions of the
values of Peter and Juan which hopefully will lead to the students stating some of their
own values, though not at as great length as in the book.
It would be well to have these
stated in writing if the teacher can accept them for content alone without too much at
tention to grammar and punctuation, because at this point the objective is to have the
students learn to value and to recognize a value system.
If the students are enthusiastic and want to exchange ideas, a good activity is
to have them tape record their own ideas after they have written them down.
Then the
class can listen to a contribution from each member.
If an opaque projector is avail
able, each student can find a suitable illustration of his ultimate goals and, while the
tape is being played, the class can listen and watch the screen, which will reinforce the
learning situation in valuing and also give each student a sense of achievement in mas
tering his objective. As the class members hear comments concerning their presentations,
they will be able to answer in their own minds such questions as: Where am I going?
Where have I been? How are my past and present life affecting my future? Should I
strengthen my value system? What else ought I to do to achieve my long-term goals?
The reflective model designed by Massialas and Cox in their Inquiry in Social
studies (4) will serve as an excellent guide to the teacher who is beginning this type
of class instruction
THE HUMANITIES TODAY

Definition

l
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- - - - • Generalization

Orientation ---l
► Exploration
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Ev,'d enc,ng

Here its six steps are adapted to the preceding unit of work.
(1)

Definition:

What is valuing?

(2)

Orientation: Direct students' attention toward the fact that values are
an important influence. Would they like to learn more about valuing?
Decide on their own value systems? Study other teen-agers' value systems?
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(3)

Hypothesis:

(4)

Exploration:
Reading 'IWo Blocks Apart and discussing i t gives insight
into what two teen-agers value.

Values influence the direction of a person's life.

(5)

Evidences: How have the values of Peter and Juan and their families
influenced the lives of these two boys? L.ook for evidences of your own
and your family's values to determine why you are where you are now and
why you feel as you do about your home, family, school, nation, hopes,
and ideals. Has you milieu influenced your life? In what ways?

(6)

Generalization: Valuing is an important influence in shaping a person's
total personality.
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GROUP DYNAMICS AND VALUES CLARIFICATION
by
Leland Howe
(Reprinted by permission from Penny's Forum, Spring/Summer, 1972, p. 12.)
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New York:

How do group dynamics in a classroom affect the process of value clarification?
Why is it, for example that one type of group arrangement in the classroom facilitates
discussion of value issues while another inhibits communication?
The group dynamics in a classroom are often very complex. In such a brief arti
cle as this, one can not hope to develop any real expertise in group dynamics; partici
pation in university group dynamics courses or human relation labs can provide this kind
of training. However, with just a little knowledge of some of the simpler dynamics, the
teacher can improve the quality of interaction that occurs during the value clarifying
process.
One of the most common group dynamic problems teachers encounter in helping stu
dents clarify their values is selecting the appropriate group arrangement to facilitate
student discussion and involvement. Teachers who do not realize the importance of the
classroom seating arrangement often continue to use a didactic seating pattern.
(See
Figure 1.)
TI1is works well for presenting material with the purpose of informing; how
ever, it is hardly appropriate to the value clarifying approach.
One of the problems in the didactic arrangement is that students, arranged in
rows facing the front of the room, are forced to speak to each other's backs or turn in
their seats to talk to one another during a values discussion.
(As a result, much of the
non-verbal communication expressed in the face and body is lost.)
In addition, should the
teacher remain in front of the class, as many do, the very fact that all eyes face for
ward tends to put the teacher in control of the discussion whether she likes it or not.
Of course, thE, teacher may feel comfortable in this role, but it does little to encour
age students to feel that they and the teacher are searching together as equals for the
best values; instead, it is likely to foster the image that only the teacher knows what
are the true, right and wrong values that should be held. This, of course, violates one
of the basic tenets of value clarification- that the student must, of his own free choice,
arrive at his own values.
Of those teachers who do realize the importance that group arrangement has on a
values discussion, some of them attempt to improve the situation by providing tables
around which students are seated in a discursive type group. This is, indeed, an im
provement over the didactic arrangement. However, there are still some problems to be
encountered. For example, if students are seated around rectangular tables (See Figure
2), those at the ends, unless they are the group leader(s) or the teacher, are likely to
find that the focus of the discussion centers in the middle of the table and they are
left out. Or, on the other hand, if the teacher or a strong leader is seated at one end
of the table, he or she is likely to command the groups' attention, as "the head of the
table," and dominate the discussion.
One way to correct this, of course, is to provide round tables. However, the
tables themselves often create a psychological barrier to the value clarifying process .
It is as if people use the tables to hide behind so as not to reveal personal informa
tion about themselves. During the early stages of value clarification, as students are
learning to trust one another, the tables may help to create a climate of psychological
safety, but once a trusting climate has developed in the classroom, the tables may well
keep students apart who, in fact, desire to be more personally involved with one another
in the search for values. When the tables begin to act as barriers, they should go.
Figure 3 represents one of the most effective seating arrangements for a group
discussion of value issues. In this arrangement, students pull their chairs into a cir
cle so that each is an equal member of the group. As simple as it sounds, the teacher
may have to help students see that those who do not pull their chairs fully into the cir 
cle are usually not full members of the group; their participation is likely to be min
imal- a fact that students, once it is pointed out, can observe for themselves. The same
thing tends to hold true even in the smallest groupings of pairs or trios.
For example,
students often sit side by side in a diad instead of facing each other, or in a trio,
swinging their chairs around so that each is an equal member of the group. When this
happens, the teacher should help students develop more appropriate spacial relationships .
Note that the teacher in Figure 3 has not joined the group, but instead, makes
her contributions from outside. By not joining the group she is non-verbally communi
cating her desire that students learn to carry the weight of the discussion and not be
dependent upon the teacher to do all the clarifying. Of course, she may also verbalize
this expectation, but the important thing is that she acts to encourage students to be
gin to develop the clarifying skills which she is modeling.
However, it would be a mistake for the teacher to always remain outside the
group. Once the group is able to function on its own and no longer looks to the teacher
for comolete guidance or total clarification, the teacher should attempt to join the
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circle (see Figure 4) as simply another group member (as much as this is possible).
To
remain outside the group after it is functioning on its own may well communicate to stu
dents, again non-verbally, that the teacher can not benefit from an ongoing search for
better values- that, perhaps, the teacher has already arrived at her values and no long
er needs to examine them. The point is, that if we are to teach students that value
clarification is a life long process, as the theory holds, we teachers must be willing
to participate actively, as one human being with another, in the search for values .

EXAMINING VAWES IN THE UPPER GRADES
by
Jean Bernstein, Marilynn Tannebaum,
Larry Chase, and Grace Yeagle

(Reprinted by permission from Social Education, December, 1971, pp. 906-910.)

One hundred years ago, Walt Whitman, the poet of democracy, hailed the United
States as a "nation of nations." No phrase better sums up our history. From its begin
nings America has been a land of many peoples and many cultures. This diversity of cul
tural values has created not only a dynamic pool of ideas that stimulated growth and
change but also a continuous clash of interests that encouraged separatism and conflict.
No study of historical issues of social problems can be complete without the examination
of value positions and value conflicts.
For the past three years, the Center for Ethnic Studies in School District #163,
Park Forest, Illinois, has been involved in developing curriculum programs in the areas
of ethnic studies and human relationships.! Center programs are designed to give stu
dents accurate information about racial and cultural differences and to help them under
stand the values issues that stem from these differences. Our work with values has been
fourfold:
(1) to encourage teachers to establish classroom climates that support open
discussion of personal and social values;
(2) to involve teachers and students in the
identification of personal value positions;
(3) to design curriculum activities that
facilitate the examination of value conflicts;
(4) to test new programs and approaches
that allow students to experience value choices .
Creating a Classroom Climate
As we have worked in classrooms throughout our district, we have discovered that
teachers of different personality types and teaching styles can effectively promote the
open discussion of values. Classroom effectiveness seems directly related to the tea
cher's ability to respect student ideas and accept student value positions. Comments
such as these tend to destroy the potential for honesty:
"You don't really believe that,
do you?",
"I doubt that many people would agree with you," "Does anyone have a better
idea?"
Most importantly, effective teachers recognize the legitimate differences be
tween their own value positions and those of students.
This is critical when the family
or cultural values that guide student thinking conflict with middle-class standards.
Often attitudes and behaviors frowned upon at school are condoned or even praised by par
ents and peers. Certain kinds of aggressive actions, for example, may be seen as necess
ary forms of independence.
The willingness of teachers to tackle value-laden issues can be strengthened by
the interest and support of administrators who legitimize the use of class tillJZ for this
purpose. Confidence can also be gained when teachers are offered specific curriculum
approaches as guides or are able to receive training in values-clq~ification or role
playing techniques. These techniques can be applied to traditional subject matter and
provide the mechanics for handling controversial issues. They reduce the danger of stu
dent-teacher confrontation and promote intelligent and active student participation.
Identifying Personal Values
The identification of personal values can help teachers and students to deal more
rationally with value issues. This identification can be a form of self-encounter, an
illuminating experience that clarifies behaviors and goals. One technique for examining
personal values is found in the Value Survey developed by social psychologist Milton
Rokeach.2 The survey, a simple method for measuring value priorities, consists of 18
terminal values, end-states of existence, and 18 instrumental values, modes of behavior.
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Terminal values include such goals as "a sense of accomplishment," "family security,"
and "true friendship" while instrumental values invlude such traits as "honesty," "imag
ination," and "self control." survey respondents rank each set of values to form a value
system, an arrangement of values in order of importance.
Individual teachers have found the survey process a valuable personal experience.
Social studies teachers as a group, or as part of a total school staff, may use the sur
vey to identify similarities and differences among individual value priorities.
The ad
ministration of the survey to a teacher group can be paired with a report on the work
done by Milton Rokeach in his study of adult values.3
The Value Survey may also be administered to seventh and eighth grade students.
Survey results can be tabulated to develop group norms: subnorms may be developed for
distinct groups-boys, girls, blacks, whites. Students may also use the Rokeach lists of
terminal and instrumental values to analyze the value systems of other peoples and/or
other cultures. How might these values have been ranked in Roman times? How might a
colonial teenager have ranked them? Would they be ranked differently today by citizens
of China and the United States?
' Open-ended writing activities can also be used to help students clarify value
oriented goals and behaviors. We have found these three writing activities to be stimu
lating starters:
1.
2.
3.

All people throughout time have tried to achieve "the good life."
What does "the good life" mean to you?
Have you ever thought about your future life as an adult?
What kind of life do you want?
If someone were to write a short description of your personal
qualities, what would you like them to say about you?

Students should also be encouraged to own and act upon their identified personal
values. Friendship, for example, is a value that often ranks high on student lists.
What specific student behaviors bear out the importance of this value? What behaviors
run counter to this value?
Understanding Value Conflicts
Beyond the identification of personal values, teachers and students can find
within the social studies curriculum opportunities for study of value issues and value
conflicts. A careful review of course content will point up ways to help students in
terpret and understand different value positions. We have found that value conflicts can
be examined within the context of the curriculum through the use of logical analysis,
values-clarification strategies, and role-playing activities.
Many of the learning tasks that students undertake as they study materials de
veloped by the Center staff are designed to take them through a thinking process that
sharpens their perception of value cofflicts.
These specific examples are taken from
unit activities at three grade levels:
1.

2.

3.

Fifth graders begin the study of racial and ethnic groups in the
United States with the listing of the ideals articulated early
in our history in the Declaration of Independence and Bill of
Rights.
Their list provides a values touchstone against which
to examine the experiences of minority groups. What differences
do they see in the application of these ideals to people of Euro
pean and non-European backgrounds?
Sixth graders use statistical data to compare educational levels
of Mexican-Americans and Anglo-Americans. They read about the
educational experiences of a teenager caught between the values
of two worlds. How does the school-home conflict affect the
change for success of l\lc?xican-American students?
Seventh graders look at African society before the entry of Euro
peans. They analyze the values of the African social system and
compare them with the values of European society of that time.
Does this Akan proverb (Ghana) accurately characterize the value
conflicts between the two societies?
I call Gold.
Gold is mute.
I call Cloth.
Cloth is mute.
It is mankind that matters.
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In other unit activities, we have employed some of the value clarification
strategies developed by Louis R'-1.ths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney Simon.4 These activi
ties illustrate the use of three different value-clarification strategies:
1.

Sixth-grade students, following the study of the Southwest, use value
ranking to answer this question:
Which group helped most in building up the Southwest
Pioneers who came from the eastern United States
or
People in the Southwest of Mexican descent
or
Indians who originally lived in this area?
After ranking these groups in the order of their individual choices,
students explain the value positions on which their choices were based.

2.

Seventh graders work with this values continuum on colonialism:
Danny Detrimental-Co
lonialism was completely
detrimental and its bene
fits to Africans were exag
gerated.

Benny Beneficial- Co
lonialism may have had
some bad points but its
overall effect was bene
ficial.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Individual students place themselves on this continuum and then state
the basis for their value positions, their statements provide both a
check of oontent knowledge and a clarification of personal values.
3.

Eighth-grade students read the poem "Incident" by Countee Cullen
as the beginning for a values sheet and write answers to these
questions:
What incident is this poem about?
How did the writer of the poem feel?
Do you think his feelings are representative o f black people today?
Why or Why not?
Have you ever witnessed an incident like this one?
If so, describe it.
What did you do?
What could you have done?
Students discuss their responses to these questions so that they may
come to terms with the gap between their own values and their behavior
in real-life situations.

We have also found role playing an invaluable techniques for helping students
deal with value conflicts. An excellent resource book for teachers who wish to employ
this technique is Role Playing for Social Values by Fannie and George Shaftel.s Almost
any situation where a values choice is involved can be used as the basis for a role
playing session. These role-playing situations taken from our fifth-grade curriculum
unit may serve as examples:
1.

Patrick Murphy and his son Michael started out early in the morning
to look for jobs. At the first factory they came to, they saw a big
sign on the gate: No Irish Need Apply. Mr. Murphy said to the gate
keeper, "I'm a good worker and so is my son. Why can't I apply for a
job here?" The gatekeeper laughed and said, "On with you! We don't
want your kind here." What should Mr. Murphy and his son do?

2.

The Yashima family had worked hard and had saved a little money. They
decided to buy a piece of land so that they could own their own home
and start a small farm. Mr. Yashima went to the owner of the land and
offered to buy it. "I'm sorry," the owner said, "but they just passed
a new law. Japanese people can't buy land in this state." Mr. Yashima
returned to his family. His son Taro said, "Why should we work hard
if we aren't allowed to have the same things other people in this country
have?" What should Mr. Yashima do?

3.

sammy Glazer sat on the edige of the group and listened to the boys
talk about the club where they went to swim and play games. He
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decided to go there and see how to become a member. He walked up
to the man at the desk and said,
"I'd like to join this club."
"What's your name?" the man asked.
"Sammy Glazer," replied Sammy.
"I live in the flat just down the street." "Are you Jewish?"
asked the man.
"What difference does that make?" sammy asked
Angrily. "I'm sorry, son, but we don't allow Jewish members in
this club." What should Sammy do?
Of course, implicit in the use of role playing is the posing of alternative ac
tions, the exploration of alternatives for consequences, the discussion of the values on
which each alternative is based, and the decision as to the best alternative.
Classroom teachers can adapt these techniques and strategies to other content
situations.
In addition, the study of any issue or event can be raised to the values
level by the use of appropriate questions. What values were involved in this action?
What alternative actions could have been taken? What value positions do these alterna
tives represent? Under the same circumstances, what would you have done?
Experiencing Value Choices
The school classroom, with its mix of individual personalities and life styles,
can also be an appropriate setting for value activities that break through the limits of
curriculum scope and sequence. We have found upper-grade students enthusiastic partici
pants in programs that deal directly with feelings and attitudes and in discussion groups
that force confrontation of personal value positions. Two on-the-spot descriptions of
student involvement illustrate the potential of these approaches.
1.

Fifteen sixth graders sit on a small rug in the corner of their social
studies class while their classmates finish a reading assignment.
They are
joined by their teacher who begins a discussion of "Three Wishes" by telling
the group about one of his wishes. In the course of the 20-minute discussion,
each student who desires a turn will tell the group about his wishes. He
will receive reassurance from the group as several students remember and re
state what he has said. Finding the teacher would be a difficult task for he
will be right in the middle of the action, sharing his own wishes, remember
ing, and gently facilitating the discussion. As the session ends, each stu
dent will be more aware of his own ideas and values and more sensitive to the
ideas of others. On other days, discussion topics might by "How I protected
some person from harm," "I made a promise and kept it," or "I knew the truth
but lied anyway." Though the topics change as the class meets daily, the
pattern of sharing, remembering, and examining will remain constant.
This is a living social studies class in which the content for part of the
period is not history or geography but the students' own lives. Through the
medium of the "magic circle," these students are confronting and clarifying
their values.
They are learning not by being preached to but by talking
about their feelings, thoughts, and behaviors, by talking about what they can
do, and by learning to take responsibility for their own actions.
The term "magic circle" has become the informal name for the Human Develop
ment Program, a curriculum program enhancing emotional growth, developed by
Uvalde Palomares and Harold Bessell. 6 The program was field tested during
the 1970-71 school years in School District #163 and has since been made
available to all teachers in the district. Though the program is being used
effectively with students in kindergarten through eighth grades, it is upper
gr.ade students who feel a real need for time each day to talk about the prob
lems of growing up.
The process of developing values includes making choices and taking respon
sibility for these choices. In circle sessions, students are often faced
with direct-choice situations as they play "What can I do for you?" or "I
can make you feel bad or good." They are encouraged to make choices involv
ing others in the group, to make commitments to others and to talk about the
commitments they have made. As they work together, they learn that their
fears, wishes, and value conflicts are shared by others. The come to under
stand and accept human differences and similarities.
Although the Human Development Program deals directly with the affective
dimension of learning, the techniques and strategies employed can also be ap
plied to content areas.
Teachers interested in this approach may wish to re
fer to two excellent books on this subject: Human Teaching for Human Learn
ing_ by George I. Brown7 and Learning to Feel- Feeling to Learn by Hal Lyon. 8

2.

Thirty-six students sit on the floor in small groups.
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Some express themselves

excitedly; others talk quietly but intently.
room might overhear these remarks:

An observer walking around the

"When you have two groups, one is always cutting the others down. They
don't know how bad they are themselves because they never evaluate them
selves, only others."
"Nobody likes to be put down, black or white."
"Everybody's afraid they' re going to make the wrong move."
"I don't have to act like you but try to understand why you act that way."
The comments were made by seventh- and eighth-grade students attending an
all-day junior high speakout. This day was the culmination of a series of
meetings devoted to identifying and seeking solutions to school human rela
tions problems. The school, formerly an all-white suburban junior high, had
recently become racially mixed. As black and white students attended school
together, hall, gym, and bus incidents occurred with increasing frequency.
Both student values and student tempers clashed.
Conventional problem-solving techniques did not seem to be working. New
rules were made only to be broken repeatedly. School personnel became con
cerned about the increase in student tensions and their apparent negative ef
fect on the learning environment.
The staff, under the leadership of the
principal and the counselor, recognized that the very students who were cre
ating the problems needed to be involved in the search for solutions.
The staff identified the informal leadership of the school, those students
who could influence others. A small group of informal leaders met as a
steering committee with the counselor. Together they arrived at the idea for
an all-day meeting.
It was hoped that a meeting planned, organized, and im
plemented by students could provide a forum for an exchange of ideas and a
sharing of feelings. Perhaps the students involved could deal with the basic
values questions that caused daily conflicts.
The steering committee planned a series of events that included communica
tion games, role playing, a human relations film, and a rumor clinic. Facul
ty members conducted two of the formal sessions while small and large dis
cussion groups were led by students. The groups were asked to identify
school problems during the morning meetings and to suggest specific solutions
in the afternoon sessions. Although group discussions frequently began on a
superficial level, participants soon began to share real feelings and honest
reactions. Questions that concerned students were raised openly: Why do
blacks seem to fight more? Why do whites get so scared? Why do you act the
way you do? Students risked personal confrontations by discussing specific
incidents that had taken place. Many of the discussions involved clarifying
particular values important to individual students.
A frustration level was reached during the mid-afternoon. One participant
summed up the feeling of the group when he said, "Finding the problems is
the easy part. Even understanding why isn't so hard.
It's getting solutions
that's really hard." Another responded by saying that meetings like this
that gave students a chance to talk together were the best solution. Student
evaluations of the day generally reflected this feeling. Stu dents indicated
that operating with other people from a position of understanding provides a
better basis for value choices.
We believe that "magic circle" disucssions and student-to-student interaction are
as important a part of the s ocial studies experience as the study of historical events
and geographic places. As one emphatic principal put it, in anwer to the criticism that
these activities took time away from more structured study about the world, "Maybe our
students have to know why they are before they can find out where they're at."
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SENSITIVITY MODULES
by
Howard Kirschenbaum
(Reprinted by permission from Media and Methods, February, 1970, pp. 36-38. For a bibli
ography of other materials available in the humanistic education field, write: Adiron
dack Mt. Humanistic Education Center, Upper Jay, New York, 12987.)
"You never really know a man until you stand in his shoes and walk
around in them."

In every school building there is a wall which keeps the rain and cold out and
the children in. It is a wall made of concrete, steel, wood or asbestos, and glass. We
have all seen this wall, would readily acknowledge its existence and usefulness, and
therefore need not dwell upon it.
However, there is another wall which separates the school from the outside world
-one which deserves our more serious attention. This is a wall which many people say
they cannot see and many others do not want to see; although research shows -that it is
seen more easily by students than by their parents or teachers.
It is called the wall of
unreality, and it prevents students from making any vital connection between what they
learn in the classroom and what they know is happening in the seething world outside the
school.
One recent study showed that from September, 1968 to March, 1969, there were over
2000 student disruptions in secondary schools across the country. It seems that if we,
as teachers, do not do something quickly to tear down the unreal walls of our school
buildings, then the students are very likely to tear down the real ones.
In one mostly white, suburban classroom, an eleventh grade, social studies class
was discussing poverty, race, guaranteed annual income, police brutality, welfare and
other related issues. This , in itself, was a positive first step toward relevance and
away from unreality. But the teacher sensed his students had no real feeling for or
experience with the issues they were discussing. Their comments seemed to reflect a
cross between their parents' opinions and the 6 O'clock News-nothing personal. The
teacher felt the need for a greater reality-orientation in his classroom, so he gave the
following assignment:
Do two of the following within two weeks. At that time we will discuss your
experiences in class and relate them to the subject at hand.
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Wear old clothes and sit
in the waiting room of the
State Employment Office.
Listen. observe. talk to
some of the people sitting
next to you . Read the
the

Sit in the waiting room

of the maternity ward of
a city hospital whose
patients are mostly char
ity cases . Strike up a
conversation with any
other persons in the wait
ing room .

Compare the prices of
the same brands and
models of record players ,
TV sets , and transistor
radios at your local
stores with those on dis
play in a credit store in

the downtown area.

Attend a meeting of a
civic group such as the
Human Relations Com
mittee. the Welfare Rights
0 r g an i z at ion, or the
Neighborhood
Associa 
tion.

Go to magistrate•s court
and keep a I ist of the
kinds of cases brought
before the magistrate .

Go to an inner-city ele 
mentary school and read
a story to a chi Id in kin
dergarten or first grade.
The child must be held
on your lap .

t
I
I

Who are the .. custom
ers"?
How are they
handled?

Live for three days on the

ical welfare mother re
ceives to feed a son or
daughter closest to your

own age .

bune ,
can,

Afro -Ameri

Monitor

I

Go to the community
health center and take a
seat in line . Watch the
attitude of the personnel
who work in the health
center. Talk to some of
the other patients coming
for help.

amount of money a typ

Read at least two
issues , cover to
cover, of the Tri

Spend a few hours in a
prowl car traveling with a
team of pol icemen . Listen
to the squad car radio.
Ask questions. If the
pol icemen park and walk
a beat , walk with them.

Spend a morning
making the rounds
with a visiting
nurse.

Attend

some other book which
tells what it is like to grow
up black in America.

church

services some Sun
day in a store-front

church.

or

other Negro news
paper .
Try to call City Hal I with
a complaint that your
landlord did not give you
heat, or has not repaired
a roof leak. or that the
toilet is not working.
Better yet . find a neighbor
with a real complaint
and offer to he Ip him get
it fixed .

Spend a weekend with
the American Friends
Ser v ice Committee on
one of their weekend
workcamps, which are a
combination of seminar
and clean-up. paint-up
projects .

Read
Autobiography of
Malcolm X or Monchild
in the Promised Lond or

Turn the heat off in
your own house
some night in Jan
uary or February
and spend the
night in a cold
house.

I

Walk four or five blocks
between 13th and 18th on
Broadway at lunch hour
and buy a sandwich and
a cup of coffee in a
luncheonette in which
you wi 11 be the only white
person .

1 Note : Whites will not be overly welcome these d a ys if they come a-slumming in
black ghettos. This issue needs to be examined and all th e r ealities explored clearly
before any team goes out on the first module.

Two weeks later, after doing many of these sensitivity modules, the students had
developed a personal concern for the subject, a wealth of experiences to draw upon and
dozens of pertinent questions needing answers. Had it been an all-black school, the sen
sitivity modules would have been constructed accordingly, so as to enable the black stu
dents to become more sensitive to the realities of the white world. Needless to say, such
experiences generate many powerful feelings and often considerable confusion in a stu
dents-especially when their preconceptions about the world are challenged. But then,
what is learning all about?
Yet, sensitivity modules do not all have to be on such controversial subjects.
One teacher, when the class was reading Helen Keller's Story of My Life, had her
class walk around the school and their homes blindfolded for a day, so they might be more
sensitive toward Helen Keller's way of experiencing the world.

An elementary school teacher who was doing a unit on inventions and inventors
''who have changed our way of life" asked each class member to invent some useful object
for his home.
A math teacher tried to bridge the gap between the reality of the classroom and
that of the outside world by asking his students to help their parents calculate the
family's yearly income tax- using the long form.
A history teacher had the members of his class work for political candidates of
their choice, during an election ye a r, as one way of studying how politics work- a real
istic addition to the textbook version.
In fact, for just about any subject we teach, and at just about any level, sen
s itivity modules can be created.
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Some students wonder why they have to learn to write formal letters in junior
high school. So some teachers ask that those letters take the form of letters-to-the
editor or to Congressmen, and they actually get sent. Of course, the students are en
couraged to learn more about the subject they are writing on, and the letters contain the
students' own views, not the teachers'.
In teaching elementary children the period of world exploration and the discovery
of America, one teacher had her children go out and actually "discover" new parts of the
city. One instruction was to "find a new and faster route to the ball field."
She
stayed a half block behind them, but they had to do the discovering themselves. And the
gap between the world of Columbus and their own risk-taking work in the city was narrowed.
One high school class studying the second world war took a trip to a Veterans'
Hospital wher,~ the students interviewed many of the patients.
A good book or movie, a trip to a museum, a guest speaker-any number of tradi
tional teaching devices can serve as a sensitivity module- if the student is truly in
volved in the experience and if it is a new experience for him. All new experiences are
risk-taking experiences, because we never know how they might turn out. Generally, the
more the student has to do, the newer the experience is for him, the greater the risk,
he has to take, the deeper will be the sensitivity which results from it.
The more pas
sive the student's role is in a sensitivity module, the less he gets out of it. Natural
ly, students' ages will be an important factor in creating sensitivity modules, as will
be an intelli9ent concern for their safety. But risk cannot, and should not, be elimi
nated, because it is central to the experience.
Teachers who take fewer risks in their
classroom and in their own lives will probably be less disposed toward the newer, more
unpredictable modules than teachers who frequently experiment, try out new behaviors and
ideas and otherwise take risks in their own lives.
One word of caution for the teacher: Experience does not necessarily lead to
wisdom or sensitivity. We humans are notoriously capable of translating new experiences
and information so as to fit neatly into our old, fixed and often prejudicial way of
thinking. That is why it is essential that students have the opportunity to validate
their experiences and learnings with those of their peers and to check out these learn
ings with thoi;e of their peers and to check out these learnings with the accumulated body
of knowledge which we can make available to them. The sensitivity module, then, is only
one aspect of a more encompassing learning experience.
Many parents and teachers will probably object to the sensitivity module- if not
its conception, then in its application. They might argue that there are enough unpleas
ant realities which their children cannot avoid in this world, without having to seek out
new ones. Th<W might also say that the schools really have no right to ask students to
take risks, that is, to put themselves in situations where the outcomes are uncertain and
may be unsettling.
We believe that, although these arguments are probably offered for the children's
own good," they do a great disservice to those same children and to our society. In a
world that seems ready to explode because of lack of understanding and communication
among groups and nations, it is frightening to think what sheltered lives most of our
students lead.
Roger is white, wealthy, suburban, and until his twelfth year in school, had
never shaken hands with a black person. Denise is twelve and has never had more than 25
cents of her own . Ellen has never been hungry a day in her life. Mike, when he dropped
out of his inner-city school, had never ridden on the city's subways, for fear he might
get lost underground. Geraldine believed that every family who lives in the suburbs has
a sleep-in maid.
Are these children exceptions? We wonder. Over the years, as we have got ten to
know our studE,nts, we have continued to be amazed at what little experience they have in
worlds outsidE• their own neighborhoods or communities. But, really, this should not be
so surprising.
As small children, their friendships follow the socio-economic patterns of their
neighborhoods and their families' social circle. Thus, their friends are of the same
race and social class and frequently of the same religion. When there are exceptions to
this rule, it is not unusual for the parents to intervene and subtly or explicitly ex
plain that "we don't play with them" In many areas, the neighborhood school perpetuates
this pattern of homogeneous socio-economic grouping, as does ability grouping in schools,
By the time the student reaches high school, he still probably has little feeling for how
most people in the country or world, aside from his own closed circles, live. That is
why the first year in a college dormitory is usually such an eye-opening experience for
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freshmen.
But the problem goes even deeper than these structural realities of scmol and
society- social class, friendship patterns, neighborhood schools, ability grouping . As
we view the schools' curricula and teaching methods, it seems as though the schools had
a stake in keeping their students ignorant of many of the realities of the world around
them.
Why else would the reading matter be so carefully screened, lest real ideas or
real language influence the students? Why is controversy, certainly the norm in the
real world, still frowned upon in more schools than it is welcomed? Why are students
still allowed such little choice in sdlool subjects, while in the real world they have
to make all sorts of important choices about how they will· spend their lives? Why are
students often burdened with so much homework, especially the brighter ones, that they
have little time to discover the real world on their onw, in their own fashion? What are
we trying to protect?
It's as though schools were afraid that students might develop the "wrong" ideas,
the "wrong" attitudes and beliefs. Wasn't it Jefferson who asked, "Who ever knew truth
to be the loser on a free and open market of ideas?" Yet, apparently this is the fear
that runs our schools- the fear that constructs a wall around the school to keep the rea
i ties of the outside world from intruding and interrupting "business as usual."
But the students in the 1970's, even more so than in the '60's, will not allow
that artificial wall to stand. They want desperately to get an education that will help
them make sense out of and live in the world around them, and they will try to get it
with or without the school's help.
The sensitivity module is only one of many methods teachers have for helping stu
dents in a search for real understandings, based not only on academic knowledge, but on
life's experiences as well." Harper Lee wrote, "You never really know a man until you
stand in his shoes and walk around in them." By helping students to walk around in many
men's shoes, the sensitivity module helps to tear down the wall of unreality that too
often separates schools from life.

VAWES-CLARIFICA TION vs. INDOCTRINATION
by
Sidney B. Simon
(Reprinted by permission from s:>cial Education, December, 1971, pp. 902-905, 915. For
information about current Values Clarification materials or nationwide training workshops
contact Values Associates, Box 43, Amherst, Ma., 01002.)
Whatever happened to those good old words we once used when we talked of values?
Remember, how comfortable it was to say inculcate? It was a nice, clean, dignified,
closely shaved work if there ever was one. Then there was the old standby, to instill
usually followed by "the democratic values of our society." Doesn't anyone instill any
more? And what about the word foster? In schools, not so very long ago, we used to "fos
ter" all over the place. But nobody does that much anymore. What has happened to the old
familiar jargon of value teaching?
What happened was the realization that all the inculcating, instilling, and fos
tering added up to indoctrination: and despite our best efforts at doing the indoctri
nating, we've come to see that it just didn't take. Most of the _P,eopl~ who expe_rienced
the inculcation, instillation, and fostering seem not the much better for it. They appear
to play just as much hanky-panky with income taxes as anyoue else, and concerned letters
·to-the-edi tor are not written by them in any greater profusion.
They pollute and defoli
ate; move to the suburbs to escape integration; buy convertibles with vinyl tops that
collapse in roll-over accidents; fail to wear seat belts; and commit all kinds of sins
even while they are saying the very words that have been dutifully inculcated, instilled,
and fostered in them.
It is discouraging.
At this point, one might ask:
"Is it all that bad?" "Aren't they also among the
good people who go to the polls in November, read the current events weeklies, and pay
their BankAmericard charges on time?" Yes, of course. But in these troubled confused,
and conflicted times, we need people who can do much more than that. we desperately need
men and women who know why they are, who know what they want out of life, and who can
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name their names when controversy rages. we need people who know what is significant and
what is trash, and who are not so vulnerable to demagoguery, blandness, or safety.
The indoctrination procedures of the past fail to help people grapple with all the
confusion and conflict which abound in these baffling days. For example, in val_u es
clarifica tion, we apply a strategy which is deceptively simple. We ask students to spend
some time listing the brand names in their home medicine cabinets. Just think of your
own medicine cabinet as you are sitting reading this. Wha t 's in it? How many creams,
ointments, and salves have you been sold? Do you use a bran d-name, buffered product in
stead of plain old aspirin? How did you get started on that? What about the spray cans?
How many are in your aerosol arsenal? What did you use before the product you now spray?
How did all those brand names get there? Who bought them? What was the motivating force
force? How did you learn what to value as seen in your medicine cabinet? As long as you
have the door to your cabinet open, why don't you pull out the cosmetic tray? How vul
nerable are you to avoiding the hysteria surrounding all of us about getting a wrinkle?
Getting old has become such a negative value. Who are the people who fear it?
In place of indoctrination, my associates and I are subs ti tu ting a pro _c es_s ap
proach to the entire area of dealing with values in the schools, which focuses on the
process of valuing, not on the transmission of the "right" set of values. We call this
approach values-clarification, and it is based on the premise that none of us has the
"right" set of values to pass on to other people's children. Yes, there may be some
things we can all agree upon, and I will grant you some absolutes, but when we begin to
operationalize our values, make them show up in how we live our days and spend our nights,
then we begin to see the enormous smugness of those people who profess they have the
right values for others' children. The issues and hostility generated around hair length
and dress and armbands are just the surface absurdity.
More dangerous is the incredible hypocrisy we generate when we live two-faced
values and hustle the one right value to children. Think about the hundreds of elemen
tary school teachers who daily stop children from running down the halls.
I close my
eyes and I see them with their arms outstretched, hands pressing against the chest of kids
who put on their "brakes" in order to make the token slowdown until the teacher ducks in
to the teacher's room for a fast cigarette before all the kids get back to hear the can
cer lecture.
Think of those teachers preaching to children about the need to take turns
and share.
"We wait on lines, boys and girls, and we learn to share our crayons and
paints in here. And, I don't want to see anybody in my class being a tattletale- except
in cases of serious emergency, naturally." The words are all too familiar.
I have used
them in the old days.
I have also seen myself cut into the cafeteria lunch line ahead of
third graders.
(Take turns? Well, not when we have so few minutes for lunch and always
so much to do to get ready for afternoon classes.)
The alternative to indoctrination of values is not to do nothing.
In this time
of the anti -hero, our students need all the help we can give them if they are to make
sense of the confusion and conflict 1.nheri ted from the indoctrinated types.
Moreover, we
all need help in grappling with the chaos of the international scene, with the polariza
tion of national life- not to mention the right-outside-the-door string of purely local
dilemmas.
An approach to this problem is to help students learn a process for the clarifi
cation of their values, which is a far cry from indoctrination. The theory behind it can
be found in Values and Teaching (Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon,
Columbus:
Charles E. Merrill, 1966). In the remainder of this article, I will describe
some of the strategies we are presently using to help students learn the process of val
ues-clarification and begin lifelong searches for the sets of personal values by which
to steer their lives.I
Five Value-Clarifying Strategies and Their use
Strategy #1- Things I Love to Do
Ask students (teacher does it with them) to number from 1-20 on a paper.
Then
suggest they list, as rapidly as they can, 20 things in life which they really, really
love to do. Stress that the papers will not be collected and "corrected, n and that there
is no right answer about what people should like. It should be emphasized that in none
of values strategies should students be forced to participate. Each has the right to
pass. Students may get strangely quiet; and, at first, they may even be baffled by such
an unschoollike task as this. Flow with it, and be certain to allow enough time to list
what they really love to do • Remember, at no time muis t the i ndi vi dual ' s privacy be in
va <ied I and that the right of an indivi'dual to pass is sacrosanct.
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started.

When everyone has listed his 20 i terns, the process of coding responses can be
Here are some suggested codes which you might ask the students to use:
1.

Place the$ sign by any itme which costs more than $3, each ·time you do it.

2.

Put an R in front of any item which involves some RISK.
The risk might be
physical, intellectual, or emotional.
(Which things in your own life that
are things you love to do require sane risk?)

3.

Using the code letter F and M, record which of the items on your list you
think your father and mother might have had on their lists if they had been
asked to make them at YOUR age.

4.

Place either the letter P or the letter A before each item.
The "P" to
be used for i terns which you prefer doing with PEOPLE, the "A" for i terns
which you prefer doing ALONE.
(Stress again that there is no right answer.
It is important to just become aware of which are your preferences.)

5.

Place a number 5 in front of any item which you think would not be on your
list 5 years from now.

6.

Finally, go down through your list and place near each item the date when
you did it last.

The discussion which follows this exercise argues more eloquently than almost
anything else we can say for values-clarification.

Strategy #2 - I Learned That I . . .
This strategy fits in with the one above. After students have listed and coded
their 20 items , the teacher might say, "Look at your list as something which tells a lot
about you at this time in your life. What did you learn about yourself as you were going
through the strategy? Will you please complete one of these sentences and share with us
some of the learning you did?"
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

learned that r.
relearned that I .
noticed that r.
was surprised to see that
was disappointed that I .
was pleased that I.
realized that I .

r.

.

The teacher must be willing to make some "I learned that r. . . . " statements,
too. And they must not be platitudinous, either. Every effort is made for the values
clarifying teacher to be as honest and as authentic as possible.
"I learned that I . . . • " statements can be used after almost any important val
ue clarifying strategy.
It is a way of getting the student to own the process o~ the
search for values.
It should be clear how diametrically opposed "I learned that I. • • • "
statements are from indoctrination, although it is possible to misuse this or any clari
fication strategy to get kids to give back the party line. On the other hand, using this
strategy can begin to build that lifetime search for personal meaning into all of our
experiences.
Strategy #3- Baker's Dozen
This is a very simple strategy which teaches us something about our personal pri
orities. The teacher asks each student to list 13, a baker's dozen of his favorite items
around the house which use PLUGS, that is, which require electricity.
When the students have made their lists, the teacher says, "Now, please draw a
line through the three which you really could do without if there were suddenly to be a
serious power shortage. It's not that you don't like them, but that you could, if you
had to, live without them. o.K., now circle the three which really mean the most to you
and which you would hold onto until the very end."
It should be clear that again there is no right answer as to what "good" people
should draw lines through and circle. The main thing is for each of us to know what we
want and to see it in the perspective of what we like less.
strategy #4- "I urge" Telegrams
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The teacher obtains blank Western Union telegrams blanks. Or simply has students
head a piece of paper with the word Telegram. He then says, "Each of you should think of
someone in your real life to whom you would send a telegram which begins with these words:
I URGE YOU TO. . .
Then finish the telegram and we' 11 hear same of them."
A great many values issues come out of this simple strategy.
these telegrams:

Consider some of

To my sister:
"I urge you to get your head together and quit using drugs."
Nancy.
(All telegrams must be signed.
It is our affirmation of the need to name your
name and to stand up for what you believe in.)
To my Sunday School teacher:
"I urge you to quit thinking that you are the only
person to know what God wants." Signed, your student Rodney Phillips.
To my neighbor on the North Side:
"I urge you to see that we have no other place
to play ball and that you not call the cops so often." Signed, Billy Clark.
One of the things that students working with values-clarification learn to do is
to find out what they really want. "I urge telegrams" help do that.
Just think of the
people in your own lives to whom an "I urge telegram" needs to be sent.
The second thing
students working with values-clarification learn to do is to find alternative ways of
getting what they need and want. Take the case of Billy Clark's neighbor. The class
spent some time brainstorming ways of approaching that neighbor. They talked about how
to negotiate with a grouch, and how to try to offer alternatives in your drive to get
what you want.
"I urge telegrams" are used several times during the semester.
The students keep
them on file and after they have done five or six, they are spread out on the desk and "I
learned statements" made from the pattern of the messages carried by the telegrams.
Students also learn to use the "I urge you to.
. " model to get messages
across between student and student and between student and teacher.
An assignment I like to use, related to the "I urge telegram," is to have each
student get a letter-to-the-editor published in a magazine or newspaper.

Strategy #5-Personal Coat of Arms
Each student is asked to draw a shield shape in preparation for making a person
al coat of arms. The teacher could go into the historical significance of shields and
coats of arms, but the exercise is designed to help us learn more about some of our most
strongly held values and to learn the importance of publicly affirming what we believe,
that is, literally wearing our values out front on our shields.
The coat of arms shield is divided into six sections (see figure). The teacher
makes it clear that words are to be used only in the sixth block. All the others are to
contain pictures. He stresses that it is not an art lesson. Only crude stick figures,
etc., need be used.
Then he tells what is to go in each of the six sections:
1.

Draw two pictures. One to represent something you are very good at and one
to show something you want to become good at.

2.

Make a picture to show one of your values from which you would never budge.
This is one about which you feel extremely strong, and which you might never
give up.

3.

Draw a picture to show a value by which your family lives. Make it one that
everyone in your family would probably agree is one of their most important.

4.

In this block, imagine that you could achieve anything you wanted, and that
whatever you tried to do would be a success. What would you strive to do?

5.

Use this block to show one of the values you wished all men would believe,
and certainly one in which you believe very deeply.

6.

In the last block, you can use words. Use four words which you would like
people to say about y o u behind your back.
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A PERSONAL illAT OF ARMS
The teacher can do several different things at this point. He can have the stu
dents share among themselves in little trios or quartets. He can also get the picture
hung up on the walls and get people to take each other on gallery tours to share the
coats of arms. A game could be played which would involve trying to guess what the pic
tures represented. The class might try to make a group coat of arms to represent their
living together in that classroom.
In any case, the value expressions elicited in this
nonverbal way are very exciting and lead to discussions which range far and wide.
Inci
dentally, this strategy is a ·good one to use with parents to illustrate to them the
power of the values-clarification methodology.
It makes a meaningful exercise for an
evening PTA meeting.
The Coat of Arms strategy illustrates quite well some things common to all of
the values-clarification strategies. The teacher sets up an interesting way of eliciting
some value re:,ponses. He establishes that there is no right answer.
Toe strategy is
open-ended and allows students to take the exploration to whatever level they want to
take it. Finally, there is a chance to share with each other some of the alternatives
that emerge from our searching. This whole process allows each student to focus on
areas where he has some work yet to do in order to keep growing. The Coat of Arms can
be done several times during the school year and the various shields compared and seen
as measures o i: a student's search o
Conclusion
The five strategies used as illustrations of what values-clarification is must
raise some serious questions in the minds of readers who have more conventional views of
what the social studies should be. For one thing, I have used no standard sub_ject
matter content:
there is no history, no geography, etc o Yet, if one thinks through what
the outcomes of a course will be making use of the five strategies, he will see the stu
dent emerging with a deeper sense of who he is_, what he wants_, what is p _recious, and
what is of most worth in his and others' lives. Has the social studies ever done more
than that?
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Values-clarification demands that we take a new look at what we have been calling
the social studies. I feel more and more strongly that the most severe problem facing
all of us is HOW TO GET PEOPLE 10 LOOK AT THE LIVES THEY ARE LEADING. How can we get
fathers and 100thers to see that high college-entrance scores are not the end of a high
school education? How can we get people to see that getting a high-paying job is not the
final reward of a college degree? How can we get men and women to take on some larger
share of their personal responsibility for the rampant racism in our nation? Or for al
lowing a senseless war to continue indefinitely? When will educators make a contribution
tion towards helping people examine t he headlong pursuit towards accumulating more and
more material possessions and enjoying them less? Or what can we do about keeping our
students from making drab and dreary marriages or being trap ped into pointless jobs
which they hate to go to each morning? It boils down to a co ncern for values, and yet we
must not fall into the trap of believing that if only we could give boys and girls the
right set of values to believe, they would avoid the mistakes of the rest of us. Non
sense I
Indoctrination is not the answer.
The only thing that indoctrination did for
people in the past was to help them postpone the time when they began the hard process
of hammering out their own set of values. Values simply can't be given to anyone else.
One can't value for other people. Each individual has to find his own values. One can
memorize all c he platitudes he wants, but when it comes to living and acting on the val
ues, he needs to carve them out from carefully reflected experience. The skills neces
sary for doing this can be learned in values-clarffication.
Perhaps when the reader and au~hor acknowledge how little help they received
from their own education about making sense out of life, maybe then they will be willing
to help other people's children learn the process, a lifetime process, of searching for
a viable set of values to live by and perhaps even to die for.
The author is convinced that he can leave his own children no greater inheri
tance than the gift of knowing how to negotiate the lovely banquet of life ahead of them.
That is indeed something of value.
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(Reprinted by permission from the Committee on Education, The Ohio Council of Churches,
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Mr. Alexander Campbell

In Consultation with Task Force MambersMr. Richard Howard, Chairman
Mr. Hersh Adlerstein
Mr. Howard L. Brown
Mr. G. H. oeutschlander
Dr. Charles Foster
Dr. ~bert Greer
Mr. Nelson Harper
Dr. Edward F. Jirik

Dr. John Kirker
Sr. Beatrice Koerper
Miss Ruth McDowell
Mr. Bernard Miller
Mr, Joseph Newlin
Mrs. Janet Railey Smith
Mrs. F. Estella Worth

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Name of the Program:

DECIDING

Publisher:

College Entrance Examination Board
888 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York
10019

Grade Level:

7-9

Basic Content:

The student is supplied with a workbook entitled DECIDING. He engages
in various exercises, designed to help him examine his values, think
in terms of alternatives, consider the information necessary for good
decision making, and become acquainted with strategies he can use in
the process of decision making. There are exercises which enable him
to relate values, information and strategy to decisions he must make
in his personal life, courses at school, further education and voca
tional choices.

Cost:

Teacher's Guide free with every ten copies.

$2.50

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

DECISION MAKING

Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts
Developed by Clyde and Barbara Dodden, Copyright 1968

Grade Level:

4-6

Basic Content:

The program consists of a teachers guide and various kinds of material
for use by the students. The teacher's guide begins with introductory
material on the complexity of decision making, a look at the preadol
escent child and consideration of the discovery approach. The major
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portion of the guide, Chapter IV is given over to the theme. "Helping
Children Become Imaginative and Responsible Decision Makers."
Cost:

$44.00

DUSO
(UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR)

Name of the Program:

Publisher:

American Guidance Service, Inc.
Publishers' Building
Circle Pines, Minnesota
55014

Grade Level:

K-2

Basic Content:

Related to the themes above are stories presented by DUSO the dolphin
with the aid of an illustrated text (story illustration cards), cas
sette tapes and posters. Hand puppets are also used. A teacher's text
presents the sequential format and includes more stories and sugges
tions. Detailed, step-by-step directions are given.

Cost:

$89.00

Name of the P~ogram·
Publisher:

DRUGS, VAWES AND PERSONAL PROBLE!',f;

Warren Schloat Productions, Inc.
Pleasantville, New York
10570

Copyright 1972

Grade Level:

4-6, 7-8

Basic Content ::

Six filmstrips with cassettes portray situations in the daily lives of
young people. The filmstrips are:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

Lonely Boy
Caught in the Middle
The Neighborhood

Honor Student
Track Star
Growing Up Fast

As each situation is presented the students are asked to consider two
aspects:
"How else might the character handle his problem?" and "How
could others have helped him?" Drugs, as such are not dealt with ex
plicitly in the filmstrips, but are suggested as possible consequences
of personal problems, not as the problem itself. Suggestions are
given in a teacher's manual to extend the discussion.
Cost:

$110.00

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

DYNAMIC CONSUMER DECISION-MAKING

Educational and Consumer Relations Department
J.C. Penny Co., Inc.
1301 Avenue of the Americans
New York, New York
10019

Copyright 1972

Grade Level:

9-12, Adult

Basic Content:

The program is bound into a looseleaf notebook that contains four
sections:
1.
2.
3,

Educator's Core - ideas and learning activities that introduce a
new way of looking at consumer decision-making.
Extension - suggestions for use of included materials and activi
ties in adult extension class or groups.
Secondary School - suggestions for use of included materials and
activities at secondary school level.
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4.
Cost:

Limited Resources - supplemental materials and activities.

$11.50

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

EXPLORING MORAL VAWES

Warren Schloat Productions, Inc.
Pleasantville, New York
10570

Copyright 1969

Featuring Dr. Louis Raths
Basic O:>ntent:

14 filmstrips containing 44 open-ended situations in the areas of pre
judice, personal values, authority and honesty. Situations covered
include titles such as "The Crippled Girl," "The Team," "The Elec
tion," "The Little Brother," "The Stranger", "Trespassers," "The
Test," "The Bully", etc.
A guide accompanies the filmstrips, containing a summary of each sit
uation and suggested questions aoo learning strategies.

Cost:

$93.00

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

FIRST TI-IINGS:

Guidance Associates
Pleasantville, New York

VAWES

10570

Based on the theoretical research into moral development by Lawrence
Kohlberg
Grade Level:

K-3

Basic Content:

The program revolves around conflict situations presented through
sound filmstrips . The situations are open ended, and deal with prob
lems suggested by the following titles:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The Trouble with Truth
What do you do about rules?
You Promised!
But it isn't yours.
That's No Fair

There are 10 filmstrips with cassettes that present the above problems,
plus 3 more that introduce the teacher to the program. Discussion
Guides accompaning each set of filmstrips.
Cost:

$21.50

for a set of two filmstrips and cassettes plus a discussion guide.
5 sets in all.

$17.50

for the Introductory set of three filmstrips with cassettes, plus
discussion guide.

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

1HE GAME OF ETI-IICS

Art Fair, Inc.
80 Fourth Street
New York, New York

Copyright 1971

Grade Level :

9-12, Adult

Basic Content:

Includes an instruction booklet, 30 human situation cards, 12 modifier
cards and 2 scoring pads. Players take turns briefly studying and
making decisions relative to moral conflict situations. After a play
er has announced his decision, the other players enter a score on his
decision (from O - absolute disapproval to 10 - absolute approval).
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When scores are announced the player may accept, defend his position
or attempt to modify. · Each game is meant to go two rounds, giving
each player a chance to test his ethics against at least two situa
tions.
Cost:

$3.00

LAW AND ORDER:

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

VAWES IN CRISIS

Warren Schloat Productions, Inc.
Pleasantville, New York
10570

Copyright 1971

Grade Level:

9-12

Basic Content:

Six filmstrips with records presenting:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The Varieties of Human Values
The Evolution of American Values
Conflicts in American Values
Strategi es for Value Change: Nonviolent Dissent
Intensified Value Conflict: Violent Dissent
Peoples Park: A Case Study in Value Conflict

A guide with the script of the filmstrips, related questions and
suggested projects.
Cost:

$96.00

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

LEARNING TO DECIDE

Educational Research Council of America
Rockefeller Building
West 6th and Superior
Cleveland, Ohio
44113
Copyright 1970
Developed by Alexander Campbell and Ralph H. Ojemann

Grade Level:

4-6

Basic Content:

The program consists of a teacher's guide containing the philosophy
of the program, step by step lesson plans and a resource section re
lated to the lesson material. There are also pupil story booklets, a
pupil workbook and a sound filmstrip.
Through many involvement activi
ties (40 for each grade) and the use of story situations the teacher
and students deal with objectives above.

Cost:

Grade 4

Grade 5

Grade 6

Teacher's Book
Pupil Material
Filmstrip & Tape

$ 4.00
1.10
17.00

$ 4.00
1.10
17.00

$ 4.50
1.10 ( consummable)
13.00

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

SEARCH FOR VAWES

?flaum/ Standard
Dayton, Ohio
45402

Copyright 1972

Developed by The Center for Learning, Inc.
Villa Maria, Pa.
Grade Level:
Bas ic Content:

9-12
The program is divided into seven units:
Unit I:
Unit II:

Time
Competition
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Unit
Unit
Unit
Unit
Unit

Authority
Personal Space
Commitment
Relationships
Images

III:
IV:
V:
VI:
VII:

The seven units are composed of 44 lessons. For every lesson there is
an activity sheet to be used by each individual student. Through the
use of these activity sheets and other activities the students examine
goals, alternatives, feelings, various values, set priorities, take
action.
Cost:

$44.95

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Educational Research C>uncil of America
Rockefeller Building
West 6th and Superior
Cleveland, Ohio
44113
Copyright 1972
Developed by Alexander Campbell and Jean Lahr

Grade Leve 1 :

7-8, 9-12

Basic Content:

The program consists of a student book and a teacher guide. The stu
dent book, using illustrative material, deals with each of the objec
tives listed above. The teacher guide includes all the material in
the student book, and in addition, suggested learnirr;i activities for
each of the units (each unit is related to one of the objectives).

Cost:

Student Book
Teacher Guide

$1.25
$2.00

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

VAWES AND DECISION MAKING

Educational Research ():)uncil of America
Rockefeller Building
West 6th and Superior
Cleveland, Ohio
44113
Copyright 1971
Developed by Dan Dyer and Alexander Campbell

Grade Levels:

7-8

Basic Content:

The program consists of a teacher guide which contains suggestions for
involving the students in various kinds of activities related to the
world of art. There is also a supplemental student booklet. The stu
dent becomes involved in value exploration while engaged in the various
art activities.

Cost:

Teacher Guide
Student Booklet (consummable)

$4.00
$ .60

Name of the Program:

VAWES AND GOALS/HOW DO YOU DECIDE

Publisher:

Educational Research Council of America
Rockefeller Building
West 6th and Superior
Cleveland, Ohio
44113
Copyright 1971

Grade Level:

9-10

Basic Content:

The program consists of a basic student text entitled values and
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Goals/How Do You Decide and a teacher guide. The guide contains
various suggested activities to be usec along with the student book.
These activities center, for the most part, about the four ways people
use to develop their value systems:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Cost: · $4 .00
$1.60

Authority
Feeling
Thinking it Through
Observation and Testing

Teacher Guide
Student Book

VALUES (a game)

Name of the Game:
Publisher:

Friendship Press
New York city

Copyright 1972

Grade Level:

4-6 (adaptable); 7-8 and 9-12

Basic Content:

The game consists of a game board and spinner. As a person lands on a
particular place, he picks a card representing a contemporary issue,
and speaks to that issue or answers questions concerning it. The one
who most satisfactorily handles the various issues and is fortunate to
get the "right" spins, is the winner. However, the accent of the game
is not on winning, but in the dialogue on the issues presented.

Cost:

$5.95

THE VAWE GAME

Name of the Program:
Publi her:

Herder and Herder
232 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

10016

Copyright 1970

Grade Level :

7-8, 9-12, Adult

Basic Content:

The program consists of two booklets, one containing directions for
playing the value game and the other various topics for discussion,
such as "Right or Wrong? How certain can we be?",
''When in Doubt,
Appeal to History",
"The Changing Environment", "Peer Groups", etc.
The main focus of the program is on the value game.
In this game,
persons listen to moral conflict situations, and then determine where
they stand on the issue.
This they do literally by moving to one of
six positions laid out on a game board on the floor. The positions
are: absolutely right, right with some reservations, wrong with some
reservations, absolutely wrong. The participants chart their various
positions on issues, and discuss them with other members of the group.

Cost:

$ .95
$1.75

The value game (directions booklet)

Name of the Program:
Publisher:

VAWES IN ACTION

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
383 Madison Avenue
New York, New York
10017
Copyright 1970
Developed by Fannie and George Shaftel

Grade Level:

3-6

Basic Content:

The program revolves around nine different problem situations, each of
which is open ended. All of the problems are of concern to elementary
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school children. They are presented via filmstrips with accompanying
records and a comprehensive Coordinator's Manual . Ten filmstrips in
all, plus three records and a manual.
Cost:

$99.00
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